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Abstract 
A law often has more than one purpose, more than one intention, and more than 
one interpretation. A meticulously formulated and context agnostic law text will 
still, when faced with a field propelled by intense innovation, eventually become 
obsolete. The European Data Protection Directive is a good example of such 
legislation. It may be argued that the technological modifications brought on by the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) are nominal in comparison to the 
previous Directive, but from a business perspective the changes are significant and 
important. The Directive’s lack of direct economic incentive for companies to 
protect personal data has changed with the Regulation, as companies may now have 
to pay severe fines for violating the legislation. 
The objective of the thesis is to establish the notion of trust as a key design goal 
for information systems handling personal data. This includes interpreting the EU 
legislation on data protection and using the interpretation as a foundation for 
further investigation. This interpretation is connected to the areas of analytics, 
security, and privacy concerns for intelligent service development. Finally, the 
centralised platform business model and its challenges is examined, and three main 
resolution themes for regulating platform privacy are proposed. The aims of the 
proposed resolutions are to create a more trustful relationship between providers 
and data subjects, while also improving the conditions for competition and thus 
providing data subjects with service alternatives. 
The thesis contributes new insights into the evolving privacy practices in the 
digital society at an important time of transition from the service driven business 
models to the platform business models. Firstly, privacy-related regulation and state 
of the art analytics development are examined to understand their implications for 
intelligent services that are based on automated processing and profiling. The ability 
to choose between providers of intelligent services is identified as the core challenge. 
Secondly, the thesis examines what is meant by appropriate security for systems that 
handle personal data, something the GDPR requires that organisations use without 
however specifying what can be considered appropriate. We propose a method for 
active network security in web software that is developed through the use of 
analytics for detection and by inserting data generators into a software installation. 
The active network security method is proposed as a framework for achieving 
compliance with the GDPR requirements for services and platforms to use 
appropriate security. Thirdly, the platform business model is considered from the 
privacy point of view and the implication of “processing silos” for intelligent 
services. The centralised platform model is considered problematic from both the 
data subject and from the competition standpoint. A resolution is offered for 
enabling user-initiated open data flow to counter the centralised “processing silos”, 
and thereby to facilitate the introduction of decentralised platforms. 
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The thesis provides an interdisciplinary analysis considering the legal study (lex 
lata) and additionally the resolution (lex ferenda) is defined through argumentativist 
legal dogmatics and (de lege ferenda) of how the legal framework ought to be 
adapted to fit the described environment. User-friendly Legal Science is applied as 
a theory framework to provide a holistic approach to answering the research 
questions. The User-friendly Legal Science theory has its roots in design science and 
offers a way towards achieving interdisciplinary research in the fields of information 
systems and legal science. 
 
 
Helsinki, 25.03.2018 
Magnus Westerlund 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 v 
Sammandrag 
En lag har ofta mer än ett syfte, mer än en avsikt och mer än en tolkning. En 
noggrant formulerad och sammanhangsagnostisk lagtext kommer fortfarande att bli 
föråldrad när den står inför ett område som pådrivs av intensiv innovation. Det 
europeiska dataskyddsdirektivet är ett bra exempel på en sådan lagstiftning. Man 
kan hävda att de tekniska förändringar vilka medförs av den nyintroducerade 
allmänna dataskyddsförordningen i EU (GDPR) är nominella i jämförelse med det 
tidigare direktivet, men ur ett affärsperspektiv är förändringarna betydande och 
viktiga. Direktivets brist på direkta ekonomiska incitament för företag att skydda 
personuppgifter har ändrats genom att förordningen träder i kraft, eftersom företag 
nu måste betala markanta böter om de finnes skyldiga till att ha brutit mot 
lagstiftningen. 
Syftet med avhandlingen är att etablera begreppet förtroende som ett viktigt 
designmål för informationssystem som hanterar personuppgifter. Detta innefattar 
att tolka EU: s lagstiftning om dataskydd och att använda tolkningen som en grund 
för vidare utredning. Denna tolkning kopplas till områdena analytik, säkerhet och 
integritetsfrågor för utveckling av intelligenta tjänster. Slutligen undersöks den 
centraliserade plattformsmodellen och dess utmaningar, för att ge tre förslag för 
dataskyddsreglering av plattformar. Syftet med de föreslagna förändringarna är att 
skapa ett mer tillförlitligt förhållande mellan leverantörer och registrerade, 
samtidigt som man förbättrar konkurrensvillkoren och därigenom tillhandahåller 
de registrerade med tjänstealternativ. 
Avhandlingen bidrar med nya insikter om förändrad integritetspraxis i det 
digitala samhället, vid en viktig övergångstid från servicedrivna affärsmodeller till 
plattformmodeller. Först undersöks integritetsregleringen och forskningen inom 
analytik för att förstå deras konsekvenser för intelligenta tjänster, vilka bygger på 
automatisk bearbetning och profilering av persondata. Möjligheten att välja mellan 
leverantörer av intelligenta tjänster identifieras som kärnutmaningen. För det andra 
undersöks vad som avses med lämplig säkerhet för system som hanterar 
personuppgifter, något som GDPR kräver att organisationer använder utan att dock 
specificera vad som kan anses lämpligt. Vi föreslår en metod för aktiv 
nätverkssäkerhet i webbprogramvara som utvecklas genom att använda analytik för 
detektering och genom att sätta in datageneratorer i en mjukvaruinstallation. Den 
aktiva nätverkssäkerhetsmetoden föreslås som ett ramverk för att uppnå 
överensstämmelse med GDPRs krav på användningen av lämplig säkerhet i tjänster 
och plattformar. För det tredje utforskas affärsmodellen för plattformar ur 
privatlivets synvinkel och konsekvenserna av "bearbetningssilon" för intelligenta 
tjänster. Den centraliserade plattformsmodellen anses problematisk både ur den 
registrerades synvinkel och från en konkurrenssynpunkt. Ett förslag framförs för att 
möjliggöra användarinitierade öppna dataflöden för att motverka centraliserade 
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"bearbetningssilon" och därigenom underlätta lanseringen av decentraliserade 
plattformar. 
Avhandlingen ger en tvärvetenskaplig analys som utgår från den 
rättsvetenskapliga studien (lex lata). De givna förslagen (lex ferenda) definieras 
genom en rättsdogmatisk metod och de lege ferenda om hur den rättsliga ramen bör 
anpassas för att passa den beskrivna miljön. User-friendly Legal Science 
(användarvänlig rättsvetenskap) appliceras som en teoriram för att ge en helhetssyn 
i sökandet av svar på forskningsfrågorna. Den användarvänliga rättsvetenskapen har 
sina rötter i designvetenskap och erbjuder ett sätt att uppnå tvärvetenskaplig 
forskning inom informationssystem och rättsvetenskap. 
 
 
 
 
Helsingfors, 25.03.2018 
Magnus Westerlund 
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I grew up with the understanding that the world I lived in was one where people 
enjoyed a sort of freedom to communicate with each other in privacy, without it being 
monitored, without it being measured, analysed or sort of judged by these shadowy 
figures or systems, any time they mention anything that travels across public lines. 
― Edward Snowden 
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1. Introduction 
In a world not long ago, the meaning of privacy was a relatively trivial matter. The 
walls of private property and personal correspondence have defined privacy. In the 
Western world, the right to privacy has been a fundamental right for a long time. In 
some countries, trespassing on another man’s private property could justify, in some 
cases, the use of lethal force to repel the intruder. Opening letters addressed to 
someone else has a maximum penalty of imprisonment in many countries. Von 
Koskull (2002) considers that the legal concept of privacy and its notions of kin 
(private life, personal integrity) are linked to historically changing socio-economic 
conditions and these notions are related also to cultural values. 
In the digital world, the word privacy has many meanings. For some, there is no 
difference between the physical world and the digital, while for others, privacy does 
not exist in a digital world, hence creating an illusion of a fully transparent 
environment. As the business world faces digitalisation challenges in adopting new 
technologies and establishing new revenue models, balancing the right to privacy 
for the individual consumer is likewise demanding. Many of the most financially 
successful online businesses employ a revenue model primarily based on delivering 
personalised advertisement on-site (Chaffey and Smith 2013). By using their service, 
a consumer agrees to be served advertisement as part of the service experience. 
Lately, however, many of the well-established service providers (e.g. Google) have 
started offering consumers the possibility to opt out of personalised advertisement. 
This is a development that has arisen from the data subject’s right not to be subjected 
to automated processing that produces legal effects or significantly affects the data 
subject (EU Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EC, art. 15). The argument against 
such a development from industry has been that the advertisement value increases 
with targeted advertisement; these are funds that can be reinvested for creating a 
better service experience. Hence, a monetary value can be assigned to the collection, 
storing and processing of user data. Companies therefore have a direct business 
interest in learning as much as possible about the data subject, which again clashes 
with the legal intention in the EU General Data Protection Regulation that “Data 
processors, as well as producers of IT systems, should design their services in a data-
minimising way and with the most data protection-friendly pre-settings” (Albrecht 
2015). Certain online service providers (e.g. Microsoft) have also launched 
subscription-based services that are advertisement free. These services, although 
primarily targeted to business users, offer the consumer an alternative to paying in 
data. However, online businesses are also giving out mixed messages in regard to 
the data subject’s rights. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, or 
Regulation) will repeal the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) (also referred 
henceforth to as Directive) and entered into force on 25 May 2016. It will apply from 
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25 May 2018. In a prioritised effort, EU officials are working on creating conditions 
for a digital single market that includes all Member States. A unified data protection 
legislation for Europe is the foundation stone in this, for Europe important, effort. 
Progress was slow and media reported Google, Facebook, and several other top U.S. 
technology firms, are using lobbyists “to relax EU privacy laws to suit Silicon Valley 
businesses” (Dembosky and Fontanella-Khan 2013). The case of Google is of 
particular interest, because few companies have been as beneficial in forming the 
Internet as we know it today as Google has. Let us consider Google’s mobile platform 
Android, the official App Store “Google Play”, and their authorisation/identity 
service. Researchers have found that 73% of Google Play’s most popular apps talked 
to low-reputation websites (those receiving a Web of Trust rating lower than 60/100) 
while 74% talked to websites containing material that is not suitable for children 
(Wei et al. 2015). The development of smartphone ecosystems with an abundance 
of context-aware apps has led to what can be seen as excessive collection of user data. 
The argument that most mobile app providers need access to the data subject’s 
personal information (e.g. call logs, contacts, photos, location) in order to use a 
service is in many cases too excessive and uncontrolled. However, all excessive 
access to user data does not necessarily start with malignant intent, but can be a 
result of poor planning. The most popular Apple IOS game (according to weekly 
statistics from the iTunes charts 14.7.2016) Pokémon GO offered two options for 
users when signing in to play the game. The player could choose between using 
either Google’s authentication service or by registering on the Pokémon website, 
which was unavailable due to an overwhelming demand. In consequence, players 
were forced to login using their Google credentials. Using Google credentials 
required granting the developer of Pokémon Go, Niantic, full access to the player’s 
account. According to a security report on the subject, this included, inter alia, the 
ability to send and read any emails, images, files, search history, or any previous 
location data the player has stored on Google’s cloud service. Perhaps the most 
negative aspect from a data protection legislation perspective is that the player was 
never informed what account rights had been granted to Niantic when logging in to 
the service in the first place1. Studies have shown that users of mobile devices are 
often unaware of how much data the apps gather, but also dislike the fact when told 
(Shklovski et al. 2014). A survey by Pew Research Center showed that 81 % of 
parents “are concerned about how much information advertisers can learn about their 
child’s online behavior, with some 46% being “very” concerned” (Madden et al. 2013, 
p. 61). In an examination of the apps in the Android App store, Google Play, it was 
found that many apps showed the behaviour of “overly aggressive communication 
with tracking websites, of excessive communication with ad related sites, and of 
                                                            
1 See security analyst Reeve’s documentation for further details, 
http://adamreeve.tumblr.com/ post/147120922009/pokemon-go-is-a-huge-security-risk, 
Accessed 14.7.2016.  
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communication with sites previously associated with malware activity” (Vigneri et al. 
2015, p. ii). In their experiment, the researchers installed 2146 popular apps directly 
from Google Play on a standard Android smartphone and consequently observed 
their traffic activity behaviour. After executing and interacting with each app that 
they had installed, they had recorded connections to almost 250000 unique URLs 
across 1985 top level domains. Official App Store providers (not only Google or 
smartphone ecosystems) may maintain a position that they give no assurances to 
consumers in regards to third-party apps. Although they all have a control 
mechanism in place for accepting apps and are often vigilant when it comes to 
certain types of content. Still, they seem close to ignorant of the privacy issue 
experienced by users of their platform. The issue of mass data collection has become 
a part of life for most smartphone and web users (Vigneri et al. 2015). Grace et al. 
(2012) categorised three problematic behaviours from analysing mobile in-app 
advertisements. 1) “Invasively Collecting Personal Information”, by requesting 
information not directly useful in fulfilling their purpose. 2) “Permissively Disclosing 
Data to Running Ads”, offering direct exposure of personal information to running 
ads, e.g. for the purpose of circumventing platform permissions. 3) “Unsafely 
Fetching and Loading Dynamic Code”, for bypassing existing static analysis efforts 
by undermining the capability of predicting or confining any code behaviour. 
Although apps and games are distributed through official App Stores, research still 
shows us that self-regulation is perhaps not enough in an environment without any 
de-facto overview (McKinnon 2014). However, it is evident that people continue to 
use the technologies and applications implicated; otherwise, the said smartphone 
ecosystems would not continue to flourish. This behaviour is referred to as the 
"“privacy paradox” where intentions and behaviours around information disclosure 
often radically differ" (Shklovski et al. 2014). 
The interesting question from a technical or legal point of view is perhaps not to 
ask why people continue using these services, although they dislike the privacy 
violations, but rather how they can be given an option of determining what is 
processed and communicated about them, while still maintaining their access to 
current virtual networks and the digital presence in general. For the purpose of 
technological and social inclusion, teaching children that if the one care about one’s 
own privacy, the child cannot play many popular games or use apps should be 
considered a discriminatory message that we strongly ought to avoid. 
Advertisement driven business models are not the issue here, however; the excessive 
collection of personal information for the single purpose of exploiting the data 
subject is seen as being in conflict with both current Directive and coming 
Regulation governing the data protection of data subjects. 
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1.1. Historical Example of Digitalisation and Regulatory 
Shaped Development, Creating a Competitive Consumer-
First Telecom Market 
In the late 1970's, the world started its digital journey, which would change the way 
we look at privacy forever. One, and arguably the first, example of digitalisation was 
the digital telecommunication switches (exchanges). Two of the more prominent 
companies in this development were Ericsson with its AXE switch and Nokia with 
its DX200 counterpart. In addition to service scaling for operators and improved 
consumer experiences, the digital telecommunication switch can be analysed 
through a privacy perspective. The digital telecommunication switch enabled 
authorised eavesdropping, through telephone tapping, on a massive scale for the 
first time in history. Although telephone tapping had been possible also earlier in 
the analogue (circuitry switched) exchange, the digital switch enabled authorities to 
perform telephone tapping through the telecom operator by automatically 
recording any calls to and from a certain telephone subscription. There was also an 
economical enabler involved. Due to the new digital telecom switch, cost efficiency 
of large-scale telephone tapping was markedly improved. The digital switch 
removed much of the manual labour in the recording process. The third enabler was 
an improved quality of service. The analogue system was often more sensitive to 
noise and as it included more manual labour it was arguably also more error prone. 
These three scaling enablers today often define digitalisation: innovative digital 
services, economics of scale and service quality. These enablers are often the answer 
to the question how digitalisation is achieved, regardless of domain. The answer to 
the question what we need digitalisation for, is data, in its various forms. However, 
the more important question why we need data recorded on everything in life, has 
a more multifaceted answer that shall be addressed in later sections. 
The introduction of GSM wireless network (2nd generation, 2G) technology 
introduced both new technology and a marked change to the ecosystem of the 
communication sector. The earlier fixed network (PSTN) ecosystem consisted of 
three main parties, manufacturers of network infrastructure, operators, and end-
users (customers). The operator often had a regional monopoly, the manufacturer 
had many customers per country, and the consumer had a limited option regarding 
provider. The GSM wireless network allotted two or more operators to make use of 
the available frequency bands that were divided by country and not region. The 
change introduced the consumer to a choice of network operator, which for the first 
time could be based on personal preferences. Eventually, in many countries, even 
allowing the consumer the option of phone number portability between operators 
(e-Privacy Directive 2009/136/EC, recital 47). This option was important, because it 
removed the last lock-in mechanism available to operators, to “force” consumers to 
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stay with them. This also indicated the regulator’s power to change market dynamics 
on its own accord. The following years were turbulent for the operators, who 
experienced a sharp increase in customer churn rates, sometimes resulting in 
eroding market share and/or revenues. For manufacturers of network 
infrastructure, the situation changed in the sense that they had fewer customers per 
country. The technical complexity of the network grew significantly as 
interoperability and co-existence between the different manufacturers of operator 
networks had to be guaranteed. This required the introduction of worldwide 
standards organisations that coordinated the work of defining common design 
requirements. The technical standards were initially developed and adopted on a 
continent basis; Europe had the GSM, and North America CDMA. Ultimately, the 
standards have converged into a global standard referred to as 4G LTE. The reason 
for GSM’s success was, in addition to the industry led standards consortium, a firm 
understanding and legislation that 17 EC Member States would adopt the common 
European technical standard in 1987. The Member States then bound their 
telecommunication operators to adopt the 2nd Generation GSM standard through 
a competitive tender.2  
This regulatory environment improved conditions for European manufacturers 
by increasing the market size, but also created an enriched roaming experience for 
European citizens. Comparing to social networks of today, the alternative for a non-
regulated wireless telecommunication infrastructure would have been that each 
operator developed their own technology that would be incompatible with all other 
operators’. This include communicating from one telecommunications network to 
the other. Such a scenario would potentially have created an ecosystem with a few 
pan-European or worldwide operators that most likely would have manufactured 
their own equipment. Such a scenario seen from a business point of view is not 
perhaps a failure of markets, but from a consumer point of view a drastically inferior 
experience. 
During the past four decades, the world has gone through a technological era 
sometimes referred to as the digital age. This era has led to a tremendous change in 
how individuals and businesses manoeuvre in daily life. Yet, across the world, 
privacy laws, which govern the operational modus for companies providing services 
to consumers, can originate from a time when the Internet was predominantly used 
in research labs and academia, if they exist at all. At the time of writing, EU Member 
State law is regulated through the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). The 
Directive was conceived at a time when commercial activities on the Internet were 
almost non-existent and the United States have yet to adopt a general data 
protection legislation. The United States currently rely on sectorial legislation. 
                                                            
2 See Eliassen et al. (2013) for an extended history of telecommunications sector. 
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Examining the original underlying network communication Internet Protocol 
(IP-layer) suggests that the Internet was originally never designed with security or 
privacy in mind. Rather the technology we now consider the Internet, was designed 
as a method for allowing as many data packets as possible, from as many nodes as 
possible, to pass through the network unhindered. Based on these technical design 
goals we can consider the Internet a complete success. For example, today the data 
packet delivery time over large distances is limited to a large extent by physical laws 
and not by technological constraints. However, the impossible task of foreseeing the 
impact of Internet on our social constructs has to a large extent directed continued 
academic research in the area, towards trying to solve the issues of security and 
privacy that the initial communication protocol stack did not consider. Arguably, 
much of this research is based on the assumption that anonymity, in its various 
forms, is achievable and desired. 
1.2. Introducing Intelligent Offerings in a World of the 
Internet of Things 
Today the Internet has become a global platform for commerce and 
communication. At the same time, the regulator has lately not been absent, but 
clearly more careful of business interests than consumer choice, compared to the 
onset of the digitalisation process. Looking forward, we can anticipate that intense 
technological progress will continue to shape new domains in our lives. It is 
predictable that, within the coming decades, this will extend to include many other 
areas, e.g. personal healthcare and home automation. These new domains will 
introduce a myriad of highly sensitive information sources, information that must 
be processed, and often stored for an indefinite and sometimes an infinite period in 
order for these areas to be digitalised. By embedding information-sharing 
electronics into everyday physical objects, we will create a “global cyberphysical 
infrastructure” (Miorandi et al. 2012).  The term often used for describing this future 
Internet vision is the Internet of Things (IoT). Internet of Things is based on 
standardised communication protocols and merging computer networks into a 
“common global IT platform of seamless networks and networked “Smart 
things/objects”” (Vermesan and Friess 2011 , p. 10). From the perspective of platform 
and service innovation, by utilising Internet of Things technology, the focus will be 
on creating intelligent services that are able to draw inferences from our own and 
other’s data. This will offer users descriptive answers, predict future behaviour and 
needs, and eventually provide prescriptive suggestions for improving daily life. 
Intelligent platforms and services are thus defined as analytics enabled platforms 
and services. 
As the development of the underlying Internet technology showed, introducing 
security and privacy measures later on is very difficult in a distributed environment. 
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Changing the IP-layer, which would potentially introduce more built-in security 
into the protocol, has been an ongoing endeavour for the past decades3. Without 
incentives to implement privacy friendly solutions, the change may not come. 
Particularly, when the companies that are the leaders of digital platforms and 
services are not of European origin, they might not share the values and ideals of the 
European society. For this reason alone, if the EU citizens and voters share the values 
of strong digital privacy rights, then enforcing them through legislation benefits 
society at large. 
As later discussed, data protection as a legal term in EU legislation considers 
personal data that is linked to a natural person. Data protection legislation has a 
foundation in the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, the Right to 
respect for private and family life.4 The article is often referred to as establishing a 
‘right to privacy’. Privacy as a philosophical term has long roots and many diverse 
definitions. Parent (1983) defines privacy as “the condition of not having 
undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others. A person's privacy 
is diminished exactly to the degree that others possess this kind of knowledge about 
him.” He highlights that the condition of privacy should be detached from the right 
to privacy. Schoeman (1984) divided earlier philosophical research definitions into 
three main branches. 1) Claim, entitlement or right to privacy. 2) A measure of 
control an individual has over data connected to himself, the level of intimacy 
(sensitivity) of such data, and who has access to such data. 3) A state or condition of 
limited access to the individual.  
The European Convention on Human Rights may grant the right for privacy, but 
understanding what this means in a digital environment, where data are collected in 
an ever increasing manner and this data are then processed tirelessly by smart 
algorithms, is important. The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
considers that achieving better respect for and safeguarding of human dignity could 
be the counterweight to the pervasive surveillance and asymmetry of power that now 
confronts the individual (Buttarelli 2015). An ethical framework needs to underpin 
the building blocks of this digital ecosystem. The EDPS opinion sets out to open up 
the discussion of what should be at the heart of a new digital ethics framework 
dealing with intelligent offerings. The thesis aims at continuing this discussion by 
elaborating selected areas important for empowering the individual and improving 
conditions for launching competitive services. As later discussed, the current 
proliferation of cloud-based ‘X-as-a-Service’ is here considered to pave the path 
towards a digital environment that enables digital personal assistants as 
                                                            
3 An early draft version of the IPv6 specification was given by Hinden in October, 1994. For 
further details, see, https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hinden-ipng-overview-00, accessed 
14.7.2016.  
4 See the European Convention on Human Rights, accessed 3.11.2017 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts/convention 
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recommenders offering decision support and eventually as expert actors on the 
behalf of an individual. 
1.3. Research Agenda 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014, pp. 123-124) make the argument that we as a 
society need to define “what we really value, what we want more of, and what we 
want less of”. In their world, technological progress cannot and should not be 
hindered. At its inception, the Internet and its related activities were considered to 
be of a free nature. Trust and practicality issues with payments contributed to an 
environment where only meagre revenues were created. Over the last decade, we 
have been able to witness a change in the generation of revenues; companies such as 
Google and Facebook are generating persistent and large positive cash flow from 
predominantly free digital services. At the core of these so-called free business 
models is that, while users are not charged money for using the service, they allow 
the service providers to process and sell information about them (McGrath 2010). 
Companies with an online advertisement based business model, like Facebook and 
Google, share their insight from collected customer data with a multitude of 
affiliated companies (Gomez et al. 2009). A monetary value can thus be assigned to 
the collection, storing and processing of user data (Smith et al. 2011). Ausloos (2012) 
argued that personal data has now become the new currency on the Internet. The 
opposing argument presented by incumbents, is that by using digital platforms the 
data subject gives permission to the controller of these platforms to use the personal 
data in order to be able to provide tailored services. Provided the service is of value 
to the data subject, the service provider owns the data (information, knowledge) 
they have synthesised by working on the personal data with their algorithms. 
At the same time, security for everyone involved is becoming ever more 
important as we over the coming decades move towards becoming a near fully 
digitised society. Security, defined here in broad terms as comprising the security of 
digital life in general, has also been afforded attention by EU lawmakers as it 
launched a Directive on Network and Information Security (NIS) (EU 2016/1148) 5. 
The regulator considers undesirable occurrences to information systems caused by 
human mistakes, natural events, technical failures, or malicious attacks, as security 
incidents. The handling and mitigation of negative effects in the case of a security 
incident are hence outlined by the Directive on Network and Information Security. 
NIS provides legal measures to improve the overall level of cybersecurity by 
enhancing cooperation, ensuring risk management practices in key sectors, and by 
increasing the cybersecurity capabilities in the Member States (European 
                                                            
5 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information 
systems across the Union. 
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Commission 2015). In 2016, Internet users were made aware of several large 
breaches that had occurred years earlier. Companies such as Yahoo and LinkedIn 
revealed that data concerning more than 1 billion accounts (Thielman 2016) and 
167 Million accounts (Hackett 2016) respectively had leaked from their systems. 
Together the NIS and the GDPR should compel companies to come forward earlier 
with data breaches. However, as the examples above indicate, once a network breach 
happens it may be detected too late with conventional passive network security 
methods. In chapter 5 we describe methods for going beyond conventional methods 
and introduce the term active network security, as to identify the paradigm shift in 
the view of network security. Section 7.2 summarise, in the form of a taxonomy, 
active network security developed on the basis of the explorative case studies in 
chapter 5.  
The primary focus of the thesis is to improve the understanding of the role that 
privacy legislation 6 plays in discovering an equilibrium for the rights of different 
stakeholders, without limiting future opportunities for developing desired 
intelligent services. Driving the regulatory development of data protection 
connected to intelligent service development, we find profiling and automated 
processing, and closely related fields such as tracking and giving consent. By 
investigating current information system literature, we determine what is meant by 
intelligent services and intelligent systems; hence, we gain a grounding in the area 
of analytics that guides the development of intelligent systems. Considering the 
broader perspective of privacy, the thesis aims to also make a contribution in what 
type of security measures should be considered adequate.  
International e-commerce implies cross-border data flows and the privacy 
challenge will therefore be to construct a global legal regime that would provide data 
subjects control over their personal data, and at the same time allow companies the 
ability to engage in trans-border data flows (Birnhack 2008; Regan 2003). 
Determining a stable globally viable state requires a broad understanding of issues 
such as IT-security, intelligent services, and scalable systems. The technical aspects 
ought to be treated as being intertwined with the legal texts and regulatory 
intentions. To understand and determine the technical challenges facing 
organisations building intelligent services and platforms in general, certain 
technical areas are examined. The selected areas are scalable system architectures, 
network intrusion detection using big data tools, and the creation of active intrusion 
defence methods. These areas provide industry with advances in securing user data, 
and thereby improving user confidence over time. However, these methods should 
not be considered as the only means of improving security, but rather provide 
industry and academia with new avenues in improving security. The GDPR (art. 
                                                            
6 The term ‘privacy legislation’ is used to indicate that there are other considerations to be 
made, than those included in the general data protection regulation, e.g. NIS Directive and 
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (2002/58/EC). 
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5(1)f) does not define the level or type of security, but states that data shall be 
“processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, 
including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing.” We can assume 
that what is appropriate will evolve over time; therefore documenting current state-
of-the-art security methods also serves a historical purpose.  
The current EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) that forms the basis for 
today’s legislation in the separate EU Member States is considered problematic 
primarily due to the fragmented adoption in national laws. A directive does not 
supersede national law, but rather sets a general rule and goals to be transferred into 
national law at the national legislator’s discretion. This may lead to a difference in 
interpretation and/or implementation between the Member States. Hence, 
contributing to the fragmentation. Therefore, to solve this problem an EU-wide 
General Data Protection Regulation has been adopted to replace the Directive. 
The reform of the data protection legal framework has been met with 
considerable discussion regarding its objective. The Regulation supersedes 
incompatible Member State law and will also influence companies established 
outside the EU if they handle personal data regarding individuals residing in one of 
the EU Member States. A regulation can be compared to a national law, but the 
regulation also binds all Member States to adhere to the same law text. Wagner and 
Benecke (2016) argue though that the GDPR will give Member States some latitude 
to enact further legislation; one such area is processing and freedom of expression 
and information (GDPR art. 85). Still, the purpose of the reform has been to improve 
the clarity and coherence of personal data protection by strengthening individual 
rights and reducing administrative formalities for companies. Writing legislation 
for an area under intense development has been challenging; although most parties 
agree that the current Directive is cumbersome to administer, it is not clear whether 
the Regulation will improve the situation. The EU Commission sped up the reform 
process considerably in 2015 by launching the EU digital single market strategy. 
From the perspective of a digital single market, the new Data Protection Regulation 
is essential when compared to the current EU Data Protection Directive. 
Nevertheless, the Regulation still lacks clarity and protection in some cases, but 
perhaps also includes a faltering rationale (Enkvist and Westerlund 2013; 
Westerlund and Enkvist 2013; Westerlund and Enkvist 2016). 
Wallgren (2004, p. 602) considered that legislation is under strain due to how 
digitalisation changes the underlying foundations of society and its interfaces to the 
digital world. He states that from a legislation point of view, the ever-accelerating 
pace of a complicated technical environment leads to “that traditional means of 
solving legal problems are becoming less efficient”. Sandgren (2000) urges the 
research community to search for new tools through an empirical legal science 
method. He finds that jurisprudence is at risk for marginalisation unless it takes on 
the development in other fields. Wallgren (2004, p. 603) considers that the 
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traditional approach to legislative development in the case of information and 
communication technology is already limited. The reason for these shortcomings of 
the traditional approach he defines to that “the IT sector tends to offer solutions of a 
complex nature and the lawmaker often encounters problems in trying to satisfy the 
prevailing demands”.  
The historical relation between the fields of Information Systems and Legal 
Science are readily observable in the digital world. Information systems theories in 
generative digital infrastructures have its origin in the field of Law (Lessig 1995, 
1999, 2006; Zittrain 2006). Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) identified three 
generative mechanisms at the core of creating successful digital infrastructures: 
innovation, adoption, and scaling. These mechanisms were considered self-
reinforcing processes that create new recombinations of resources. As user adoption 
increases, more resources are invested into developing the service and therefore the 
usefulness of the infrastructure increases. True service scaling attracts new partners 
by offering incentives for collaboration and increasing collective rewards. 
Considering that the assumption made is correct, then the theory of the generative 
mechanisms for digital infrastructure is a representation of how successful digital 
platforms are flourishing. Hence, the inferences to be made are not only 
technological but also socio-economical. 
The primary object of study is the European Union regulation for data 
protection. The legislation affecting the digital world is however based on a number 
of laws and therefore this study will consider other laws when relevant. At the core 
of current and future digital platforms and services are the privacy rights of the 
individual stipulated by privacy legislation. Therefore, the focus will be on 
resolutions for a focused view of how data subjects can be given the control of their 
digital presence. All data subjects in the EU should receive the same level of 
protection, but companies should also be able to compete on equal terms. Currently, 
incumbents can protect their business models by not allowing competitors access to 
their platform. Once a platform reaches a critical mass of users, the immobility of 
data outside the platform becomes what can be seen as a lock-in mechanism. This 
lock-in mechanism should be studied further to understand why it contributes to a 
problematic situation for the future adoption of intelligent services. 
1.4. Research Questions 
The field of study directs the research questions towards an understanding and 
improvement of legal and socio-economic arrangements, supported by technical 
augmentation. By exploring ways of interpreting the data protection legislation in 
relation to intelligent systems, I expect to achieve a deeper and more meaningful 
understanding of the complex interdisciplinary phenomena of trust for digital 
platforms and services. Trust in a social context often carries a moral value and is 
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frequently seen as a continuous function (i.e. in various levels of trust adjusted over 
time). Trust arises from the risk of being let down and without this risk, trust would 
serve little purpose. For humans and animals alike, trust enhances relationships. 
Certain activities have naturally, over the millennia’s, evolved as being most 
efficiently handled within a cohesive social group (Marsh 1994). Trust originates 
from the concept of family, both as a way to ensure that offspring survives but also 
because of self-preservation through the sharing of food. Through experience, we 
learn to apply trust of various degrees in our relations.  
In a technical context, on the other hand, trust is often defined as a binary 
representation. In network security research, we often try to classify a user either as 
malicious or good (normal). A platform or service is likewise also often considered 
either trusted or not. Examples of this thinking are, for example, ranking sites such 
as TRUSTe7 and Web Of Trust8, but also issuers of security certificates (certificate 
authority). However, this binary thinking is likely to contribute to the privacy 
paradox. One may consider a social network platform trusted when it comes to 
handling network connections and simple messages within the network. When the 
platform extends its service beyond messaging into, inter alia, news delivery, image 
sharing, payments, direct marketing, and delivery mechanisms for virtual reality, 
then it becomes difficult to discern between the initial trusted platform and a myriad 
of potentially untrusted practices. Because of the non-transparent activities taking 
place, the question of how personal data are shared and processed, and for what 
purpose becomes an issue. Ranking sites may give the platform the highest score and 
the platform may be a root certificate authority (Leyden 2017), but this offers little 
improvement to platform transparency and trust. The more artificial intelligence 
that is built into the platform and the more data sharing activities between the 
services on the platform, the more it is likely to undermine trust for the digital 
platform further. Recent research into the accountability of algorithms, although 
outside the scope of this thesis, may provide a new dimension for understanding the 
issue of trust for intelligent services (Diakopoulos and Friedler 2016). 
The introduction of cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin) are based on the premise 
that trust can be achieved through consensus, also referred to as trustless consensus 
(Nakamoto 2008). Through the use of smart contracts (a contract written in a 
programming language and executed on a virtual machine connected to a 
blockchain) that are enforced through a consensus mechanism, it was hoped that 
the risk of performing transactions would be nullified. As most interactions with an 
information system is of a transactional nature, trust would be built into any system 
utilising blockchain technology. However, blockchain technologies that implement 
the consensus mechanism are not infallible either. Experience from the Ethereum 
blockchain shows that trust is still needed both towards those that support the 
                                                            
7 See https://www.trustarc.com/  
8 See https://www.mywot.com/  
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technology through processing transactions and those that craft the contracts 
(Spode 2017). In addition, any boundary service interacting with the blockchain 
would potentially disrupt the trust mechanism if the boundary service output 
cannot be verified by the blockchain. Elimination of the transactional risk may one 
day be achieved, but for the foreseeable future, trust remains an important topic in 
the understanding of platforms and services. 
Merging the social and technological views on trust is perhaps not possible, but 
a better understanding of how to achieve an improved level of trust in the interaction 
between technology and people should prove valuable to both the legal and the 
information systems research communities. At the core of this study is the role a 
digital platform plays in facilitating said interaction in relation to the Data 
Protection Regulation. Four research questions that are intended to probe the ability 
to construct trusted digital platforms and services are put forth. 
 
RQ 1. What are relevant interpretations and ambiguities for information systems 
that can be derived from the GDPR, particularly in regards to such 
processing of personal data that leads to profiling and automated 
processing? 
RQ 2. What future technical implications can “appropriate security”, defined as 
a legal requirement for lawful processing under GDPR, entail for scalable 
information system architectures? 
RQ 2.1. With focus on security in publicly accessible software, what is a 
viable technology basis for a scalable processing architecture?  
RQ 3. What is a potential future direction for EU privacy regulation in guiding 
the continued development of digital platforms? 
1.5. Research Theory and Methodology 
Studies in information systems are often of an interdisciplinary nature and this 
dissertation is not an exception. The research field of information systems is often 
defined as an intersection of information technology, business, and data processing 
(Thomas 2005). In this study, the business dimension is defined more broadly to 
also encompass the social environment. Governed by legislation, this is the 
environment where humans, technology, and algorithms interact in and that 
companies profit from. Digitalisation causes a considerable amount of stress on this 
environment, stress that takes different forms depending on the field of view, but 
nevertheless constantly works to reshape the environment. Sandgren (2000) 
considered studies in a closed specific field to often have a tendency to try to define 
the problem so that it conforms to existing tools. For example, jurists tend to fit the 
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problem to the legal method or engineers to a solvable technical problem. He 
defined this in terms of the legal method that has its limitations in that it cannot 
deliver results for a problem, which is not taken up by positive law. To achieve 
interdisciplinary research in information systems, we should try not to limit the 
research by applying any of the individual tools provided either by other fields or by 
our own. Rather, we should critically examine our tools in order to find new ones 
that more fluidly accommodates alternative forms of knowledge production (Grover 
and Lyytinen 2015). Grounded research methods in information systems are well 
established. Descriptive or normative methods have perhaps still not established 
themselves at the same level when it comes to traditional information systems 
research. 
However, not only information systems face the challenges of methods/tools that 
do not always fit the underlying problem. The legal sciences have long struggled 
with incorporating the mitigating effects of digitalisation into law texts. An example 
that Seipel (2004, p. 31) provides is the difficulty of classifying the new information 
society related texts. He states that some traditionalists argue that IT law should be 
fragmented and only deal with specific issues involving computers. He refers to legal 
informatics as an encompassing field of view of “how rules interact with tools”, where 
IT Law is a part. This later view is also the approach followed throughout this work. 
The thesis is based on a combination of research methods from the investigated 
fields. The discourse of the thesis is largely based on methodology used in the legal 
informatics field. The reasoning behind this choice is that the study (lex lata) and 
resolution (lex ferenda) is primarily defined through argumentativist legal 
dogmatics and de lege ferenda, how the legal framework ought to be adapted to fit 
the described environment. As shown in section 1.5.1, the legal methodology is then 
extended by empirical technical case studies, as a supportive argument that was 
suggested by Sandgren (2000). For the purpose of this thesis, these empirical studies 
can be defined as exploratory case studies into various areas relevant for delivering 
a normative discourse in regards to future regulation. It is acknowledged that the 
approach is exceptional in the field of information systems. However, Wieringa 
(2014, p.35) highlights that traditionally, design science research projects have 
always taken place in a normative context of laws. The connection to design science 
is elaborated further in section 1.5.1. Also to its support, Sørensen and Landau 
(2015) sought to develop the information systems understanding of possible 
relationships between a field and its practice context. Yoo (2013) has added to the 
debate by seeking current technological developments that stretch the boundaries 
of the information systems field. In order to determine the regulatory objective and 
technological implication, the field considered as an object of study is the legal 
sources surrounding data protection.  
To regulate implies that a method is defined, and in this thesis, the regulatory 
method primarily considered is the GDPR. Råman (2006, p.30) considers that 
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regulating software and in particular secure software, require a definition of 
regulation that:  
“is ‘decentred’, i.e., diffused throughout society. A wider perspective, which 
deviates from the pure state-centred regulation, is necessary in order to 
understand the wide area of information security and especially the regulation of 
secure software development. This regulation is essentially dispersed in different 
types of self- and governmental regulation, and social norms which have similar 
and even forceful effects to secure software development. Technologies and 
methods for their development also play an important role.”  
A decentred definition adds additional ambiguity by stating that the method 
provided in the form of a law cannot be considered complete. This seems to have 
been the legislators’ intention regarding the GDPR as well, as the EU Commission 
should for example continuously monitor whether the digital landscape in third 
countries offers an adequate level of data protection, and may later introduce 
additional limitations, obligations, or opening up access to a third country. In 
concert with external stakeholders, the Commission also seeks to define standards 
for certification mechanisms and portability guidelines.  
 The sought solution in the thesis is a technorealist view that elaborates the role 
digitalisation plays in human evolution and everyday life. “Integral to this perspective 
is our understanding that the current tide of technological transformation, while 
important and powerful, is actually a continuation of waves of change that have taken 
place throughout history”.9 The technorealism principles have received criticism 
from an engineering perspective by Holmes (2003). However, what it can offer in 
jurisprudence analysis, is a middle ground between the views of techno-utopianism, 
“the belief that advancing technology will automatically bring global prosperity”, and 
neo-Luddism, “the belief that global prosperity can be achieved only by rejecting 
technology” (Holmes 2003). Holmes redefinition of the principles serves to elaborate 
the role of humanity in the design process, whereas the original work sought to 
highlight the increasing importance of daily life being determined by information 
flows and consequent algorithmic decisions. The aim of technorealism is to 
understand technology and apply technology in a manner more consistent with 
basic human values. Holmes may be correct in the sense that humans create the 
technology used today; however, the original technorealist movement identified the 
information flow as a driving force for change in our social environment. A more 
modern terminology than information flow could today be defined as big data and 
big data analytics. Depending on the view, these automatic decision-making 
algorithms today help or control the individual with anything from driving to 
shopping, and thereby affecting a change on every single individual that participates 
in using this technology. The thesis does not take a position on the moral 
implications or completeness of the technorealism principles. Rather, the principles 
                                                            
9 See Technorealism. (1998). Accessed 22.09.2017, www.technorealism.org  
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are seen as a sober view of reality and going forward they offer a view of digital social 
inclusion contra rejection of coercive persuasion. 
The population primarily considered is the European Union Member State 
residents. Their privacy ethos spans the wide range from completely transparent to 
non-users of digital provisions. The population distribution is unknown; however, 
the normative discourse must work to embrace all. Other stakeholders are also 
considered when relevant. There is no distinction made between regulator and other 
legal sub-stakeholders. However, it is worth noting that laws are passed by 
politicians and not legal scholars. Therefore, a law when passed might be formed 
with an agenda that is not evident to those writing and upholding the same law. The 
difficulty of distinguishing the role different parties play in the law making process, 
makes it necessary to treat them as one and this is also reflected in the legal policy 
discourse.  
1.5.1. Towards an Interdisciplinary Research Theory for Information 
Systems and Legal Research 
Wieringa (2014) defines design research as the design and investigation of artefacts 
in a context. He draws two separate avenues for the design research process, the first 
starting with a design problem and the second with a knowledge question. The 
former is addressed through a design cycle that focuses on problem investigation, 
treatment design, and treatment validation. In software engineering the treatment 
term is often referred to as the implementation. The other avenue, to answer a 
knowledge question requires problem analysis, research setup design, validation, 
research execution, and data analysis. Both avenues also include application of 
theory.  
Design science offers information systems research a methodology to investigate 
observed problems when developing a better understanding of mechanisms that 
exist in the interaction between the artefact and its contextual environment. The 
identification of stakeholders is important, as they often define the requirements 
that should be addressed. The requirements are also important in the validation 
process. The research methods for the individual papers are further described below, 
but the thesis as a whole takes place in the normative context of legal acts that govern 
the digital landscape, but naturally also in the context of ethics, human values, 
desires, and goals that constantly evolve with the individual and cultural groupings. 
As such, a common natural stakeholder may be difficult to define. However, I 
assume that the primary stakeholder is the lawmaker and the requirements 
presented are the legal acts and other legal tools such as norms, opinions, and court 
resolutions. Another stakeholder may be a company or individual affected by the 
legal acts. However, defining their view may be difficult to generalise. These actors 
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can be used when reflecting upon the societal effects of a particular issue or question 
and then analysed in that specific context. 
The positivistic approach would be to accept the legal acts as infallible fact, and 
an external viewpoint analysis may offer some information systems design insights, 
but minor scientific output. The external point of view here refers to the legal term 
for outside examination into a specific set of laws. Hart’s (1961, 1994) positivistic 
approach assumed instead a combination with an internal viewpoint (Holton 1998). 
As the chosen point of study is primarily external (the mechanisms of information 
systems in combination with the GDPR), a normative theory based on examining 
the problem through what can be considered a holistic approach is chosen. This 
includes the law text, other legal tools, technology, and an economical aspect 
through theories regarding platform economy.  
Mäntysaari (2017, p. 145) defines a User-friendly Legal Science theory that 
realises the qualitative approach of design science. He considers a positivistic 
approach in for example economy or analytics to be based on methodological 
individualism and a narrow view on societal reality, whereas, “User-friendly Legal 
Science has as its goal interpretive understanding, takes a holistic approach, and tries 
to describe societal reality from different perspectives.”  
Mäntysaari (2017) reflects on the difference between User-friendly Legal Science 
and traditional “law and something” legal theories10 in regards to what can be used 
as primary sources. Whereas the later often connects an external view with a specific 
primary source, the former opens up for a wide variety of sources relevant to a 
holistic description and understanding of the problem at hand. User-friendly Legal 
Science also considers the role of legal dogmatics important as it offers a middle 
ground (debate topic) between law and practice. 
In User-friendly Legal Science Mäntysaari draws parallels to the legal history 
discipline, where questions concerning how law has evolved and why they changed 
are asked. The questions are then answered through the hermeneutical circle, by 
legal historians trying to understand and describe how earlier legal systems work. 
The method theories of legal history are diverse, e.g. doctrinal study, connectivity to 
current law, societal impact, as well as statistical and economical approaches. The 
ability to choose between multiple perspectives and diverse sources are well suited 
for creating a balanced narrative, thus also rejecting legal positivism, as choices 
preceding the research reflect the researcher’s subjective values. User-friendly Legal 
Science approaches the problem similarly, by determining a holistic perspective it 
sets the goal as interpretive understanding by describing social reality from different 
perspectives. (Mäntysaari 2017, pp 137-147) 
                                                            
10 “Law and something” legal research are often based on a generic theory referred to as the 
legal method or legal science. Legal informatics can be considered such a field that 
Mäntysaari refer to as “law and something”, i.e. law and information technology. 
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Research questions in User-friendly Legal Science are still recommended to be 
sufficiently narrow, regardless of the holistic approach to answering them. For the 
purpose of an interdisciplinary thesis, User-friendly Legal Science offers a bridge 
between a fervently theory driven field such as information systems and a more 
practice and policy driven field such as legal science. An adapted User-friendly Legal 
Science theory thus offers the thesis a theory connected to information systems, 
through design science, by including relevant technical single-case studies. The case 
studies are of an exploratory nature, intended to identify single case mechanisms 
(Wieringa 2014). The thesis as a whole is therefore based on a descriptive part and 
combined with an interpretivist part that includes problem solving as suggested by 
Mäntysaari (2017, p.145).  
The evaluation for descriptive design science was characterised by Verdonck et 
al. (2015, p. 12) as  
can be done through scenarios, where the utility of the artifact is demonstrated 
through detailed scenarios, or through informed  arguments,  where  information 
is used from the knowledge base (e.g. relevant research) to build a convincing 
argument for the artifact’s utility.  
There are different legal dogmatics methods, some of which have been defined 
as argumentativist, realistic-technological, and critical legal dogmatics (Vaquero 
2013). In this thesis, these methods are mostly considered normative and 
descriptive, and are referred to in a general sense as legal dogmatics. This is in 
accordance with Peczenik’s (2005) view that legal doctrine can be descriptive and 
normative at the same time. 
To achieve a deeper understanding from an external point of view, formulated 
problems can also be studied through technical case studies. New open problems 
can be identified in this process through an iterative approach. To achieve the 
interpretive understanding in User-friendly Legal Science theory, one can make use 
of a constructivism based method theory. From the legal perspective of the whole 
thesis, using an observational method in order to explore an artefact in its 
environment offers a way to evaluate technical case studies. It should be noted that 
the information system approach to observational case studies tend to often be 
action research based. Although the User-friendly Legal Science theory is defined 
through the pragmatical school of thought, the quantitative perspective is suggested 
to be examined in individual studies, whereas the thesis as a whole uses a qualitative 
perspective. This is argued to be based on the premise that complex societal 
phenomena would otherwise be lost. The constructivist method of answering 
questions through a holistic approach and repeating the hermeneutical circle until 
sufficient knowledge is gathered to present an answer is considered the basis for 
User-friendly Legal Science theory building. Although going beyond the traditional 
scope (Law and IT) this theoretical approach can be considered well suited for legal 
informatics. Integrating the social and economic dimensions may in general 
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improve the basis for reasoning about complex concepts related to digital platforms. 
In reference to the conformity limitation identified by Sandgren (2000), User-
friendly Legal Science may offer the ability to study a phenomenon more broadly 
and thereby avoid the tendency to try to define the problem so that it conforms to 
the existing tools. 
1.6. Overview and Contribution of Papers 
The thesis includes six original research publications, published in peer reviewed 
scientific journals (3/6) and at peer reviewed conferences (3/6). The journal articles 
are from the field of law and focus on the EU General Data Protection Regulation. I 
have presented the three conference publications at international conferences. The 
topics for the conference publications have been chosen to elaborate new technical 
innovations that at the time of publication lacked academic contributions and 
understanding. The papers are presented thematically, first the law related papers 
and then the technical explorations. Table 1 shows the link between original 
publications and research questions posed. 
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Table 1 - Original publications and the research questions they address 
Publication Research 
Question 
Paper I: Enkvist, J. and Westerlund, M. (2013). Personuppgiftsskydd – 
med särskild betoning på profilering, JFT – Journal of the Law Society of 
Finland (2)2013, pp. 85-113. 
RQ1 
Paper II: Westerlund, M. and Enkvist, J., (2013). Profiling Web Users – 
In light of the proposed EU Data Protection Regulation, Retfaerd - 
Nordic Journal of Law and Justice, Vol. 36, Nr 4/143, pp. 46-62. 
RQ1,RQ3 
Paper III: Westerlund, M. and Enkvist, J. (2016). Platform privacy: the 
missing piece of data protection legislation. Journal of Intellectual 
Property, Information Technology and Electronic Commerce Law 
7(1)2016, pp. 2-17. 
RQ1,RQ3 
Paper IV: Westerlund, M. Hedlund, U., Pulkkis, G. & Björk, K-M. 
(2014). A Generalized Scalable Software Architecture for Analyzing 
Temporally Structured Big Data in the Cloud. New Perspectives in 
Information Systems and Technologies, Volume, 559, Springer. 
RQ2,RQ2.1 
Paper V: Xiang, J., Westerlund, M., Sovilj, D., and Pulkkis, G. (2014). 
Using Extreme Learning Machine for Intrusion Detection in a Big Data 
Environment, 7th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security 
(AISec14) collocated with 21st ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications (CCS14). 
RQ2,RQ2.1 
Paper VI: Paarnio, P., Stenvall, S., Westerlund, M., and Pulkkis, G. 
(2015). Active Intrusion Management for Web Server Software: Case 
WordPress, Tenth International Multi-Conference on Computing in the 
Global Information Technology (ICCGI 2015). 
RQ2 
 
1.6.1. Legal publications 
In the first publication (in Swedish), Enkvist and Westerlund (2013) examine the 
then newly proposed regulation. The work primarily deals with defining the 
terminology and understanding the scope of the proposal. In the paper, the 
interpretation primarily focuses on profiling of users. The work and insights are 
closely connected with the fourth technical paper, as I there gain an understanding 
of how massively scalable systems are to be built. The paper also connects the 
‘profiling’ term to the field of analytics and motivates the relevance of the new 
regulation. Towards the end, the paper identifies some limitations, for example in 
relation to profiling of "virtual identities". The paper is mostly based on descriptive 
methodology, by analysing positive law. 
The second publication (Westerlund and Enkvist 2013) continues with the theme 
by analysing what profiling of web users means in light of the proposal. The paper 
uses the hermeneutical circle method to identify ambiguities in the interpretation of 
 25 
the proposed Regulation. One of the identified issues with the proposal was the 
vagueness regarding what is meant by profiling that produces legal effects and what 
is meant by “significantly affects” a natural person. We also motivate further our 
previous findings from the first paper relating to the lack of protection of virtual 
identities. We highlight that often the physical identity would not be needed by the 
controller/processor for user profiling and the consequent customisation of content 
to users. 
The third publication (Westerlund and Enkvist 2016) takes place just before the 
introduction of the final revision of the proposal to the EU Parliament. As the 
proposal has matured, we study its impact on the digital platform and find that the 
legal tools required are still largely unspecified. The paper adopts a critical legal 
dogmatic methodology and our findings lead us towards asking if the rationale for 
the regulation is old-fashioned, even before its adoption. When considered through 
the theories of the platform economy, we reflect on if the regulation should have 
been formulated differently. The paper provides certain scenarios and propose 
suggestions as to how digital platforms should be regulated to improve the 
protection of data subjects. The main critique presented is in relation to the ability 
of digital platforms to create "data silos" and hence lock-in its user base. 
1.6.2. Technical publications 
The thesis also includes three technical single-case studies. The choice of topic for 
these papers has mostly been curiosity or problem driven and can be best defined as 
single‐case mechanism experiments through the design science methodology 
(Wieringa 2014). 
In the fourth paper, Westerlund et al. (2014) propose a reference design for a 
scalable processing architecture using cloud computing. We develop a prototype to 
advance the understanding of technical challenges involved in creating a massively 
parallel processing software. In the paper, we first define a general workflow for 
temporally organised data and as a solution, a component abstraction for 
generalising the insights learned from the constructed software. In addition we draw 
general security conclusions based on our design. 
The fifth paper (Xiang et al. 2014) develops a machine learning algorithm for 
performing analytics on an open-source big data platform (Hadoop). To validate the 
ability of the algorithm we analyse a common dataset used in network security. We 
show that our implementation of the extreme learning machine scales with the 
increasing of processing nodes. An insight with relevance for the GDPR that can be 
drawn from our paper is that active network security is a viable option for securing 
company data. Traditionally, using passive network security methods was 
considered enough, but this is a slow method to detect intrusions with. Thereby, 
network intrusions often result in massive data loss. Today machine learning 
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methods can be used to perform big data analytics in near real-time, and should be 
considered to be included in a company’s network security arsenal. 
The sixth paper (Paarnio et al. 2015) investigates how to improve security in the 
world’s most popular content management system, WordPress11. WordPress is well 
known for numerous plug-ins of varying quality, and as a result that often opens up 
vulnerabilities that are used to take over the service or leak data. We developed novel 
methods for WordPress called booby traps. Booby traps are implemented as an 
active defence against intrusion attacks using return-oriented programming. The 
methods may offer improved protection for zero-day attacks and the ability to 
classify certain connections, e.g. those scanning for specific plug-ins, as suspicious. 
We estimate that our methods should be generalisable to other web server software. 
The work shows that largely unexplored avenues in securing web services still exists. 
So far, the economic incentives to use this type of technology may have been 
missing, and SME companies using open-source software have often relied, perhaps 
too much, on the community to provide secure solutions. Redefining what 
constitutes state-of-the-art security, which companies need to employ in order to 
comply with the GDPR, can perhaps improve the situation and increase the needed 
funding for open-source software organisations. 
1.6.3. Limitation of Scope and Legal Disclaimer 
The research questions are constricted and the scope of the thesis is limited, though 
the traversed field is more ambiguous and broad than the typical environment 
construed in a doctoral thesis in information systems. However, I find this 
warranted in order to be able to extend information systems research toward an 
unbeaten track. The regulator (EU Commission) has set itself a lofty strategy in 
creating a digital single market, with the GDPR as what can be considered the 
fundamental regulation. The GDPR and other legislation interacting with 
technology, offer the information systems discipline a new domain for investigating 
wicked problems. This thesis is but an example of what can be researched in this 
domain. History shows us, as stated in section 1.1, that the presence of an active 
regulator requires digital innovation research to acknowledge that the environment 
is broader than only technology and economical quandaries. Definite answers are 
difficult to achieve in this area and as often is the case in any technology 
requirements documentation, the law in itself is not always self-explanatory or 
definite. Therefore, we limit the discussion to some aspects of the law and the 
defined environment.  
The Data Protection Regulation has gone through several iterations during the 
time of research. Therefore, some of the papers may refer to a situation or topic no 
                                                            
11 Based on W3 Techs ranking of content management systems, accessed 28.07.2017 
https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_management/all. 
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longer relevant. Still, this should be considered as affirmative progression, as the 
outcome of research then has had an impact. 
A doctoral thesis in legal science that reference legal sources from different 
judiciaries often derive the philosophical differences of both the judicial systems and 
the legal scholars. The author acknowledges the judiciary differences between US 
law, central European law, and Nordic (Scandinavian) law. The heritage of the 
Nordic judiciary view is self-evident in this work’s view of trust in society, individual 
freedom, and the role of state as an active participant. The inclusion of U.S. law 
scholars serves as a historical reflection on the regulatory development of cyber law. 
The individual papers or the thesis as a whole should not be considered as legal 
advice in any form. 
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Facebook is at the forefront. It's the company that can fundamentally change the way 
information is being exchanged and processed. It can be the basis for artificial 
intelligence to develop over time. 
― Yuri Milner 
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2. Evolution of Big Data Analytics Enabled 
Platforms 
Information systems may by the layman often be described as something complex, 
mysterious and to a part elitist in the sense that only a limited group of people tend 
to comprehend them. When information systems are treated as a whole, this is often 
an earned reputation. Due to the design principles often used for scalable software, 
transparency issues in the field are well known and are often reported in media as 
security incidents or design flaws (Tanenbaum and Van Steen 2007, pp.4-7). To 
comprehend the problem setting present in the new regulatory environment, this 
section presents a technological background as to provide the basis for the multi-
disciplinary research objectives and research questions. The underlying issue that 
this thesis considers is that companies are constantly compelled to improve 
turnover, and becoming increasingly data driven often allows these companies to 
improve their businesses. However, this should not automatically imply that any 
type of data processing should be allowed, or that the results produced should be 
used to the detriment of the individual. Data protection also implies that data are 
securely stored, something many companies and other institutions today struggle 
with (Takabi et al. 2010). In addition, as discussed later in chapter 3, 4, and 7, data 
protection implies that personal data can be transported freely between platforms, 
without unnecessary obstacles put in place because of business reasons intended to 
strengthen the platform’s control of the user.  
This section presents the development of fields highly relevant to the systematic 
evolution behind the data driven business model. The intention is to present the 
gradual development occurring in information systems and connecting the 
development to the GDPR. Although to the untrained eye it may seem that a 
technological revolution would better describe this change. The sections of this 
chapter that present the individual techniques and technologies show that they 
either have a history, sometimes spanning several decades, or represent a logical 
next step. The evolution observed is arguably mostly taking place in the combination 
of these technological resources. The focus is on topics considered relevant for the 
development of intelligent platforms and services. In addition, the network security 
aspect of the thesis and a link to platform economy theories are introduced. The 
chapter reviews the evolution of intelligent systems through the perspective of 
information systems and the consequent development of the analytics field as a 
driver for future development. 
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2.1. The History of Analytics  
Analytics as a field has a history in operations research (also referred to as 
management science). Operations research in turn has long traditions going back to 
first improving military operations (Morse and Kimball 1946) and later on as a 
science for taking business decisions (Ackoff 1956), such as improving 
manufacturing performance. We often see operations research and decision theory 
defined in two main branches; descriptive or prescriptive/normative. The core 
difference between these is in the definition of the data subject; prescriptive assumes 
that the subject acts rationally and that analysis of the group gives insight into the 
individual, while the descriptive assumes that the subject is irrational and requires 
analysis of the individual subject in order to gain insights into its behaviour. 
Descriptive questions in an Internet setting usually relate to earlier behaviour of the 
subject, e.g. how to cluster the individual based on products earlier viewed or on 
entered search terms. Prescriptive modelling on the other hand is often concerned 
with improving or changing a process. A typical use of prescriptive methods in this 
context relates to using optimisation techniques for improving the customer 
experience. (Delen & Demirkan 2013) 
A third type of decision model has been proposed to deal with probabilities of 
future events, namely predictive modelling. Predictive modelling being the least 
explored field of the three, has had some difficulty in finding an equal standing in 
academic research due to the intricacy of showing proof and repeatability. 
Traditionally predictive modelling has mostly been confined to linear regression 
modelling, and to some degree to nonlinear time series e.g. price forecasting of 
instruments on a market. (Delen & Demirkan 2013) 
Predictive analytics encompasses all traditional regression techniques, but also 
includes other types of analysis, e.g. Social Network Analysis (Borgatti 2009) or 
Sentiment Analysis (Liu 2010). The type of predictive question asked can be of either 
a descriptive or prescriptive nature, but focuses on what will occur in the future. The 
basis of every answer is a value, sometimes referred to as a predictor, which describes 
a forthcoming event. The predictor can e.g. be the potential of someone making a 
purchase on a web site depending on an earlier shopping pattern. Prescriptive 
analytics techniques, on the other hand, can use this probability in order to set a 
price that maximises company revenue in total, by weighing in how other subjects 
have behaved. The travel industry (airlines and hotels) is perhaps best known for 
employing these types of techniques, which, albeit still being relatively naïve, are 
used for setting a customer specific price for the transaction (Taylor 2012). 
Following is an overall classification of the primary analytical methods. They are 
also exemplified by how analytics connects to the social/technical environment 
regulated by the GDPR. As earlier stated, there are three main categories of 
analytical methods; descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive (normative). 
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Depending on the analytical task (what we want to know about a data subject), we 
can use methods from these categories either individually or in combination. The 
underlying machine learning methods may often be related or similar for all three 
categories, but the categories below are described per function of objective. 
 
 
 Descriptive Analytics – Understanding events by mining historical data, to 
look for the reasons behind past success or failure (Oracle 2012). Reducing 
dimensionality and/or compressing data by grouping actors, events, or data 
points together. Identifying relationships in data and visualising these for a 
human operator. A common service utilising descriptive analytics is a 
traditional search engine. 
 
 Predictive Analytics – Finding probable future outcomes by turning data into 
actionable information (IBM 2010). Capturing patterns and relationships in 
past data that can be used to forecast a future event by some probability. The 
assumption made is that past patterns will reoccur in a similar format in the 
future. An example of predictive analytics is the use of profiling in the travel 
industry for direct marketing. 
 
 Prescriptive Analytics – An ability to synthesise optimal decisions from big 
data, context rules (e.g. business rules), and machine learning, determining 
decision options that are as good as possible from data, rules, and modelling. 
In its original form, prescriptive analytics did not necessarily include 
forecasts, e.g. solving a scheduling problem according to a defined goal 
function (Evans and Lindner 2012). Currently, more advanced forms may 
involve both predictive functions and objective reinforcement learning. 
Examples include both optimisation and simulation of problems that can be 
defined by system rules, which are established either manually or derived 
automatically. A digital personal assistant could be classified as using 
prescriptive answers when guiding the individual. 
2.2. Application of Analytics in Industry 
Operations research focus on employing mathematical techniques, such as 
mathematical modeling, statistical analysis, and optimisation. Operations research 
arrives at optimal or near-optimal solutions to complex decision-making 
problems12. Analytics may use, but are not limited to, operations research methods. 
However, the main difference between the two is that analytics focuses on the 
scientific process of transforming data into insight for making better decisions13. 
This implies that analytics can be seen as a holistic approach for processing data, 
                                                            
12 See https://www.informs.org/About-INFORMS/What-is-Operations-Research 
13 See https://www.informs.org/About-INFORMS/What-is-Analytics 
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performing analysis, asking questions that provide insight, and finally considering 
the objective of decisions that lead to actions (Liberatore and Luo 2010). 
The terms big data analytics or data analytics (as a more general term) have today 
been adopted by industry and academia to describe the integrated use of advanced 
mathematical modelling, big data, cloud computing, service-oriented architectures, 
and decision support systems (Delen & Demirkan 2013). Analytics is used to 
describe the process of extracting relevant decisions from data (Davenport 2006). 
The potential of analytics often extends beyond the use of historical data into a real-
time setting, thereby allowing for an instant as well as automatic interaction with 
the consumer (MacMillan 2010). Analytics has also become a general term for 
describing data driven efforts to gain insights into a general process or situation 
without a direct business decision interest. Traditionally academia has used 
operations research as the term defining the interaction of data, mathematical 
modeling, and information technology in a business setting. In the following 
sections, we go through some of the important historical research branches leading 
up to the use of analytics in companies. 
In section 5.1 in this thesis we detail an implemented generalisable and scalable 
architecture for processing temporally structured data. The architecture enables the 
application of real-time analytics and the use of historical data for training models. 
The development work started in 2012, and by 2013 open-source tools such as 
Hadoop were available to perform machine learning based analytics on historical 
data, as detailed in section 5.2.  In 2017, we can consider that most multinational 
enterprises are actively investing in developing the ability to analyse each 
transaction in near real-time for each data subject, be it a person or a product. 
Analytics opens up great possibilities for companies with access to massive amounts 
of data on their users and products. Analytics will e.g. allow companies to customise 
their product assortment to better suit certain customer segments. Netflix, a 
provider of on-demand Internet streaming media, reportedly bought the rights to 
the political/adult-content drama series House of Cards after analysing the viewing 
habits of their customers and finding they correlated with the themes for the 
storyline of House of Cards (Davenport 2013). The analytical methods employed 
have a descriptive nature, i.e. finding the customer preferences from historical data. 
The way Netflix made use of the understanding can be considered a prescriptive 
service, since once the TV-series was made, Netflix were able to suggest to particular 
households a solution that viewers were unknowingly yearning for. This serves as a 
good example of the difference between utilised analytical methods and intelligent 
service design strategies. 
One of the better-known early examples of the use of predictive analytics 
described in media was how the US-based retailing chain Target deduced women 
were pregnant by analysing a change in shopping behaviour. When customers using 
loyalty cards went from buying scented body lotion to non-scented, Target tracked 
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this information, classified them as potentially pregnant, and started marketing 
products that were needed in early pregnancy to them. The insights behind the 
conclusion, that there potentially was a pregnant woman in the household of the 
loyalty cardholder, was in this case derived manually (Duhigg 2012). However, there 
is nothing holding back the automation of such insights and decisions as long as 
enough data exists and a sufficiently reliable predictor can be trained. Either 
supervised or unsupervised training methods can be applied depending on the 
required output (Enkvist & Westerlund 2013). 
The two examples of Target and Netflix both show how information about users 
can be synthesised. Pregnancy in this case can be seen as very sensitive information 
(cf. Wong 2007). Even if Target did not collect health information per se, the 
synthesis of such information, for the purpose of using it in a commercial setting 
should be interpreted as sensitive information. A similar argument can be made 
from the ECJs statement in the Lindqvist Case (C-101-01) where the court held that 
in the light of the purpose of the Directive, the expression “data concerning health” 
used in Article 8(1) thereof must be given a wide interpretation so as to include 
information concerning all aspects, both physical and mental, of the health of an 
individual. 
The Target example shows that whole households can be purposely profiled for 
revealing very sensitive personal data about someone in the household who does not 
necessarily want to share such information. The Netflix example on the other hand 
reveals that data can improve the user experience for their customers. However the 
insights may still not be suitable for sharing with the whole household. We can note 
that the service provider in the two examples may be unable determine a specific 
individual in the household to aim at. The inability to determine the exact physical 
data subject in a household and the risk of an anonymity breach by suggesting a 
revelatory sensitive insight to another individual in the same household ought to 
make such service insights in Europe questionable without gaining explicit consent 
from the data subject. 
2.3. Management Support Systems 
In a computerised setting, the use of information systems to automate the 
processing of data into (a) decision(s) in an enterprise is often performed by so-
called management support systems (MSS) (Aaronson et al. 2005). A management 
support system is based on the principles of decision theory. Decision theory states 
that an optimal solution can be determined given the values, uncertainties and other 
relevant matters for a given decision. Decision theory thereby focuses on finding the 
optimal solution for a given problem. The different types in the classification of 
analytics, provided in section 2.1, has its roots in decision theory. Bell et al. (1988) 
defines decision-making as either descriptive, normative, or prescriptive 
interactions. There are two main types of MSS that have a relevance for 
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understanding the GDPR; decision support systems (Sprague 1987) and expert 
systems (Feigenbaum et al. 1993). To condense their difference, expert systems can 
be seen as automated processing systems, while decision support systems require 
interaction with a human. We should however note that the definition of the latter 
is more ambiguous, as processing of data leading up to a proposition can also be 
automated in a way that hides the influence of any underlying parameters. This can 
be problematic in case the modelling infers any discriminatory practices. Both types 
of MSS tend to use similar methods, while the systematisation question and level of 
system autonomy may differ. 
2.3.1. Decision Support Systems and Business Intelligence 
The analysis roots in decision support systems (DSS) and business intelligence can 
be traced to the statistical (descriptive) methods developed during the 1970s and 
data mining techniques developed in the 1980s (Chen et al. 2012). Business 
intelligence that utilise a DSS has largely focused on business performance 
metrics/indicators using balanced scorecards. Chen et al. (2012) classified these 
types of systems as the first version of a data-centric approach to management. Data 
management and warehousing is considered the foundation of version 1.0. They 
state that the use of scorecards and the extended dashboards help analyse and 
visualise a variety of performance metrics. The data structures used in version 1.0 
are often relational, meaning that data is considered pre-structured and includes 
important metadata in the relations constructed. 
The following version 2.0, in Chen’s et al. (2012) maturity model, focuses on 
integrating internal business data with user-generated content. This type of user-
generated content can e.g. take the form of social interactions in web-based systems, 
such as forums or product reviews. User-generated data are often regarded to be of 
an unstructured nature. Davenport (2013) extends the definition to focus on the 
concept of big data as the key driver. He identifies the need for scalable tools that 
can handle user-generated big data in order to deliver business relevant 
insights/decisions at a moment’s notice. 
The third version (3.0) is broadly considered to be about data-enriched offerings 
were industrial companies, not just the online or information business, become 
digitalised (Davenport 2013). To enable such a development, companies will want 
to start generating data on any physical process in their reach. For example, an 
automobile manufacturer is no longer satisfied by receiving data once a year (or 
according to the service interval) when the car is brought in for the annual 
inspection to the local service centre. Rather, the manufacturer wants to monitor 
continuously any of the numerous sensors in the automobile. Still, data-enriched 
offerings go beyond monitoring. Manufacturers for example in the automobile 
industry are currently competing on who can build the safest driver assistance 
system, that makes use of sensor data in real-time. The data collection and modelling 
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approach chosen is to use data from other automobiles as well, in order to improve 
the ability of the assistance system. The assistance system can then be automatically 
updated when needed over a mobile connection. Tesla, the manufacturer who 
arguably has gone furthest in the marketing of their autonomous driving assistance 
system (Autopilot), has, according to media reports, logged over 160 million km 
with the Autopilot active (Simonite 2016). The separation between a DSS and an 
expert system in this example can be defined as the latter being implemented as a 
fully automated autopilot, were the human goes from being a driver to becoming a 
passenger. To be compliant, a decision support system which handles personal data 
and creates propositions that are acted on by a human operator, should, when 
requested by the data subject, also be able to determine what parameters influenced 
the proposition. We here consider recommender systems as similar to a DSS, as they 
also do not act on decisions autonomously either. However, considering that 
recommender systems often present options to a data subject based on personal 
data, such a system should also adhere to the regulation. 
2.3.2. Expert Systems 
In addition to being data driven, expert systems are knowledge driven. The designer 
of an expert system should understand the system dynamics so well as to be able to 
automate decision-making. Traditionally we have seen this implemented through 
two different branches: applied artificial intelligence (i.e. machine learning) (Gallant 
1993) and rule-based systems. Decision-making in rule-based systems has shown 
that fuzzy logic methods enable decision-making also with estimated values, thereby 
significantly extending the real-world application of rule-based solutions (Carlsson 
and Fullér 1996). In systems based on machine learning this often includes some 
sort of derived intelligence in terms of reasoning over an objective. Game theoretic-
based solutions have been proposed for solving the reasoning problem (for a 
network security application see Hu et al. 2017). Game theory examines the 
possibility of conflicting or optimal solutions to interrelated problems. Hence, game 
theory focuses more on simulating scenarios. An optimal solution would not be 
defined as the best solution, but rather as a good enough solution or as a better 
solution than what is currently available. Recent research into reinforcement 
learning (see e.g. Mnih et al. 2016) focuses on understanding the mechanisms in 
automatically determining multiple objectives where the relative importance of the 
objectives are not known a priori (Mossalam et al. 2016). A system able to deal with 
multiple objectives offers autonomous agents a more human-like reasoning ability. 
An autonomously driving car as in the example above, may have to choose between 
avoiding hitting an obstacle in the middle of the road or manoeuvring the car into a 
ditch. If the obstacle detected is considered an animal the response may be different 
than if a human is detected. If the probability is sufficiently high of the passenger 
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being fatally injured in the manoeuvre, then the rationality for the decision becomes 
circular and more difficult to solve. 
This latter definition of expert systems as autonomous agents, particularly with 
objectives derived autonomously, has a compliance implication for the GDPR as 
well (cf. RQ1). First, the use of automated processing of personal data, as later 
discussed, is limited. Second, agents that possess autonomously derived knowledge 
may not be under the explicit control of a controller, thereby limiting their potential 
use for personal data. A third implication may be related to the definition of 
personal data, as this is based on a direct or indirect ability of the controller or 
processor to identify a natural person. Defining an expert system as fully 
autonomous, incl. automated data processing and decision-making, may make it 
possible to argue that the legal person behind the agent is not in a position to 
determine the physical identity of the data subject, hence limiting the application of 
the GDPR. 
2.4. Machine Learning 
An important enabler for intelligent assistant systems are the models that act as 
pattern recognition algorithms. These algorithms often go under the name machine 
learning models or deep learning models. A model learns its original pattern 
recognition behaviour from historical data. The desired behaviour for the model can 
be defined by providing a target variable for each input vector. The model will then 
adjust itself to produce an output response corresponding to both input data and 
the target variable. Such model training is termed supervised learning. The opposite 
of supervised learning is unsupervised learning. For unsupervised learning, a target 
function is not provided for the input data given to the model. Rather, in 
unsupervised learning the model often strives to categorise input vectors into 
clusters of related data.  
An example of a supervised learning model is the artificial neural network (also 
referred to as a neural network). The development of the neural network has its 
history in the Perceptron developed in the 1960’s. A neural network has an input 
layer, at least one hidden layer, and an output layer. The learning method then 
attempts to find a non-linear mapping of the input vector into a high-dimensional 
feature space (hidden layer). Connecting the high-dimensional feature space to an 
output layer can then be performed through linear mapping (Haykin 2009). There 
are several types of supervised learning models, such as the Recurrent Neural 
Network, Support Vector Machine or the Extreme Learning Machine. The learning 
problems solved with supervised learning are either a regression or a classification. 
In a regression, the model attempts to reconstruct a continuous function, provided 
to the model as the predictor variable, while the classification entails a mapping of 
inputs to (a) discrete (non-continuous) output(s).  
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Unsupervised learning has its roots in information reduction techniques through 
the use of associative memory. An early example of such a model is the Self-
Organising Map (Kohonen 1981). The self-organising map finds complex 
relationships based on input features and maps these into a given number of 
clusters. An unsupervised learning technique used for training a self-organising map 
model is competitive learning. Competitive learning works by specialisation of 
neurons in the model. To distinguish two input vectors their quantified distance is 
measured and compared, e.g. using the Euclidean or Hamming distance. In 
unsupervised learning, corrections are not performed through an external process, 
as often the expected solution is not known. Conversely, the clustering output may 
contain clusters that represent information in an unsolicited manner (cf. RQ1). This 
may create the predicament that clusters are created based on personal data, which 
contain special categories of personal data, such as religion, race, sexuality, or health. 
Now the processor and/or controller may or may not know this as a fact, but this 
has a clear implication on the creation of profiles on data subjects.  
Although here described as two separate learning methods, in reality, these 
methods are often combined or mixed in the analytics workflow. The described 
models are often referred to as shallow learners, as their accuracy in tasks based on 
complex data, such as image or speech recognition, is usually much worse than what 
a human being can perform. Shallow learners focus mainly on a one layer mapping 
process between input and output. In more complex deep learning models results 
are often on par with, if not exceeding, human recognition. Deep learning models, 
such as a deep convolutional neural network, often employs both unsupervised 
learning and supervised learning techniques in combination. The unsupervised 
learning phase tends to perform feature engineering, while the supervised phase 
defines the model target. In 2012, Krizhevsky et al. won the ImageNet competition 
by reducing the classification error from the runner-up’s 26% to 15%. For this task, 
he employed a deep convolutional neural network. An important insight gained 
from deep learning models is that these types often perform better in feature 
engineering than a human being. Deep learning has also received critique for being 
computationally heavy, compared to shallow learners. Deep learning typically 
requires massive datasets to be used for properly training the models (Chen and Lin 
2014). Essentially the more data that exists the better the models’ end result tends to 
be. This demand for data is in stark contrast with the GDPR requirements of data 
minimisation and the privacy-by-design methodology. 
Another critique towards deep learning is their sensitivity to tampering. An 
adversarial attack manipulating the dataset used for training the model could lead 
to undesirable results. Research has shown that for image classification tasks, 
manipulating an image with for a human undetectable noise, means that the image 
is no longer classified correctly (Goodfellow et al. 2015). Machine learning 
techniques are also susceptible to stereotyping and bias due to the training dataset 
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(Miltenburg 2016; Danks and London 2017). For instance, when Microsoft’s Twitter 
chatbot Tay was introduced to the public it developed, through a symbiotic 
interaction, a behaviour considered racist (Neff and Nagy 2016). The GDPR requires 
companies to ensure the integrity of a data subject’s personal data. The sensitivity of 
machine learning models in regards to noise in training data (incl. adversarial 
attacks on training data) and sensitivity to symbiotic stereotyping may, inter alia, 
make the launch of personal digital assistants more difficult. To generalise, these 
two presented examples show the frailty of artificial intelligence technology imposed 
on an interconnected society that value digital privacy (cf. RQ1). Developing 
intelligent technology is not only a question of innovating, but one also needs to 
consider being compliant with a long-reaching GDPR. 
2.5. Scalable Cloud Computing Architectures 
Cloud computing can be described as a utility service in which computers, storage, 
computing power, or software, is rented virtually over the Internet. The rapid 
proliferation of ‘X as a Service’ (XaaS) type services in the cloud space have to a 
degree contributed to the commoditisation of complex information technology 
infrastructures. As an example, today anyone can create and run a supercomputer 
(i.e. thousands of linked computers) for a minimal cost when needed, without 
having to deal with the setup of the information technology infrastructure or 
develop the software needed. The ‘X’ in ‘X as a Service’ can be any type of digital 
service, which can be defined by the ability of scalability. Scalability refers to both a 
certain standardisation of service as well as to a microservice or modularity based 
software architecture. To scale horizontally means to add more hardware while 
achieving a near linear increase in processing ability. The driving force behind such 
software designs has been the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) approach (SOA 
Manifesto), which has become an industry de-facto standard for building cloud 
based, loosely-coupled “X as a Service” enabled data sharing software modules.  
The evolution of SOA has transitioned cloud architectures towards stand-alone 
microservices that improve the ability to both scale and standardise services even 
further. Lewis and Fowler (2014) compare the microservice style to the traditional 
monolithic style to better explain the differences. The monolithic application is built 
as a single unit, often as a single logical executable that runs in a single thread. Any 
changes incurred on the system involves building and deploying a new version of 
the complete system. To horizontally scale the monolith can be done by running 
many instances behind a load-balancer. The monolith instances then become 
activated based on requests coming into the load-balancer. The more requests 
coming in, the more instances are then replicated over more server hardware. 
However, once the monolith grows, maintaining a modular structure of the code, 
updating a small part of the code, or testing out new features on a subset of users 
through continuous user testing, can become frustrating. To implement continuous 
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integration and continuous user testing, both an enhanced software architecture, 
such as the microservice style, and new production tools that support the creation 
of native cloud applications are needed. A microservice achieves componentisation 
via a service that exists as an out-of-process component, which communicates with 
other services through a mechanism such as a web service request, or remote 
procedure call (Lewis and Fowler 2014). Microservices aim to be as decoupled and 
as cohesive as possible and have their own domain logic. Therefore, a microservice 
does not aim to reuse code, but rather is designed for code replacement. 
The ability to perform analytics using machine learning based models can be 
implemented using in-house developed, proprietary, or open-source software. If the 
intended use requires massive processing power, i.e. individual model training or 
transfer learning per user, then this will require a massively scalable processing 
architecture. The use of microservice frameworks can support the personalisation 
of services. However, our findings are that scalable processing architectures can be 
implemented efficiently through a generalised worker/master node architecture, 
were the master-node performs a type of scheduling duty (cf. RQ2.1).  
In section 3.1, the construction of an in-house developed scalable processing 
architecture is presented. Section 3.2, presents an algorithm implementation on 
Hadoop, an open-source based solution for storing and processing big data. The 
choice of solution may be project dependant; however, a finding from the presented 
work is that the complexity of such a processing architecture opens the software to 
an increasing number of network security attack vectors. The use of well-tested 
proprietary or open-source software may mitigate this risk; however, the use of well-
known software also requires a continuously updated software environment. The 
challenge of employing current open-source big data solutions is that they include 
a great number of bindings to various other software libraries, which may be 
demanding to keep up-to-date. As a response to RQ2 and RQ2.1, in section 3.1 some 
high-level security considerations to deepen the understanding of the complexities 
involved in creating scalable systems are also provided. 
2.6. Big Data Software Design 
Big data is often explained through the four data describing V-attributes: volume, 
variety, velocity, and veracity (accuracy)14 15. A fifth attribute, value, was added later 
to explain the value creation process in the organisation. Value is thus considered 
to arise from the ability to analyse data in order to develop actionable information 
(Kaisler et al. 2013). As previously stated, designing software that is able to handle 
big data requires a horizontally scalable system that usually resides in the cloud. 
                                                            
14 Laney (2001) introduced the first 3 V’s and IBM added later the fourth V – veracity. Other 
attributes has also been proposed, such as value, complexity, and unstructuredness.  
15 For an in-depth discussion see De Mauro et al. (2015). 
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Considering the process model for analytics presented in section 2.2 and the data 
centric V-attributes, an overview of programming related issues and considerations 
that often arise when designing big data analytics software are here presented (see 
Table 2). This section connects the technically focused sections 2.4 and 2.5, to a 
design-focused, and thereby a higher abstraction point of view, as is represented in 
the other sections in this chapter. 
As big data grows in volume, storage capacity on a single node is no longer 
enough, and may require a distributed multi-node solution. Processing power 
during the analysis phase may likely require a similarly distributed multi-node 
solution (see section 3.1 and 3.2). 
Table 2 - Reference model for typical Big Data Analytics software design issues 
 Data Analysis Insight Action 
Volume Storage capacity 
Processing 
power   
Variety 
Integration 
of data 
sources 
Data 
transformation 
Inputs 
representative  
of problem 
 
Velocity Throughput Latency  Time to react 
Veracity 
Correctness 
and 
completeness 
Outliers and 
modelling 
choices 
Do we ask 
correct 
questions 
Trust in 
decision and 
risk 
management. 
Great variation in the type of data generators often require extensive integration 
of data sources. A common design architecture is to create a master data source that 
any consequent analysis endeavour can then employ. This may improve integrity 
and thereby minimise the risk of using erroneous data. Using a master data source 
may also make it easier to utilise disparate data sources, but to succeed master data 
may require a massive governance organisation. Data of different types often involve 
data transformations dependent on the analysis context and models utilised. During 
the insight stage, effort must be given to determine if data types are representative 
of the question at hand. 
A relatively new problem in academic settings is how to deal with data streams. 
Velocity has traditionally not been a research problem for operations research, as 
the data primarily used has been at rest. Data throughput is often measured as the 
data amount that can be stored per a given time in a database, but within real-time 
analytics this data must also reach processing nodes. Once processing nodes 
completes the analysis, latency needs to be smaller than the throughput frequency 
(rate measured in transaction/time interval). If latency is higher than the throughput 
frequency it leads to lags in the system or the input resolution can be reduced, e.g. 
through compression. 
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The veracity of a management support system is naturally of paramount 
importance. However, in big data analytics this may rather be expressed as a 
probability statement. If the chance to be correct is greater than being wrong, it 
might be enough to take a certain decision, particularly if the downside of being 
wrong is small and the benefits of being right is comparatively greater. When it 
comes to the quality of big data we have to assume that input data has a certain level 
of correctness and completeness, but the great number of samples may make up for 
certain inconsistencies in quality. Pre-processing of data is often the most time 
consuming step in creating analytics software and may sometimes require 
estimation of missing values and correction of input errors16.  
During analysis, veracity needs to be studied both in regards to the modeled data 
and to the type of model chosen. To achieve true insight we need to ask the correct 
questions. Any action developed based on this insight needs to be either logically or 
factually sound. In performing real-time analytics, we measure validity continuously 
and not only during training or testing. Depending on the area and solution, we may 
also have to perform risk management continuously. 
The development of big data analytics enabled software solutions has mostly 
been driven by the existence of massive unstructured datasets. Analytical systems 
have recently received a great deal of attention from academics, open-source 
community, as well as industry (see e.g. Begoli 2012; Fox 2012; Valvåg et al. 2013). 
In addition, standardisation steps in big data analytics have been taken (Ghazal 
2013). An initial seminal paper published by two Google researchers, Dean and 
Ghemawat (2004), laid out a software architecture for data processing called 
MapReduce. The paper discussed an approach for introducing an abstraction to deal 
with complexities arising from the need to massively parallelise a processing task 
over hundreds or thousands of nodes. The researchers realised that many of the 
processing tasks involved in constructing a search engine could be summarised to 
two main operations. The first operation is a mapping of logical data (relevant 
records from the input) to a key/value pair. Then a reduce operation, were each 
value that shares a key is combined, is performed. The approach is influenced by 
various functional programming languages that have a similar map and reduce 
approach for single node processing. The benefit with the MapReduce programming 
model then becomes that it decomposes data into smaller pieces, which are then 
processed on the network hosts in which they reside, instead of moving the data 
pieces to other network nodes for processing. This type of programming model can 
be considered one of the fundamental technical principles for implementing 
scalability in data processing. The programming model is particularly suited for 
processing unstructured or semi-unstructured data, where content lacks a strict 
                                                            
16 For an approach to estimate missing data see e.g. Sovilj et al. (2016). 
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schema defining the data model; often suggesting that input data can be 
decomposed without a negative effect on the processing output. 
In the case of structured data, section 5.1. presents an alternative cloud 
computing architecture that allows horizontal scaling using spatio-temporal 
structured data (Westerlund et al. 2014). One of the challenges using spatio-
temporal structured data is when data needs to be processed both in batch (at-rest) 
and in real-time (stream data). Dependencies introduced early on in the process 
workflow need to be accounted for in process stages later on. The inspiration for the 
software architecture came from grid computing, but through utilising cloud 
computing resources. When designing our architecture, we defined a design 
requirement that any processing (both batch and real-time) had to be performed 
using a unified processing architecture. During the model training workflow, we 
used data at rest, while in prediction mode we could use both at rest and real-time. 
Real-time data can have different definitions depending on the context. In a cloud 
environment, we often define real-time data as either a segment or an event. The 
difference is that a segment stores a small data buffer of a certain size before it is sent 
to processing. The size can be determined based on a time limit or amount of data. 
On the other hand, event driven often infers that data are sent to processing as soon 
as the system receives the data. There are certain technical reasons for using a buffer, 
such as reducing overheads and improving latency. For this reason, many of the big 
data analytical tools such as Hadoop and Spark mostly use a segment based 
processing model. Since our design goal was to design an event-driven model, we 
chose a star topology as a network architecture, instead of the mesh-driven network 
topology used in most other big data tools. The star topology binds the data model 
to the worker node while active, which may have a detrimental effect on node reuse 
times in truly massive environments. This occurs because a new data model must be 
loaded each time the node needs to be repurposed. The star-topology on the other 
hand also allows a dedicated processing environment, were a designated node can 
with small overhead, continuously listen for new events in real-time, and thereby 
avoid some of the latency issues that might arise otherwise. In a real-time processing 
environment, our implementation considers the worker node as the solitary handler 
of a specific responsibility. 
One added benefit from our architecture is that we can isolate data per processing 
node. This can be considered to provide the system controller with a more fine-
grained access control to potentially personal or sensitive data. The fine-grained 
access control can be applied to both user access and to model access. Model access 
here refers to models that are certified being ethically designed and approved. This 
discussion and the response to RQ2 and RQ2.1, continues in chapter 5.  
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2.7. Platform Economy 
The Internet was started on what can be considered idealistic goals such as openness 
and free services. The rise of the global tech behemoths over the last decade may 
have changed these ideals and the nature of the Internet permanently. The platform 
economy as a theory for explaining how companies employ the network effect to 
their competitive advantage, has gained wide academic support (Hagiu and Altman 
2017). The role of platforms in building the Internet enterprise is also becoming 
increasingly evident. Platforms have been instrumental in changing consumer 
behavior and are also opening the way for radical changes in how work and value 
creation is being organised (Kenney and Zysman 2016). They can change industries 
that have been closed and sometimes heavily regulated, for example the 
telecommunication industry as later discussed. The early work of Cusumano and 
Gawer (2002) showed a clear tendency that successful technology companies often 
acted in symbiosis on several levels with other successful companies. In particular, 
they highlight the interconnectedness between companies such as Microsoft 
(software), Intel (hardware), and Cisco (network) in creating the PC-platform and 
how each company supports their own complementors, “companies that make 
ancillary products that expand the platform’s market”. Rochet and Tirole (2003) 
emphasise the price discovery process for multi-sided markets and find two 
different price structure approaches. The early game console platform market 
employed a model financed by the seller side (game developers), to be contrasted by 
the opposite model that is consumer financed in the PC-market. Parker et al. (2016) 
highlight a third alternative price structure, whereby consumer generated data is 
processed and then sold forward to third parties (e.g. to data stores or marketers) in 
a refined form. Gawer and Cusumano (2014) consider there is strong evidence 
pointing to that the platform tends to shape industries through the interaction 
between companies and users. 
Parker et al. (2016) defined this interaction between users (both individuals and 
companies) on the digital platform as a transaction. When a new platform market 
can be introduced to an industry, it will likely open the industry to the threat of new 
competitors. Kenney and Zysman (2016) has argued that platforms will become a 
core organising principle for a new economy. The platform economy is often 
defined as a result of a market that is created through the facilitation of transactions 
between market participants. Emphasising the difference to a technological 
definition, which focuses on the platform as an intermediary fabric for delivering 
various types of data. The price structure Parker et al. (2016) described has become 
the standard model for offering “free services”, where consumer generated data are 
processed and then sold forward to third parties in a refined form as payment for 
the use of the platform. The incentives for establishing the platform then become 
closely related to the ability of utilising massive computing resources for the purpose 
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of gaining an understanding (insight) of the users and then conveying this 
information to other market participants willing to compensate the platform owner 
for gaining access to this user base.  
As defined in section 2.2 the ability of gaining insight through analytics can be 
classified into three main categories. The analytics categories can be connected to 
the platform through the type of insight they offer and what monetary value/return 
a company can hope to achieve by using them. Descriptive insight may offer the 
smallest monetary value, while prescriptive insight has the potential to change 
customer behaviour and is thus the most coveted form. Predictive insights can 
certainly also influence customer behaviour, but it is more focused on earlier 
behaviour than creating new experiences. If the aim of the future digital platform is 
to create monetary value for its owner, then it will likely be driven towards offering 
prescriptive insights. 
The challenge of creating prescriptive insights is that the data needed should 
encompass the life of the individual, and not only in relation to the current 
event/process that is being evaluated. Providing someone with complete access to 
all data regarding the individual extends the data protection question beyond that 
of lawful processing to the construction of systems with guaranteed data security, 
something that today may sound like a utopia. Still, some may argue that as long as 
the processing is done in the best interest of the user of a “free service”, then it causes 
no harm. Related to this is the discussion around who owns user-submitted and/or 
created data through profiling (the encapsulated model insight). Platform owners, 
as will later be shown, have made very few concessions regarding ownership or 
ability to process data. As the incentives until now have only been geared towards 
processing any data stored on the platform, many, and among them the European 
Commission, have considered that self-regulation in the sector is not enough, and 
thus anyone found violating the GDPR face considerable fines, up to €20 million or 
4% of global annual turnover, whichever is the greater. In response to RQ3 we will 
continue the platform discussion in chapter 6 and 7. 
2.8. Summary 
The aim of digital platform companies is to create an interaction between users and 
users, and users and customers (companies). This interaction leads to an 
accumulation of data that can be transformed into insights through the use of 
analytics. We here refer to the term analytics as a technical synonym for processing 
used in the legal text of the GDPR. Analytics may include process steps from storing, 
extracting, transforming, and loading, to model training, validation, execution, and 
maintenance. In the construction of intelligent services, analytics also has a great 
importance for the human-computer interaction. In section 2.3, the connection 
between management support systems and the GDPR is highlighted (cf. RQ1). The 
potential use of fully automated decision-making expert systems is limited by the 
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regulation. In addition, machine learning algorithms, particularly those trained with 
unsupervised learning or reinforcement learning methods, may also expose the 
controller (owner) to additional GDPR compliance risks. The difficulty in 
determining the behaviour of these types of algorithms should not be considered 
leading to a lessened accountability.  
The practical use of analytical systems typically require them to be scalable. One 
important factor to become scalable is the ability to grow the processing 
environment when required, and shrink the environment when resources are no 
longer needed. To achieve this elasticity, a public cloud is often used. This solution 
opens the system to new network and data security threats that need to be mitigated 
(cf. RQ2.1).  
The thesis defines the aim of analytical services as descriptive, predictive, or 
prescriptive. Prescriptive services have the potential to change consumer behaviour, 
thereby offering great revenue enhancing possibilities to companies that are able to 
build such services. Because of this, companies will ultimately pursue the creation 
of prescriptive services. To create insightful prescriptive services, companies will 
need to access as much data as possible regarding a user. Introducing IoT into the 
home will in time digitise any personal experience occurring inside the walls of 
private property. The GDPR highlights the importance of data minimisation and 
privacy-by-design, the clash between the technological and legal views are obvious. 
Regulating digital platforms is certainly important if we want to remain private in 
our own homes. However, anticipating the challenges is very difficult (cf. RQ3).  
Research in network security is progressing, but immense practical challenges in 
securing information systems still remain. The use of open-source software has 
likely raised the bar for security, but it has also introduced new challenges (cf. RQ2). 
Broadly speaking, perhaps an overreliance on built in software security in open-
source software exist today. An increasing amount of software bindings and the 
introduction of lightweight microservices, which can easily be deployed by almost 
anyone in the organisation, may reduce that security barrier going forward. 
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Why should it be that just when technology is most encouraging of creativity, the law 
should be most restrictive? 
― Lawrence Lessig  
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3. Data Protection Legislation 
The following chapter introduces some important legal concepts regarding the Data 
Protection legislation. The regulation includes many amendments of the Data 
Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and therefore the directive is briefly introduced. 
The Regulation also includes completely new legislation to ensure modern data 
protection while still maintaining a strong business environment in a unified 
Europe. The reader should note that the regulation has undergone a revision 
process, which consequently have introduced changes. The GDPR text used is the 
consolidated version referred to as (GDPR 2016)17, signifying that some additional 
insertions (e.g. recitals) and numbering changes has occurred in the adopted text. 
3.1. EU Legal Acts Relevant to the Digital Landscape 
As the digital landscape has matured, the Regulator has introduced a set of legal acts 
that may affect a service or platform provider. These acts can be categorised into two 
main groups; sectorial and wide-ranging. An example of a sectorial act in the EU 
can be found in the health care sector18. Wide-ranging acts, such as the GDPR, 
establish a common practise for operating standards and what can be considered a 
minimum of respect for the rights of the weaker party. The raison d’être of EU law 
has been to bring together the economies of the Member States. For this purpose, 
the EU Regulator has different instruments at his disposal. In this thesis, primary 
sources such as regulations and directives are considered. Other primary sources 
referenced are previous court decisions and motivations behind a decision. 
Secondary sources that are relevant for the technology field are working groups, 
standards, and communiques that aim to find common practise and a measure of 
self-governance.  Other secondary sources referenced are the work of legal scholars. 
The debate over whether to have a general data protection legislation or a specific 
abuse-based legislation, was mostly conducted during the introduction of the data 
protection directive in the 1990’s, but still continued in some countries until the 
early 2000’s19. This coincided with the introduction of the Internet to the general 
population. At the time the Member States demanded that they be able to specify 
                                                            
17 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 
XXX/2016 of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation). 15039/15, consolidated text of the General Data Protection 
Regulation as an outcome of the final trilogue on 15 December 2015. Can be accessed 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15039-2015-INIT/en/pdf last accessed 
12.08.2017. 
18 EU Regulation on Community statistics on public health and health and safety at work (EC 
1338/2008) 
19 For a historical perspective focusing on the Swedish experience, see Öman, S. (2004). 
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the specific conditions governing the lawfulness of data processing in their national 
law. One reason for this may have been that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
only became legally binding in 2009, only after this all Member States guaranteed 
their citizens personal data protection as a fundamental right (Charter (2000/C 
364/01) art. 8). In passing the Directive, the EU Parliament called for the Member 
States to strive to improve the protection currently provided by their national 
legislations. The data protection directive was introduced for dealing with an 
increase in international trade among EC countries and the consequent transfer of 
personal data. However, already then it was foreseen that a directive might become 
problematic, as the national legislation differences would have an effect on the 
movement of data within the Community, and thus leading to disputes and 
ambiguity over whose legislation should be abided by20.  
Some countries (e.g. Sweden (Datalagen SFS 1973:289)) had a long tradition of 
legislation dealing with automated processing. Efforts considered prior to the 
Directive had also been performed at OECD in 1980 to create international 
guidelines. However, without an enforcement mechanism they were considered 
mostly ineffective (Boyd 2006). In 1995, the European Council and Parliament 
adopted the directive with a strong link to the United Nation declaration of human 
rights (privacy of correspondence)21 and the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market (Boyd 2006).22 Member States were required to enact national 
legislation by 1998. 
3.1.1. Other legal acts influencing the digital landscape 
In addition to the general data protection legislation, other relevant acts that 
influence the digital landscape exist. As they further the understanding of the 
Regulators intention in connection to security and tracking, their scope is shortly 
summarised below. 
The Directive on privacy and electronic communications (2002/58/EC), also 
known as the e-Privacy Directive, mainly concerns the electronic communication 
networks regulating confidentiality and treatment of traffic data. This directive was 
later amended by what became known as the Cookie directive (2009/136) that 
introduces changes to how tracking information is collected. At the time of writing, 
the EU Commission has given a proposal for an e-Privacy replacement, this time a 
regulation. The replacement regulation is considered needed to handle new types of 
                                                            
20 See the data protection directive, recital 9. 
21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Part I, at 
71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). Article 12 states: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honour and reputation." 
22 For a historical and comparative study between USA and EU regarding privacy from a 
legal standpoint, see Boyd (2006) 
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communication applications and corresponding meta-data, simplify tracking 
consent, protection against SPAM, unifying the national adoption, and a 
harmonisation in regards to the GDPR23. 
The Directive on Network and Information Security (2016/1148) applies primarily 
to defined infrastructure (operators of essential services) and certain digital service 
providers. The intention of NIS is that it should not place additional burden on small 
and medium sized enterprises but rather be a recommendation for dealing with 
security and security incidents. It should be noted that the handling of security 
incidents involving personal data or sector-specific data are further specified in, for 
example, the GDPR. Incidents are defined as any event having an actual adverse 
effect on the security of network and information systems. Enterprises that fall 
within the definition of the directive and thus must fulfil its obligations are operators 
of essential services, such as energy, water, transport, banking, financial market 
infrastructures, healthcare, and digital infrastructure. Some of the requirements 
defined under NIS are preventing risks through appropriate technical and 
organisational measures, ensuring IT security appropriate to the risks, and handling 
incidents to minimise impact. (Pulkkis et al. 2018) 
3.2. Certain Relevant General Data Protection Definitions 
The Regulation has certain limitations in applicability. To understand these 
limitations, definitions of some central terms are provided in the sub-sections 
below.  
3.2.1. Personal Data 
The definition of personal data is highly important because it states whether the data 
protection legislation is applicable or not. Personal data is characterised as only such 
data that can be linked to a natural person (i.e. an individual’s physical presence). 
Any other type of data is not relevant from a legal perspective when it comes to the 
GDPR. Accordingly, the GDPR should not be considered to provide protection for 
legal persons such as companies.  
The regulation defines personal data as any information related to identifying a 
data subject. The physical person thus becomes a data subject if data related to the 
natural person is processed. Personal data thus receives a wide definition in the 
regulation: 
'personal data' means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person 'data subject'; an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, online identifier or to one or more factors 
                                                            
23 See EU Commission communication, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/proposal-eprivacy-regulation last accessed 09.08.2017. 
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specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity of that person. (GDPR 2016, art. 4(1)) 
An earlier version of the GDPR (2012/0011 (COD)) defined it differently, as 
“means reasonably likely to be used by the controller or by any other natural or legal 
person” to identify the data subject. Both definitions raise several questions about 
what type of data or information, as stated in the definition, is classified as such. The 
design implications due to these issues are discussed in section 4.1. 
There are two sensitivity classes defined for personal data; normal and special 
categories. Special categories of personal data include, inter alia, data related to 
criminal convictions and offences that may only be processed under the control of 
an official authority or when the processing is authorised by Union law or Member 
State law. A register with data on criminals and their corresponding convictions has 
a specific requirement that it may only be kept under the control of an official 
authority. Other special category definitions are genetic data, biometric data, and 
data concerning health.  
Genetic data represents data relating to the characteristics of an individual that 
have been inherited or acquired, which give unique information about the 
physiology or the health of that individual, particularly resulting from an analysis of 
a biological sample from the individual in question (GDPR 2016, art. 4(10)).  
Biometric data denotes any data resulting from specific technical processing 
relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual 
which allows or confirms the unique identification of that individual (GDPR 2016, 
art. 4(11)). Examples are facial images or dactyloscopic (fingerprint) data. It is 
however important to understand that an image of a face is by itself not considered 
biometric data. Facial images will only be covered by the definition of biometric data 
when being processed through specific technical means allowing the unique 
identification or authentication of an individual (GDPR 2016, recital 41). 
Data concerning health signifies data related to the physical or mental health of 
an individual, also including the provision of health care services, which reveal 
information about his or her health status. 
In addition to the described special categories of personal data we find racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, and trade-union 
membership (GDPR 2016, art. 9(1)). Considering a use case when personal data 
needs to be archived, then the recommended approach, where possible, is to first 
protect data through pseudonymisation. Pseudonymisation of personal data entails 
the transformation of data so it can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject 
without the use of additional information. A possible key that can be used to 
transform data back to its original form ought to be kept separately and subjected to 
technical and organisational measures to ensure non-attribution to an identified or 
identifiable person (GDPR 2016, art. 4(3b)). An incident with the security of 
personal data is referred to as a personal data breach. Security is here denoted as an 
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encompassing term to define any type of incident with personal data. A breach of 
security leading to “the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, 
unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored, or 
otherwise processed” is denominated as a personal data breach (GDPR 2016, art. 
4(9)). Required measures to be taken once a personal data breach is detected are 
further specified in the NIS (chap IV and V) and in the GDPR as a notification 
requirement.  
3.2.2. Processing 
As stated earlier, data becomes personal data only when the said data are processed 
with the intention or ability to identify a natural person directly or indirectly. This 
definition suggests that data, when viewed in its natural unstructured form by a 
human being, may not be automatically considered personal data. Nor will such data 
therefore fall under the protection of the Regulation. Processing steps are defined as 
the means of: 
any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of using those data 
to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to 
analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, 
economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, 
location or movements. (GDPR 2016, art. 4(1)) 
Processing of such personal data that is considered belonging to a special 
category by parties such as employers, insurance and banking companies, should 
not be performed (GDPR 2016, recital 42b). To limit the effect of technological 
progress and the risk of circumvention, the Regulation should be considered 
technology agnostic. This also suggests that simply adding a manual step in the 
process does not limit the data subject’s protection for personal data. Provided that 
data are collected for storing purposes with the ability to henceforth indirectly 
identify the individual, it is considered to fall under the Regulation. In recital 13 
(GDPR 2016), an exception to this rule is specified in the case a file or set of files are 
processed where data are not in a structured format in regards to a “specific criteria”. 
Such a file can e.g. be assumed to be any web page or document that consists of 
unstructured text. This exception can be considered to permit the search engines to 
index all publicly available web pages as long as no storage of ordered data that fall 
under the definition of personal data occurs. There are also considerations that limit 
the exception. As was highlighted by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in the case Google vs AEDP and Costeja (Case C‐131/12)24, an individual’s 
fundamental rights may be considered over the general public’s interests (see section 
4.3 in this thesis for a methodical case analysis). In a case where personal data are 
                                                            
24Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario 
Costeja González. (2014). Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Case C‑131/12.  
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transmitted outside a certain Member State, the term cross-border processing is 
used to signify either that processing takes place in several Member States or is likely 
to substantially affect data subjects in several (≥2) Member States. 
3.2.3. Actors 
Several actors that require definitions exist in the Regulation. The term actor is here 
used for the purpose of identifying an entity involved in a specified role in the 
process. The data subject has already been defined indirectly as the natural person 
who is identified by the personal data in question. The controller is someone who 
determines the purpose and means of processing of personal data. The controller is 
also the original collector of data subject consent. A controller is defined in the 
regulation as following: “…natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data…” (GDPR 2016, art 4(5)).  The definition of the 
controller is similar to the definition in the Directive, although in the revision 
process the word “conditions” has been considered. The original proposal stated 
“purposes, conditions and means of the processing”. That “conditions” was deleted 
from the proposal can be related to the complexities of defining all conditions in a 
cloud environment that is controlled by some third party and sold as a service that 
employs virtualised hardware. A processor is defined as follows: “…[n]atural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on 
behalf of the controller.” (GDPR 2016, art 4(6)) This definition is equivalent to the 
definition in the Directive. In case a controller uses an external processor, it should 
be the controller’s responsibility to verify that the processor handles the personal 
data as predefined through the purposes and means of processing. The processor 
cannot redefine the purposes or means of processing. This is often accomplished 
through a service level agreement that also ought to stipulate what can be done in 
regards to personal data. Once personal data has been processed and the result is 
disclosed to some party, this party is referred to as recipient. The recipient is not 
necessarily a third party, but can also be the data subject, the controller, or the 
processor. The third party is then defined by the “persons who, under the direct 
authority of the controller or the processor, are authorized to process the data” (GDPR 
2016, art 4(7a)). 
Children receive a stronger protection than other data subjects in the Regulation. 
The controller has the responsibility to determine if a child is the intended data 
subject. In such a case, the processing is only lawful with the consent of the parent. 
A data subject is determined to be a child below the age of 16, or a Member State 
defined age no younger than 13 (GDPR 2016, Art. 8). The use of personal data of 
children for the purposes of marketing, creating personality or user profiles, and the 
collection of child data when using services offered directly to a child are 
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discouraged, but lawful if consent is obtained from a parent (GDPR 2016, recital 
29). 
3.2.4. Lawfulness of processing 
The regulation puts forward several principles to determine the lawfulness of 
processing for private enterprises. The controller should process personal data in a 
transparent and fair manner in relation to the data subject (GDPR 2016, art. 5 (1)). 
To achieve lawfulness in processing (GDPR 2016, art. 6(1)), we can categorise the 
options as fulfilling one of the following requirements: 
 
 Through consent by the data subject, 
 
 for the performance of or in anticipation of a contract between the data 
subject and another party, 
 
 through legitimate interests of a controller or other party that may provide a 
legal basis, 
 
 in the public interest (see section 4.3.). 
In addition to these categories, personal data can be processed if authorised by 
public authorities for reasons of safeguarding a democratic society. Lawfulness 
through the consent of a data subject is the recommended principle to follow and 
the only principle that receives an explicit definition in the regulation. Consent 
means “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of his or her 
wishes by which the data subject, either by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, 
signifies agreement to personal data relating to them being processed.” (GDPR 2016, 
art. 4(8)). The consent agreement can be achieved in any type of statement; however, 
the controller may need to produce evidence of such an agreement at a later stage. 
There is a requirement that the data subject needs to actively accept such an 
agreement and therefore silence or pre-ticked boxes do not constitute consent 
(GDPR 2016, recital 25). Asking for the consent should not be unnecessarily 
disruptive to the use of the service, as to discourage users from declining consent. 
The user should also be able to refuse or withdraw consent at any time without 
detriment (GDPR 2016, recital 25 & 32). For consent to be considered freely given, 
it must allow separate consent to be given to different data processing operations 
(GDPR 2016, recital 34). For processing of special categories of personal data, the 
data subject should in general give explicit consent (GDPR 2016, Art. 9 (2) point a).  
Processing of personal data can also be based on the performance of a contract 
or in anticipation of the data subject entering into a contract (GDPR 2016, Art. 6 (1) 
point b). A contract is not defined in the GDPR, but can in the digital environment 
be assumed to be linked to the provisioning of a service to a user. We can assume 
that the processing on many platforms are done using a combination of contract 
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and consent (cf. Facebook Terms of Service25), where the contract establishes 
lawfulness and consent is sought as a secondary assurance. In this case we may 
assume that the consent agreement in practice is obsolete and that contractual 
autonomy is considered to fulfil the right to self-determined data processing (Moser 
2016). The contract is a legally binding and enforceable agreement with specific 
terms between the data subject and other entities, in which there is a promise to do 
something in return for a valuable benefit known as consideration (Contract [Def. 
1]). In the digital space a contract is established based on the initiative of the 
controller, if there is no other legal requirement. For digital services, this means a 
contract is often of a unilateral nature. A unilateral contract is a promise by the 
offeror to pay or give other consideration in return for actual performance by the 
offeree (Contract [Def. 1]). However, a contract does not necessarily require that a 
monetary transaction is performed between the data subject and the controller for 
the use of a service. A contract defines the following factual elements:  
a) an offer; b) an acceptance of that offer which results in a meeting of the minds; 
c) a promise to perform; d) a valuable consideration (which can be a promise or 
payment in some form); e) a time or event when performance must be made (meet 
commitments); f) terms and conditions for performance, including fulfilling 
promises; g) performance. (Contract [Def. 1]) 
The e-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC, amended by Directive 2009/136/EC), 
defines contracts for public communications services (art. 20). The directive 
requires, inter alia, that a contract should state that: 
details of prices and tariffs, the means by which up-to-date information on all 
applicable tariffs and maintenance charges may be obtained, payment methods 
offered and any differences in costs due to payment method;  
When the consumer subscribes to services providing connection to public 
communications services, consumers have the right to a contract with the company 
undertaking providing such services. As this is a Directive, and each Member State 
implements separate legislation, it has led to some confusion regarding its scope. 
The e-Privacy Directive applies to companies offering electronic communications 
services, e.g. telecommunication companies, but in most cases exclude information 
society services (Aldhouse and Upton 2015). However, if a company is defined to 
belong to the category of providing public Internet communications services, then 
the contract should clearly state any prices and tariffs, including payment methods. 
Should payment be performed through the collection and processing of user data, it 
stands to reason that a specific and detailed charge and/or value, is determined for 
any services rendered. In extension, this ought to be considered for any digital 
service offerings through terms of service specification. This would be a key 
facilitator for consumer choice and effective competition in a competitive market 
                                                            
25 Facebook Terms of Service as of 30.1.2015, Accessed 22.09.2017, 
https://www.facebook.com/terms. 
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for digital services. Being able to withdraw from a contract for lawful processing, 
based on informed consumer choice, such as understanding the true cost of using 
said service, should form the basis for giving consent.  
Several types of legitimate interests to process personal data not explicitly defined 
in the GDPR art. 4 exist. A public authority can be considered to act with legitimate 
interests when enforcing the rule of law. Scientific or historical research, as well as 
archiving, can also be seen as legitimate reasons (GDPR 2016, recital 125). 
Particularly social and health sciences receive a broad mention where combining 
registers and performing longitudinal research can reveal important results that 
justify the processing of sensitive data (GDPR 2016, recital 125aa). A company can 
also have legitimate reasons to process personal data when it comes to protecting its 
vital interests, which is necessary for the establishment, exercise, or defence of legal 
claims. Such examples can be utilisation of active network security methods or 
securing intellectual property rights. The former may include anonymised traffic 
meta-data. The latter example can arguably allow the intellectual property rights 
holder to collect network IP-addresses of users that are sharing material thought by 
the said holder to infringe on its rights.  
3.2.5. Automated Decision-Making and Profiling 
Whereas processing refers to the complete process of handling personal data (any 
operation), automated and specific processing regarding the individual over time is 
referred to as profiling. As such, profiling of data subjects is regulated further than 
processing. The regulation defines profiling as meaning “any form of automated 
processing of personal data consisting of using those data to evaluate certain personal 
aspects relating to a natural person,”. Examples of profiling provided in the law text 
are “in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's 
performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, 
reliability, behaviour, location or movements” (GDPR 2016, Art. 4 (3aa)). The law 
text separates the terms profiling and a broader automated decision-making action. 
The main difference can be seen as the term profiling is mostly used when 
processing is done for a predictive or prescriptive purpose, e.g. direct marketing 
where continuous tracking of the individual is the basis of the analytical decision-
making for future needs. Tracking of data subjects can for example be done by 
recording the physical location of the subject, used IP-addresses, storing cookies in 
the browser environment, device fingerprinting, or recording other behaviour or 
attitude-related data. These methods are often used in combination to improve the 
ability to follow the subject more closely. According to art. 15 in the Data Protection 
Directive, every person has the right not to be subjected to automated processing of 
personal data. An almost identical rule has been taken into the Regulation (GDPR 
2016, art. 20). The right not to be subjected to automated processing covers only 
measures that produce legal effects concerning the person, or which significantly 
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affect the person. If the automated profiling produces legal effects concerning the 
data subject or significantly affects the data subject, it requires consent from the data 
subject concerned (Bygrave 2001). In addition to consent, there is a requirement for 
suitable technical safeguards to prevent any potential abuse. The Commission is 
empowered to further specify the criteria and conditions for suitable safeguards. 
3.3. Summary 
In relevance to RQ1, chapter 3 outlines the applicability of the GDPR and the 
processing of personal data. Processing refers to the complete process of handling 
personal data, from the collection to any decision-making. Profiling refers to a 
specific part of the processing procedure, namely the analysis or prediction of 
aspects concerning a natural person's performance based on personal data. 
GDPR recommends as a minimum precaution that personal data be 
pseudonymised before being stored, particularly if data are stored long-term. Where 
possible, the controller should try to anonymise data belonging to a special category. 
This implies for example that such traffic meta-data that is not needed for service 
personalisation, but where data can be used at a later stage for some other purpose, 
should be anonymised (cf. RQ2). The method difference refers to anonymisation as 
the aim of irreversibly preventing the identification and pseudonymisation as the 
replacement of any identifying characteristics of data with a pseudonym (Data 
Protection Commissioner 2017). Provided the source data are deleted, irreversibly 
anonymised data are then no longer considered personal data. Several researchers 
have questioned the effectiveness of these privacy-by-design methods and have 
shown that de-anonymisation attacks can re-identify the data subject (e.g. see 
Wondracek et al. 2010; Narayanan et al. 2012; Ma et al. 2013). 
The classification separation between both normal and special categories of 
personal data may at times result in difficult design choices. For example, an image 
is considered under special categories when used for identification and/or 
authorisation, while in documenting a care story the same image may be considered 
personal data. Assuming the data subject has manifestly made the image public 
outside the immediate family, the system may in some cases be allowed to process 
the image at its own discretion (Pulkkis et al. 2018). 
Anonymised genetic data offers another challenge, because if the physical link to 
the data subject is removed, then the genetic data should be relatively free to process. 
Still, de-anonymisation can perhaps not be performed by using a secondary register, 
but as long as the individual is alive, a secondary register exists. If the individual at 
a later stage permits a secondary genome sequencing, a link to any processing of the 
first sequencing, may be performed. Additionally as the genome is heritable, any 
offspring may also be identified at a later stage. Consequently, it stands to reason 
that genetic data should always be treated as personal data. A partially similar 
argument can be done in regards to biometric data. 
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Determining lawfulness of processing and to subject a natural person to 
automated decision-making through profiling, is regulated in the GDPR. 
Management support systems (see section 2.3) that are using personal data will 
consequently be affected (cf. RQ1). Decision support systems that allow a human 
operator to interact with decision algorithms may fulfil the requirement that a data 
subject has the right not to be subjected to a fully automated process that uses 
personal data. The use of expert systems (e.g. automated intelligent agents) which 
produce legal effects that concern the natural person or significantly affects the 
person is limited by the consent of the data subject. The data subject shall at any 
time be able to understand the use of automated decision-making and be able to 
revoke the consent for the use of such automated decision-making. 
As the centralised governance model is the common manifestation of the 
platform today, this is discussed in section 2.7. In Enkvist et al. (2017) we discuss 
the application of a decentralised platform, which is governed through the 
decentralised execution of smart contracts on a blockchain (cf. RQ3). Although 
someone has to construct these smart contracts, their execution is fully autonomous. 
The question then becomes if the data subject wants to exercise his right not to be 
subjected to autonomous decision-making, who should become an operator, or 
whether the decentralised blockchain platform is unlawful, provided that it is 
handling personal data. Autonomous software and platforms designed on the 
principals of “code is law” (Lessig 2000) can thus be seen as problematic from the 
consent seeking GDPR, thus we can assume that the lawfulness can best be achieved 
through contract. The Ethereum blockchain is often considered an example of the 
“code is law” principals (Filippi and Hassan 2016). In a decentralised system, there 
may neither be a central power with the ability to insert individual transactions as 
this requires consensus nor a single point or node of failure (Raval 2016). In the case 
of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, the GDPR is only applicable if the natural 
person can be identified. The Bitcoin wallet address is public and any transfers to or 
from the wallet can be tracked. For example, once a traditional bank account is used 
in transferring funds into the wallet, the physical link can be determined by the 
facilitator of said transfer. Still, this information is not necessarily public, nor is the 
data linking the wallet address to a bank account published on the blockchain. Thus, 
we can assume that the Bitcoin blockchain itself does not fall under the GDPR. The 
omission of protection for virtual identities is further discussed in sub-section 4.2.5. 
However more advanced use cases and developments of blockchain-enabled 
platforms presented by Honkanen (2017), show that personal data may in the future 
be stored on the blockchain. This development will be interesting from the 
perspective of decentralised business models and their compliance to the GDPR.  
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We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be 
done.           
― Alan Turing 
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4. Regulatory Design Implications 
The Regulator has emphasised that the Data Protection Regulation should be 
technology agnostic, thereby hoping that technological progress should not directly 
render the law invalid. From a technological perspective, obstructive legislation that 
hinders the development of new technology should be avoided. Instead, we should 
always strive for a law text that allows for diversity in technology and digital services.  
The following chapter examines the legislation from the design perspective of 
information systems. Interpreting the challenges the legislation transposes on 
information systems and determining the limitations in scope of the legislation is of 
interest to both the information systems researcher and system creator alike. The 
intention is to deepen and thereby connect the earlier discussion in chapter 3 with 
technological aspects often encountered in the design of information systems and in 
particular intelligent services. I intend to achieve this through detailed examples 
(use cases) of chosen areas and link up with core themes in the Regulation, regarding 
aspects of automated processing. 
4.1. Personal Data 
Over the years the definition of personal data has raised some important questions 
concerning what is covered by the definition. Some guidance in connection to this 
was already given in Recital 26 of the Data Protection Directive. A category of data 
that has been extensively discussed with regard to whether it is covered by the 
definition of personal data or not is IP addresses, especially dynamic IP addresses. 
The Article 29 Working Party26 has been arguing that not only static IP addresses 
should be considered personal data, but also dynamic IP addresses should fall under 
the definition (Article 29 Working Party 2007). This point of view has also been 
taken in the Regulation. The Regulation has much of the same wording as the Data 
Protection Directive, but in the Regulation online identifiers have been added to the 
text (GDPR 2016, Art. 4(1)). The original proposal considered that online identifiers 
as such are not necessarily to be considered as personal data in all circumstances 
(draft Regulation, Recital 24). In the GDPR (2016) this ambiguity has been removed.  
An important question relating to the definition of personal data is how the word 
identifiable should be interpreted. To be identifiable it has to be possible to identify 
a person, which suggests that the meaning of the word includes some grade of 
probability (Vaidya et al. 2006). The Data Protection Directive and the Regulation 
does not implicitly give any guidelines regarding how big the possibility has to be. 
It has been considered that a mere hypothetical possibility to single out the 
                                                            
26 Article 29 Working Party has an advisory status to the EU Commission, acts 
independently, and is mostly composed of Member State data protection supervisory 
authorities. 
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individual does not fulfil the requirements, though (Article 29 Working Party 2007). 
Recital 23 of the original Regulation stated that account should be taken of all the 
means reasonably likely to be used, either by the controller or by any other person, 
to identify the individual. This was criticised for being unclear (Westerlund and 
Enkvist 2013). What is reasonably likely to be used can differ from situation to 
situation. A mere hypothetical possibility to identify a person is not enough. The 
deciding factor is what kind of means will likely be used to identify persons. One of 
the most important factors deciding what the means are for identifying a person will 
be based on a cost-benefit analysis by the processor (Article 29 Working Party 2007). 
Technical development can also change the situation regarding what is reasonably 
likely to be used. New techniques and technology may make it much easier to 
identify persons (Costa and Poullet 2012). Therefore, the definition of a data subject 
is not static; it will change over time alongside the technical development. In the 
GDPR (2016), the term 'reasonably likely to be used' has been removed. This 
suggests that the burden of proof is still with the controller, but now the controller 
is e.g. no longer evaluated against its peers or technology in general, but rather in its 
own capacity. 
Both the Data Protection Directive and the Regulation make a distinction 
between common personal data and special categories (sensitive) personal data. 
Processing of sensitive personal data, e.g., race, ethnic origin, religion, health and 
sex life, is in principle prohibited and is only allowed under certain exceptions. 
However, the Regulation does not give an answer to which category such sensitive 
data that have been derived through processing of common personal data belongs. 
Using combinations of data-processing techniques makes it possible to create such 
information that can be regarded as sensitive. This information does not need to be 
labelled as e.g. race and religion, but rather as a cluster of people that belong to 
unspecified groups. It may be possible for a processor to correlate this synthesised 
information with data belonging to special categories, if this data can be accessed, 
but in most cases e.g. visiting a place of worship at a particular location or weekday 
is already a strong enough indicator of religion and in some cases race. With regard 
to a strong protection of data subjects, such derived information should be 
considered to be sensitive, and therefore allowed only under certain exceptions (De 
Hert and Papakonstantinou 2012). Hildebrandt (2009) goes further, arguing that no 
differentiation between data and sensitive data should be made, because highly 
sensitive information can be inferred from seemingly trivial and anonymous data. 
This is also very much in line with the view of this thesis. Insights gained during 
profiling should always be considered as potentially sensitive (cf. RQ1). Synthesised 
data and eventual decisions made based on these insights should therefore require 
an explicit consent from the data subject. In the construction of information 
systems, this should thus influence design choices, as automated decisions 
concerning a data subject must be transparent. When employing machine learning 
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algorithms that are by nature non-deterministic, particularly such algorithms that 
are not provided a goal (e.g. unsupervised learners), there is an imminent processing 
risk that needs to be communicated. 
4.2. Profiling and Tracking data subjects 
Profiling and tracking are among the most important tools a company or 
professional (e.g. a marketer) can employ to understand and anticipate the 
customer’s needs. At the same time, these tools can be used to exploit a data subject 
against his will. For example, with the help of profiling marketing professionals can 
target tailored and behaviour-based advertising to individual recipients, i.e. 
personalised marketing. The transition to the digital society has made us leave an 
increasing number of electronic footprints behind us. With the help of these 
footprints, detailed profiles of individuals can be drawn up. Earlier, both the 
technical infrastructure and the high cost were a barrier for the development of 
detailed profiles of data subjects. The transition from centralised IT-architectures to 
scalable and distributed solutions, such as the MapReduce-model by Google, has 
removed the obstacles concerning infrastructure. As discussed in section 2.5, 
scalable architectures in principle make it possible to scale out the calculations 
horizontally, merely by adding more hardware. In addition, the high cost of 
preparing detailed profiles has been minimised due to the development of cloud 
computing and the possibility to rent virtual hardware. Recently, the development 
of so called 'Analytics as a Service' has lowered the cost barrier further, as the 
employment of advanced models can now be performed without first having to 
develop costly software in-house. 
In the subsequent sub-sections, the discussion focuses on some of the 
technological implications of the GDPR (cf. RQ1). The intention is to develop an 
interpretation of the GDPR in order to understand the limitations and ambiguities 
in implementing such processing of personal data that leads to profiling and 
automated processing. The analysis of the law text is not intended as a critical or 
negative examination, but rather as a way to determine how analytics developers 
should understand the text.  
4.2.1. Consent 
The definition of consent in the Data Protection Directive (Art. 2(h)) has led to 
various interpretations in different EU Member States. Some Member States, e.g. 
Finland, accepted that passive behaviour fulfils the definition of consent in the Data 
Protection Directive. According to the Article 29 Working Party, passive behaviour 
should not be seen to be in accordance with the word “indication” (Article 29 
Working Party 2011). For processing of sensitive personal data, the Data Protection 
Directive (art. 8) requires that the consent is explicit.  
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As highlighted in sub-section 3.2.4, several provisions for achieving lawful 
processing exist. The definition of consent in the Regulation demands that consent 
must be explicit to the purpose of processing. Consent for processing common 
personal data and sensitive data therefore have the same requirement of consent. In 
Recital 25 of the Regulation it is expressly stated that silence or inactivity do not 
constitute consent. The requirement of explicit consent does not mean that the 
consent has to be given in written form (Lynge 1995). It is possible to give explicit 
consent e.g. by ticking a box on a website. A significant change was inserted in the 
original Regulation (art. 7) that consent shall not provide a legal basis for the 
processing when there is a significant imbalance between the data subject and the 
controller (cf. RQ3). Bräutigam (2012) considered that platform companies like 
Facebook would find this particularly problematic to achieve. In the second public 
draft the text had changed, and in the third draft of the proposal this article had been 
deleted. However, in GDPR (2016) Article 7 has been re-inserted; when assessing 
whether consent is freely given, account shall be taken of whether the provisioning 
of a service is made conditional on the consent for the processing of data that are 
not necessary for said service. Recital 34, was again amended to include the 
following interpretation: 
In order to safeguard that consent has been freely-given, consent should not 
provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case, 
where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller 
(GDPR 2016). 
That consent shall be freely given means that there shall be no constraint or 
pressure on the person giving his or her consent (Solove 2013; Cleff 2007). There 
has to be a real possibility to give consent or not for the data subject. The 
requirement of freely given consent shall not be interpreted to prevent for example 
websites from using some kind of consequence(s) for a person who does not give 
consent. For example, charging a small fee for using the service when no consent 
has been given, while persons who have given consent can use the service for free, 
should be interpreted to fulfil the requirement of freely given. If a refusal of consent 
prevents a person from using the web service, it can be argued that the requirement 
of freely given consent is no longer fulfilled. This particularly concerns incumbent 
platform companies like Facebook and Google, who can be considered to be in a 
dominant market position in their respective domains. Another particular category 
of companies is those that provision services to children exclusively or 
unexclusively. 
As mentioned earlier, both the Data Protection Directive and the Regulation 
make a distinction between common personal data and special categories personal 
data. This raises the question whether one given consent can be interpreted to cover 
both categories of personal data (cf. RQ1). A consent given for processing sensitive 
personal data may in some cases be considered to cover also processing of common 
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personal data. For sensitive personal data the consent must be made specific to the 
processing task and therefore if that task also includes processing of common 
personal data it should be seen as valid. Consent given for processing common 
personal data should not be considered to cover sensitive data. If the controller 
will/can synthesise sensitive personal data from the common personal data, then the 
data subject ought to give an explicit consent to this as well.  
The data subject has the right to withdraw his consent at any time (GDPR 2016, 
art. 7). To be effective, this rule should require controllers and/or processors to 
uphold a web page or similar service, in order to inform the data subject what he or 
she has given consent to. This becomes even more important for platform 
companies, which uphold a diverse set of services (RQ3). Otherwise the data subject 
will have great difficulties withdrawing each consent given to every single party and 
altering this consent at a later stage. This should not mean that a service provider is 
required to employ an identification and authorisation service for users, but it can 
also be based on other tracking mechanisms utilised by the controller. This will 
thereby let the data subject review what is currently known of him, what he has 
consented to, and the possibility to remove specific consents. Hence, if the controller 
has stored a cookie (or uses any other mode of tracking that involves storing data) 
on the data subject’s device and this identifier is linked to a consent agreement in 
the controller’s service, then the data subject must be given a way to review or amend 
this information. 
4.2.2. Profiling 
By employing profiling, the advertiser for example is capable of sending the 
recipient tailored advertisements. As earlier stated, according to the Regulation 
(GDPR 2016, art. 20) a person has the right not to be subjected to a decision (e.g. 
based on profiling) that is based solely on the automated processing of data, 
provided it is not needed for fulfilling a contract. The Right is linked to the outcome 
of such processing; because it only applies if legal effects are produced concerning 
the person or otherwise significantly affects the person. What defines “to be 
affected” is not explicitly determined. For instance, if the automated profiling 
produces a suggestion to view certain material on a web site, will the user then 
always be affected (cf. RQ1)? The assumption should be that any measure taken to 
influence the subject in some way, based on automated processing, requires consent 
from the data subject concerned.  
According to art. 17 in the Regulation (GDPR 2016), the data subject has the 
right to require the controller to erase all personal data on himself. Even if it is not 
stated clearly in the Regulation, this could be interpreted in a way that the data 
subject has the right to require erasure of profiles built through profiling (RQ1). It 
is important for data subjects to be aware of the results of profiling, in other words 
to be able to object to profiles they do not find appropriate. Art. 11 in the Regulation 
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also emphasises the importance of transparent information. The information 
relating to the processing of personal data must be in an intelligible form and consist 
of clear and plain language. 
4.2.3. Defining the processor of client-side profiling 
The revision of the HTML standard enable developers to create web applications 
that resemble native applications both in responsiveness and persistence 
capabilities. The HTML5 (2014) and forthcoming HTML5.1 recommendations 
bring with them a fully-fledged local storage capability for a client application 
running in the browser. The recommendations add three new technologies 
(Application Programming Interfaces, API) implementing offline support for web 
applications27, namely Service Workers (Russel et al. 2016), Web Storage (Hickson 
2013) and Indexed Database (Mehta et al. 2012). The Service Worker is a generic 
handler for event-driven background processing (incl. offline) in the client 
application that responds to events dispatched from documents and other data 
sources. A system for managing installation, versions, and upgrades is provided. 
Web storage will give the developer access to a key/value-like data structure that can 
be set to exist for only the session or to be permanent. The web storage technology 
resembles and to some degree substitutes, the use of cookies, but it can be considered 
more robust. The Indexed Database API allows for more complex and indexed 
object data structures to store large amounts of data in so-called object stores. The 
browser will limit access from client applications to data originating from within the 
same domain (sandboxing). The client-side sandboxing neither limits data transfers 
on the server-side nor client-to-client, provided this transfer mechanism is built into 
the service. It should be recognised that the utilisation of these storage technologies 
should require consent or a contractual agreement from the user, as they currently 
can be considered bound by the e-Privacy Directive art 5(3) when used for tracking 
purposes. In particular, this should apply to services that allow several users of a 
device access to the same account and the data connected to the account. A platform 
or service should always strive to ensure that data are protected from other users of 
the same device, before initiating tracking and/or profiling (cf. RQ1 & RQ3). 
This new technology unlocks the possibility of building rather advanced web 
application clients. An example is email clients in the web browser that store all 
email data locally; the client can also store many other types of user statistics, e.g. 
search keywords, likes, and any other platform-related feature. Assuming that the 
service provider implements a direct marketing profiling system directly into the 
web client. The system would allow the provider to target advertisements to the user 
by using personal data, sensitive or not. Accessing only locally stored data and 
processing the data only locally and then simply fetching a certain class of 
                                                            
27 The browser creator can choose to implement support for some or all APIs. 
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advertisements, opens the definitions of controller and processor in the Data 
Protection Regulation to interpretation.  
A provider who distributes an application that uses client-side profiling can be 
argued to fall within the definition of a controller (cf. RQ1 & RQ3). The service 
provider determines the purposes, conditions, and means of personal data when the 
application is being distributed. However, the situation is not that clear after the 
system is stored locally. Once the system is stored locally and the processing of data 
proceeds only locally, without the insight of the controller, there could be ambiguity 
regarding whether the controller still determines the purposes, conditions and 
means of the processing. However, it would not be reasonable to interpret the 
Regulation in such a way that the controller would be free from obligations once the 
system is stored locally.  
Processing has been given a very broad definition in the Regulation. Client-side 
profiling will without doubt fall inside the definition of processing. In client-side 
profiling, the processor would be the data subject himself. It is not clear whether the 
definition of processor in the Regulation, also covers the data subject. There are, 
however, no expressed restrictions in the definition, whereby even the data subject 
should be interpreted to fall within the definition of processor. On the other hand, 
the aim of the regulation is to protect data subjects, and a contract between the 
controller and processor will always be required (GDPR 2016, art. 26(3)). Therefore, 
to interpret data subjects as processors would, to some degree, contradict the general 
aim of the Regulation. Consequently, if a processor cannot be determined, it is 
unclear whether any party holds the obligations of the processor. The example 
shows there is still a need for a clearer definition of the term processor. In this case, 
if the processor’s obligations are not with the controller, it suggests that any sensitive 
information can be used for profiling purposes, provided that the controller does 
not hold the means for identifying the natural person. Therefore, client-side 
profiling as a technological solution for improving data security, should be strived 
for (cf. RQ2).  
Although client-side profiling is here described by implementing it in the web 
application, it can also be implemented in the browser directly or in a browser 
plugin, as well as in any device application. The reason we chose to describe client-
side profiling as a web application is due to the simplicity, it can be done by anyone 
providing a web presence, signifying that a user only has to visit the web site, while 
the other examples require the user to download and install software first. In the 
example, when the user visits and loads the web page for the first time, the 
application logic and required data structure schema is transferred at the same time. 
Afterwards, each time the user communicates with the web service, all processing 
and profiling can occur in the client. Real-time browser-to-browser communication 
capabilities with a new communication protocol called WebRTC have been 
proposed (Bergkvist et al. 2017). This potentially enables synchronising personal 
 72 
data between the web clients of the data subjects without a central storage node 
provided by the service provider. Considering then that the service provider, i.e. 
controller, no longer is performing the processing (incl. storing data), nor is a third 
party involved, we can argue that the controller cannot determine the physical 
identity of the individual. As stated earlier, being able to identify the physical 
identity of the individual directly or indirectly, is a prerequisite for the Regulation 
to be applicable.  
4.2.4. Tracking of users 
Tracking users on the Internet can be performed in many ways. The topic of using 
different types of tracking mechanisms have been extensively debated in both legal 
and technical literature (e.g. see Enkvist-Gauffin (2006)). The practise of tracking 
users has also received a lot of attention from EU lawmakers and is regulated in the 
Directive on privacy and electronic communications (e-Privacy Directive 
2002/58/EC; 2009/136). A significant change brought by the e-Privacy Directive was 
the requirement of prior consent before storing information (tracking mechanisms) 
on the device of a user (art. 5(3)). Enkvist-Gauffin (2006) considered the prior 
consent requirement as an opt-in mechanism, were users had to give consent prior 
to tracking being initiated. The e-Privacy Directive does not however define a 
tracking mechanism per se, but a broader storage procedure, as it is defined as that 
“to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal 
equipment of a subscriber or user” (recital 66) requires consent. Nowadays, state-of-
the-art techniques employ more advanced methods for tracking, as storing cookies 
on a device is not reliable enough and cookies are easily deleted by the user. Cookies 
can still be a part of tracking, but as the modern user is no longer confined to a 
certain device, service providers want to be able to identify the individual among the 
myriad of devices. This can be done by using a combination of techniques, but at its 
centre is often a global social media platform that requires the user to log in to its 
service (cf. RQ3). When the user identifies himself to the social media company, 
they become able to track the user, even if the user exits from the said service, when 
browsing other sites that use the tracking software developed by the 
aforementioned. Typically, tracking is done through the implementation of social 
network widgets. This way user activity can be traced in terms of the user’s browsing 
behaviour. 
The way users were traditionally tracked was by recording the IP-address, but as 
the use of mobile broad band increases, using IP-addresses has become an unreliable 
method. Instead, software developers have created a browser (device) fingerprint 
from various other identifiers describing the machine (e.g. installed browser fonts 
or plugins). Although the browser fingerprint is not considered stable in the sense 
of giving a unique identifier in all cases, it is still considered quite reliable when 
combined with other techniques such as location segmenting (e.g. based on client 
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time-zone or IP owner) (Eckersley 2010). As the browser environment changes, the 
user installs new fonts or plugins, the browser fingerprint is no longer the same. 
Then other methods can be used in combination to detect that it is still a known user 
to the service provider. Regarding smartphones, when a user installs an app, then 
each sub-sequent usage session of the app can be used to uniquely identify the same 
device. The app may also access a unique identifier for the device, which can be used 
server-side to link a user’s behaviour between two or more apps using the same 
technology. 
As stated earlier, if a company uses IP addresses to track users it is usually 
considered to be an identifier that can be used to identify a natural person, and is 
therefore protected by the Regulation. The same applies for cookies or other 
information being stored on the device for achieving a tracking ability of an 
identifiable natural person. However, direct marketing or price quoting on the 
Internet often have little interest in identifying the natural person, the interesting 
part is the online behaviour of the data subject. Considering the volume of data 
amassed on data subjects, the velocity of staying updated and the data variety 
describing users, as big data often is defined (Laney 2001), it is no surprise academics 
consider big data challenging from both a privacy and an integrity point of view 
(Krasnova & Kift 2012; Kaisler et al. 2013). The definition of tracking methods is 
broadly defined in the e-Privacy Directive, as a tracking ability. So the main focus is 
on whether the situation with tracking fulfils the definition of data subject. As 
mentioned earlier, the definition of data subject is an identified natural person, or a 
natural person who reasonably can be identified. In the definition of data subject, 
some particular factors which can enable such identification are also pointed out. 
The factors mentioned in the definition are identification number, location data, 
online identifier, or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person. This means that 
different types of tracking techniques must be considered to fall within the scope of 
the Regulation, including the browser fingerprinting.  
4.2.5. Protecting the innocence of children when using information 
services 
An additional concern regarding tracking is how the service provider can detect that 
children use a certain device. In families, it is often common that everybody in the 
household uses the same user account to browse the web. When it comes to tablet 
operating systems, they do not necessarily offer an obvious or easy way for families 
to separate the usage patterns of adults and children. Children deserve a specific 
protection of their personal data. This is emphasised in recital 29 to the Regulation. 
Children need specific protection because they are less aware of risks and 
consequences in relation to the processing of personal data. According to Art. 8 (1) 
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(GDPR 2016), the processing of personal data of a child is lawful only if consent is 
given or authorised by the child’s parent. The controller must make reasonable 
efforts to obtain verifiable consent. An example of such a process is that the child 
chooses to install an app that will process personal data on the phone, but before 
being able to complete the process a parent must first consent to the processing. This 
requires the parent(s) to link their phone account to the child’s, before installing the 
app. There will be significant problems for tracking services to detect whether the 
user is a child or an adult when it comes to tablet operating systems. The example 
provided above will also require the parent to be a smartphone user or at least 
digitally inclined as to solve it some other way. Provided it is extremely difficult for 
the service provider to detect whether the user is a child or an adult, will it mean 
that the provider is allowed to assume the user is an adult? Because children are 
using different kinds of devices with an Internet connection more and more, it 
would not be a reasonable solution to allow such a presumption. On the other hand, 
if a child uses a browser to read a digital newspaper, how should the provider of said 
service determine that the consent to track could not be given by the visitor himself? 
Today, there is no standardised technology to indicate that the browser user is a 
child, hence, the situation still needs further clarifications from the Commission. A 
similar technique as ‘do not track’ that is implemented in most browsers could be 
used for indicating that a child is the user of this device. In the browser this is 
implemented as an HTTP header that is sent to the service provider with the request 
for a web page. 
We should point out that ‘do not track’ messages are today only respected at the 
discretion of the service provider. Should the Commission lay out guidelines for 
requiring service providers to detect user preferences in a generalised way, then the 
technical implementation for web traffic or rather HTTP/HTTPS requests, is a 
proven solution. The solution applies to other applications as well, provided they 
communicate through HTTP/HTTPS requests. Other HTTP headers can also be 
implemented, e.g. ‘do-not-profile’ or ‘child-using-device’ (cf. RQ1). 
4.2.6. Virtual identity in an online forum 
The recommended approach is that a service provider asks for consent in order to 
profile users if the information contains direct or indirect references to the natural 
person. Personalised online direct marketing often works by offering advertisement 
on the basis of such user profiles. However, in the following example, we consider 
an online forum requesting users to login to be able to use the service, but asks for 
or stores none of the information referring to a natural person. While the user uses 
the service, e.g. browsing other virtual users and befriending them, liking stories or 
items, or entering search terms or posting messages; using this type of data much 
information regarding the user is revealed, i.e. data subject (Korolova 2010). When 
considering the notion of protecting the data subject, it becomes difficult to show 
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how any of the collected data as such is linked to physical identifiers, and thereby 
linking the digital profile of the user to a natural person. Regardless of this missing 
link, the service provider can likely tailor any direct marketing messages and/or 
pricing information to the data subject almost as easily as if the provider also stored 
or processed any direct or indirect references to the natural person. 
The service provider can, with some probability, deduce new information about 
the data subject by analysing data as a complete set. For example, an entered search 
term indicates something that is currently of interest to the subject. A forum posting 
can be analysed using text analytics to reveal the topic of the posting or the opinion 
in the posting. Social network analysis can reveal links between various network 
nodes, be it users or other objects. By using modern analytical techniques in 
combination, it is possible for a service provider to profile each user in near real-
time, for instance, to find out the best direct marketing advertisement to show, 
without linking the virtual identity to the natural person. 
The examples demonstrate how it is possible for a service provider to profile 
users without the possibility to identify the physical identity of the user (cf. RQ1). 
This situation will therefore fall outside the scope of the Regulation. The Regulation 
will apply only to information concerning an identified or identifiable person. 
Whether a person is identifiable or not depends on the means used in the identifying 
process. If a service provider cannot identify the physical identity of the user, 
directly or indirectly, then the Regulation will not be applicable (recital 23).  
4.3. Public Interest 
One actor (cf. sub-section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4) that is not directly defined in the 
regulation, but often referred to, is the public interest. Processing based on public 
interest shall only be used if other means of achieving lawfulness have been 
exhausted. As showed below, this method is not as straightforward as the other 
means, as guidance is rather limited and spread out in the Regulation it merits 
further inspection. Public interest is a multifaceted term that we will attempt to 
delineate in the following and highlight its connection to intelligent services (cf. 
RQ1). The section also provides a technical interpretation of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union Case (C‐131/12) that is considered to establish a “Right to be 
forgotten”. 
The data protection legislation sometimes considers the public interest over the 
data subject’s privacy right, hence the right to the protection of personal data is not 
an absolute right (GDPR 2016, recital (3a)). Personal data may be lawfully processed 
if it "is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in 
the exercise of official authority vested in the controller" (GDPR 2016, Art 6 1(e)). 
That an official authority may process personal data in performing its duties is 
relatively clear and the cases presented later show this as well. An example is the tax 
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authorities that may process sensitive information to, inter alia, determine the 
taxable income. However, there might be circumstances when some other legal 
person than an official authority can process personal data under the lawfulness 
criteria of public interest.  
We here continue with the assumption that public interest refers to a potential 
population of undetermined size in a Member State, which does not necessarily 
include everybody. The CJEU referred to this grouping in its ruling in the case 
Google v AEPD and Costeja (Case C‐131/12). The case pertains to an official notice 
given in a newspaper of a conviction against Mr Costeja and whether Google is 
permitted to continue displaying a link to this notice among the search results for 
the name of Mr Costeja. The opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen (Opinion. 
C‐131/12, 2013) in the given case, was that “processing of personal data, covers all 
information relating to an individual, irrespective of whether he acts in a purely 
private sphere or as an economic operator or, for example, as a politician” (Opinion 
C‐131/12, Sec C, §118). He continued by defining a search engine operator as a 
private subject, and on the question if interference, i.e. processing of personal data 
without consent, can be tolerated, Jääskinen argued:  
it is necessary to ponder whether interpretation of Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the 
Directive in light of the Charter, and more particularly of Article 7 thereof, could 
lead to the recognition of a 'right to be forgotten [over the public interest.] 
(Opinion C‐131/12, Sec E, §126) 
The Advocate General considered the right to search information published on 
the internet, by means of search engines, to be one of the most important ways to 
exercise the fundamental right to receive information concerning the data subject 
from public sources (Opinion C‐131/12, Sec E, §130 & §131). In the concluding 
remarks Jääskinen finds that “An internet search engine service provider lawfully 
exercises both his freedom to conduct business and freedom of expression when he 
makes available internet information” (§132). He continues with:  
reinforcing the data subjects' legal position under the Directive, and imbuing it 
with a right to be forgotten […] would entail sacrificing pivotal rights such as 
freedom of expression and information. I would also discourage the Court from 
concluding that these conflicting interests could satisfactorily be balanced in 
individual cases on a case-by-case basis, with the judgment to be left to the 
internet search engine service provider. (Opinion C‐131/12, Sec E, §133)  
According to the opinion of the Advocate General, the fundamental rights and 
freedoms cannot in this case be considered to outweigh the public interest in terms 
of right to receive information nor the commercial rights of the search engine 
company, as he considers the information at the source to contain an accurate 
description of historical events.  
In the consequent judgment by the CJEU they considered the aspect of privacy 
as a fundamental right. When: 
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[a] search by means of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual’s 
name [it is likely] to affect significantly the fundamental rights to privacy and to 
the protection of personal data [...] since that processing enables any internet user 
to obtain through the list of results a structured overview of the information 
relating to that individual [thereby establishing a more or less detailed profile of 
the data subject] (C‐131/12, §80).  
As stated in sub-section 3.2.1, information on criminal convictions belong to the 
special category and any structuring with the intention to link the information to a 
physical individual is generally not permitted. A similar limitation is provided in the 
Directive (art. 8(5)). 
However, the CJEU goes further in its statement by referring to “the information 
at issue”, and not necessarily being limited to the information of convictions.   
However, inasmuch as the removal of links from the list of results could, 
depending on the information at issue, have effects upon the legitimate interest of 
internet users potentially interested in having access to that information, in 
situations such as that at issue in the main proceedings a fair balance should be 
sought in particular between that interest and the data subject’s (C‐131/12, §81). 
The remedy then ordered by the court is to restrict certain results from being 
shown, unless a preponderant interest of the public can be determined: 
balance may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information 
in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest 
of the public in having that information (C‐131/12, §81).   
Accordingly, since in the case in point there do not appear to be particular reasons 
substantiating a preponderant interest of the public in having, in the context of 
such a search, access to that information, [...] the data subject may, [...] require 
those links to be removed from the list of results. (C‐131/12, §98) 
The decision in certain aspects goes against the opinion of the Advocate General. 
An interesting aspect of the court’s decision is that they actually do not forbid a 
search engine to provide another source for the information, hence the content does 
not need to be automatically “tagged” and classified as violating the data subject’s 
rights in question. Also, the verdict states that the links should be removed from the 
final presentation of the result. From a technical perspective this can be thought of 
as a filtering approach, and that in this case the search engine is not forbidden to 
continue processing the pages as long as the links are not included in a search result. 
From a legal viewpoint, the processing of personal data only occurs when the user 
enters the name as a search term and the result is delivered to the requester. To 
understand this argument, we have to consider how a typical search engine operates. 
Google’s particular algorithms for search have not been published, but over the years 
they have provided some generalised understanding of how it is architecturally 
constructed. A search engine has a number of different search algorithms, but in the 
case laid out we can only consider the most basic approach of a search term 
consisting of a first and last name. Essentially the processing that occurs before the 
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user enters the search term can be considered irrelevant in this case, because it can 
most likely be argued that the individual cannot directly or indirectly be identified 
from this process. First, to find content the search engine uses a crawler agent that 
retrieves content from a webpage and often stores a copy on the search engine 
servers. The following step is the indexing of retrieved content that becomes pre-
referenced in terms of determining the context relevance for every single page 
indexed and an indexing of possible search terms that can be construed from the 
page. Although technically possible, the indexing is not likely to include a specific 
profile for every single individual identified. The difference here is in whether the 
data, when pre-compiled by the search engine, has become structured in regard to a 
specific data subject, which the court did not consider likely. The third step takes 
place after the user has entered the search term, then search results are ranked and 
the presentation of the results are sent back to the requester. Here the court finds 
that the search engine only has to remove the showing of such results that have been 
contested by a data subject and that in a consequent manual process have been 
deemed adequately sensitive. The wording of the case, however, does indicate that 
certain processing by a private (legal) subject is permitted under public interest, 
provided that intrusive data for a data subject is not shown in a structured form. 
The court’s decision may be considered controversial, but not particularly 
unexpected. The original GDPR proposal (COM(2012)11) included an article 
named The right to be forgotten and erasure as an elaboration from the right of 
erasure provided for in Article 12(b) of the Directive (95/46/EC). In a later revision 
of the proposal this article has been re-named The right to erasure (GDPR 2016, Art. 
17). The article makes the definition, which was under consideration before the 
CJEU (Case C‐131/12), somewhat clearer. According to Art 17 (1)c, if the data 
subject objects on the grounds of Article 19 (1) (Right to object), to processing based 
on lawfulness of processing for the performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest (Art. 6 (1)e), then the processor shall no longer process the data unless 
compelling legitimate grounds can be presented. Generalising the legitimate 
grounds can be challenging. However, in Article 9 (2)e, processing of special 
categories is allowed if the processing relates to personal data which are manifestly 
made public by the data subject. The term manifestly made public has not been 
defined, but the adverb manifestly can be defined as ‘obvious to the eye’. In a 
Canadian Case (Murphy v. Perger) the Court came to the conclusion that the 
invasion of privacy to the data subject was minimal for Facebook postings of images, 
even if they are kept within a private sphere. The Facebook profile in the case 
included 366 friends and the posts were only viewable by this group. Such a posting 
was then referred to as being manifestly made public. Here we should stress that the 
EU courts may have a different definition as to what constitutes manifestly made 
public, but it can be considered indicative of one-to-many communications. 
In recital 36 (GDPR 2016) we find that it shall be up to:  
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Union or Member State law to determine whether the controller performing a 
task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority should 
be a public authority or another natural or legal person governed by public law, 
or by private law such as a professional association.  
This suggests that processing based on public interest may be interpreted 
differently in Member State law and that continued fragmentation will exist for 
processing based on public interest. However, this should not necessarily be 
considered a politically driven agenda, but may rather stem from a necessity due to 
other incompatible member state laws. Recital 40 also states that processing of 
personal data that has been collected for other purposes may be permitted for the 
performance of tasks carried out in the public interest. This processing may be 
further determined by Union or Member State law. Further processing for archiving 
purposes in the public interest, or scientific and historical research purposes or 
statistical purposes are considered compatible and lawful processing operations. 
Other specified reasons are vital interests of the data subject (or in limited instances 
another subject) as for example when processing is necessary for humanitarian 
purposes (GDPR 2016, recital 37) and to safeguard a democratic society (recital 40). 
Member State law may require controllers to consult with, and obtain prior 
authorisation from, the national supervisory authority in relation to processing by 
a controller for the performance of a task carried out by the controller in the public 
interest (GDPR 2016, art 34 (7a)) 
Although the GDPR does not specifically provide guidelines for processing 
under public interest, certain general guidelines are provided to determine the legal 
basis for processing of personal data for other purposes than the purposes for which 
the data have been initially collected. To ascertain whether a purpose of further 
processing is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially 
collected, the controller should consider, inter alia:  
 
 any link between those purposes and the purposes of the intended further 
processing,  
 
 the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular the 
reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the 
controller as to their further use, 
 
 the nature of the personal data, 
 
 the consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects, 
 
 and the existence of appropriate safeguards in both the original and intended 
further processing operations. (GDPR 2016, recital 40) 
To define the appropriate safeguards for processing based on public interest, we 
can consider earlier court proceedings in regards to processing based on official 
authority. In the Case (24117/08) Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 
the court held that tax authorities are classified as performing a public interest duty 
that overrides the individual’s privacy rights. The court emphasised that the tax 
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authorities had effective and adequate safeguards in place to prevent potential abuse 
and that data would be immediately deleted once no longer needed. A task carried 
out by a vested authority overrides the data subject’s privacy right, provided that 
necessary safeguards exist and that data is deleted in the controller's (or someone 
who processes the personal data on behalf of the controller) system(s) as soon as it 
is no longer needed. A third relevant principle that can be considered is the data 
minimisation principle. In the Case (C-524/06) Heinz Huber v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland the court found that German authorities may keep a register of 
foreigners currently residing in the country, provided that the register only contains 
information directly required for performing an evaluation of the right to residency. 
In the event of an official authority outsourcing the processing to a processor, it 
should not influence this standpoint, provided assurances are given that the security 
principles defined are followed. 
The interpretation of lawfulness for a private legal person to process based on 
public interest indicates that under certain settings it can be applied to personal data:  
 
 where data has been obtained from the data subject, but for another purpose, 
 
 where data has not been obtained from the data subject, 
 
 where data has been manifestly made public (incl. special category). 
Provided that the controller can show that a preponderant interest of the public 
exists without causing potential harm to the data subject, for example through a data 
protection impact assessment, the national supervisory authority may grant such 
processing. In performing a data protection impact assessment the controller 
evaluates, in particular, the origin, nature, particularity and severity of a risk to the 
data subject. When data has not been manifestly shared by the data subject himself, 
then processing can be challenged, as was done in the case before CJEU (C‐131/12). 
It should be pointed out that this interpretation of lawfulness is, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, not evidenced by EU case law. 
4.4. Summary 
There are two important concepts in the GDPR (2016 Article 5(1) a), personal data 
shall be processed fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject. 
For the adoption of intelligent services that for example utilise data from IoT-
sensors, the GDPR may add additional system challenges compared to today’s 
regulatory environment (cf. RQ1 and RQ2.1). We can draw three main 
considerations on how to achieve system compliance with the GDPR: 
 
 Design requirements  
o requiring freely given consent or 
o by contract or for the performance of a contract 
o data minimisation 
o data protection by design and default. 
 
 Handling of personal data  
 81 
o access 
o rectification 
o portability 
o transparency of usage 
o erasure.  
 
 Limitations on processing 
o notification 
o restriction 
o security. (Pulkkis et al. 2018) 
Quality of personal data from IoT-sensors or other data generators must, in light 
of the GDPR, be accurate and reliable. The data itself must be electronically 
transferable, though the GDPR does not elaborate on the use of transportation 
medium. Meta-data describing, e.g. data source, access rights, and justification for 
lawful processing should be recorded along with the data when it becomes 
associated with a natural person (cf. RQ2). During feature engineering, such efforts 
must be made that descriptive statistics do not infringe on the data subject’s integrity 
or introduce new features that can be considered sensitive (cf. RQ1). An example of 
the creation of new features can be clustering based on location and additional 
externally available data, such as places of interest (e.g. places of worship), as that 
can be considered to infer either religion and/or race. If such statistics are needed 
for determining factors and/or causes in ascertaining a hypothesis, then these 
intentions need to be disclosed to the data subject beforehand. (Pulkkis et al. 2018) 
We can assume that the invasion of the data subject’s privacy is a measurable 
property and not a binary value (cf. RQ1 & RQ3). The measurable property can be 
an objective opinion of the courts or data protection supervisors, for example as in 
the case Google v AEPD and Costeja (Case C‐131/12). The recommended approach 
is that it is a property determined through a subjective opinion of both the data 
subject and the controller. Determining a level of privacy violation or even the risk, 
may be challenging. Particularly when processing is done based on public interest, 
as in the case of a search engine, it may be difficult to determine potential privacy 
violations. Private legal entities that control platforms that utilise the argument of 
processing based on public interest face deeper scrutiny by data protection 
supervisors and may additionally face national laws that limit such processing 
further.  
When data are shared in the form of a message that is intended to be read by a 
group of people outside the immediate family, it becomes difficult to argue that data 
have not been shared manifestly. Once data have been shared manifestly by the data 
subject, the GDPR considers that the data have lost its private property (cf. RQ1). 
This applies also to personal data categorised as special. Furthermore, the 
fundamental human rights given by the EU charter, offer protection for personal 
correspondence that should be considered to include messaging services such as 
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email and SMS. When it comes to messaging between many-to-many participants 
(e.g. instant messaging groups) the argument of invasion of privacy to the data 
subject may be considered weakened. Provided that a preponderant interest of the 
public exists and can be shown, then processing of personal data may be allowed 
without the consent of the data subject. In case personal data have not been 
manifestly shared by the data subject himself, such processing (incl. that of public 
interest) can be challenged on the basis of invasion of privacy.  
Tracking users on the Internet has become an important part of driving new 
sales. Service providers want to identify individuals among a myriad of devices and 
this can be performed by using a combination of techniques, but at the centre is 
often a global social media platform that requires the user to login to its service (cf. 
RQ3). Techniques such as browser or device fingerprints, location segmentation, 
traffic meta-data and different types of beacons (incl. audio) can be combined to 
ensure detailed tracing of users. Today tracking concerns a broader spectrum of 
details than linking data to a natural person. To gain an in-depth understanding of 
the environment in which users live, companies attempt to understand the context 
of the environment. A user is thought to be more easily persuaded in a certain 
context compared to another context. To determine the physical context the user 
currently resides in, ultrasonic cross-device tracking may be used (Arp et al. 2017). 
The cross-linking may be achieved through active apps, and ultrasonic beacons 
emitted from, for instance, TV programming, store devices, or websites. This type 
of technology should in general be considered prohibited in the EU without specific 
consent by the data subject for the use of such profiling services (cf. RQ1 and RQ3). 
In practice, the device will be able to listen to any audio signal, including speech, 
without the subject’s knowledge, and any personal data recorded ought to be 
considered special category data. However, there are legitimate reasons for using 
similar technology. Digital personal assistants (e.g. Amazon Alexa) may employ 
similar technology to deliver prescriptive insights to users. As any profiling based 
on special category personal data requires specific consent, such operators may need 
separate consent for suggesting commercially driven suggestions, such as 
‘recommend that you get product A from Store X because it is on sale’, compared to 
need-based suggestions such as ‘remember to get X on the way home as your Y (e.g. 
fridge) is empty’. When a child uses a digital personal assistant, the question 
becomes what happens if the parent has not consented to the processing of the 
child’s voice or commands. Does this require the service provider to try to detect 
who is talking and predict what age the subject is? When considering children’s use 
of apps and the Internet in general, the use of identification mechanisms should be 
developed and required by law. An example given of such lightweight mechanisms 
is through a dedicated HTTP header attribute. 
Based on sub-section 4.2.4 and 4.2.6, we can draw the conclusion that a provider 
of intelligent services will face the least amount of scrutiny from the regulator if 
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client-side processing is performed (cf. RQ1and RQ3). Decentralised solutions that 
only utilise local storage may perform processing quite freely; the primary exception 
may be special category personal data that would require a specific processing 
consent. The local storage may be backed up on a central node if encrypted by the 
user. This would allow the controller to claim that personal data are not used in 
processing, and that the virtual identity of the user is not naturally identifiable. 
Client-side processing may also be more secure as data would only be stored in a 
readable format locally (cf. RQ2). This will require a certain amount of processing 
power from the client device, but assuming Moore’s law holds, then this challenge 
can soon be trounced.  
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Talk is cheap. Show me the code. 
   ― Linus Torvalds 
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5. Security in Information Systems 
The GDPR requires controllers to safeguard that personal data is processed in a way 
that ensures appropriate security. The direct incentive used to compel companies to 
invest in security is the potential fine if found in breach of the GDPR. The GDPR as 
established in chapters 3 and 4, focuses on a methodological approach to reduce the 
risk and scope of security incidents. The risks identified by the GDPR include 
protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing, accidental loss, destruction, 
or damage. The solution for achieving this is stated as using appropriate technical 
or organisational measures. To assess the appropriate level of security, account shall 
be taken of risks presented by data processing (GDPR 2016, art. 5(1)eb; art. 30). 
The e-Privacy Directive (art. 4) calls attention to providers of publicly available 
electronic communications services and that they must take appropriate technical 
measures to safeguard security of its services, with respect to network security. 
Although from a technical perspective any Internet based service involves the 
communication of data over a public network, the e-Privacy directive is much 
narrower in scope. The e-Privacy directive applies to providers such as traditional 
telcos and ISPs, but likely also to some Over The Top (OTT) providers, i.e. providers 
of one-to-one messaging apps, e-mail platforms, and VOIP services.  
The Directive on Network and Information Security is similarly limited in its 
application (cf. sub-section 3.1.1), as the NIS concerns the security for operators of 
essential services (e.g. utility platforms of a considerable public interest) and for 
digital service providers. Digital service providers are listed as such organisations 
that provide online marketplaces, online search engines, or cloud computing 
services (NIS, recital 15-17). Other digital service providers are thus not bound by 
the obligations laid out in NIS, but the law can be seen as best practice for the 
industry. Some of the obligations listed are: 
 
 preventing risks – technical and organisational measures that are appropriate 
and proportionate to the risk, 
 
 ensuring IT security – ensure a level of security of the network and 
information systems appropriate to the risks, 
 
 handling incidents – prevent and minimise the impact of incidents on the IT 
systems used to provide the services. (Pulkkis et al. 2018) 
The GDPR does not define a certain required level of security, but rather it 
implies that whether an appropriate level of security existed shall be assessed later 
on. This advocates also that what will be considered an appropriate level of security 
will likely change over time. The approach can be considered in line with the 
Regulator’s aim to create a technology agnostic law. However, determining 
technological actions based on achieving an environment that ensures appropriate 
security, based on the risks listed above, may be challenging for controllers, 
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processors, and owners of information systems (cf. RQ1 and RQ2). The regulators 
focus on data security methods (e.g. data minimisation and privacy-by-design) is 
understandable, but from a technical perspective appropriate network security is 
just as important. The omission of what can be considered guiding network security 
principles in the GDPR may lead to a lesser focus from companies on improving 
this aspect of their information systems (cf. RQ2 and RQ2.1). Thus, this chapter will 
focus on documenting researched solutions to data protection problems that arise 
from network security issues. An additional benefit of developing and defining 
state-of-the-art methods available at the time of writing and connecting them to the 
Regulation, is that these can become important metrics for the judiciary system and 
for jurisprudence reasons. 
This chapter presents three exploratory single-case mechanism studies 
(Wieringa 2014) to determine available security measures against network threats a 
company faces when handling personal data (cf. RQ2 and RQ2.1). The review is not 
intended to be exhaustive, but focus on two state-of-the-art techniques that are 
further elaborated in two of the papers included (Xiang et al. 2014; Paarnio et al. 
2015). The techniques are of importance in determining what constitutes using 
appropriate technical security measures, as set out by the Regulation (GDPR 2016, 
art. 5(1)eb; art. 30). A secondary objective with the chapter is to understand the 
technology stack and methods behind big data analytics, as well as to elaborate the 
design issues and certain attack vectors (cf. RQ2.1). The realisation of an 
architecture for a big data analytics processing tool was expounded in the paper 
Westerlund et al. (2014).  
5.1. Big Data Analytics Technologies 
In 2012, the Cloud Security Alliance initiated a Big Data Working Group with 
representatives from industry and academia. The agenda for the group was to be a 
conduit for highlighting the importance of developing big data methods and tools 
for information security. In a report issued by the Big Data Working Group (2013), 
they exemplify big data analytics approaches to information security. One important 
tool for implementing big data analytics solutions for network security is Hadoop. 
Hadoop can be described as a distributed database. Hadoop was the first widely used 
open-source system to implement and extend a distributed MapReduce 
programming model. The processing capabilities of Hadoop are built upon the 
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). The HDFS is a general-purpose file 
system, which is designed for handling file sizes up to terabytes and hundreds to 
thousands of processing nodes. Supported file formats are such that have a built in 
schema support, e.g. various types of UTF-based text files. HDFS does not support 
binary formatted files in general, but offers end-to-end encryption of data read from 
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and written to HDFS28. The best processing performance is achieved when available 
jobs can be scheduled to an equal number of processing nodes. However, a 
distributed architecture also tends to have an overhead from network 
communication, meaning each node should have a sufficiently large amount of data 
to process. Enabling encryption may have a detrimental effect on processing 
performance. End-to-end encryption ensures that sensitive data can be stored and 
processed securely though, provided encryption keys are not compromised. Attack 
vectors do exist that may make the processing unsecure, which particularly affects 
cloud installations when the cloud provider cannot be trusted. If an attacker gains 
root access to data nodes or name nodes, such malicious root users may also gain 
access to the in-memory state of the processes holding encryption keys and data in 
clear text29. This issue has, inter alia, a relevance to the negotiations regarding third 
country data transfer frameworks, for instance between the United States and the 
European Union over a safe harbour framework and its successor the Data Privacy 
Shield. The European Commission’s Decision (2000/520/EC, of 26.07.2000, art. 130) 
considered there was an ensured adequate level of protection for personal data 
transferred from the EU to organisations established in the United States. In the case 
Schrems vs. Data Protection Commissioner, the European Court of Justice issued a 
judgment declaring the European Commission’s Decision as invalid. According to 
the judgment, “the Commission did not state, in Decision 2000/520, that the United 
States in fact ‘ensures’ an adequate level of protection by reason of its domestic law or 
its international commitments” (Case C‐362/14, point 97). Consequently, if the 
cloud provider maintains root access to nodes, inter alia for national security 
reasons, then the use of Hadoop may be considered unsecure for storing personal 
data. This issue is not limited to Hadoop, but rather describes the challenge of cloud 
computing software in general (cf. RQ2 and RQ2.1). The data transfer agreement 
framework has since been replaced by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 31, but its legal 
validity is still questioned and the technical challenges with cloud services that 
handle personal data remain much the same (Lynch 2017). 
                                                            
28See HDFS Data At Rest Encryption. Accessed 30.07.2016, 
https://www.cloudera.com/documentation/enterprise/5-4-
x/topics/cdh_sg_hdfs_encryption.html 
29For further details, see Cloudera’s summary on HDFS Attack vectors. Accessed 30.07.2016 
https://www.cloudera.com/documentation/enterprise/5-4-
x/topics/cdh_sg_hdfs_encryption.html#concept_db3_d3w_hp  
30 See Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour 
privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of 
Commerce. Accessed 30.07.2016 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000D0520:EN:HTML  
31 See European Commission - Press release, European Commission launches EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield. Accessed 05.09.2017 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
2461_en.htm. 
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Through the MapReduce programming model, Hadoop offers developers a 
rudimentary interface for manipulating data. On top of this interface, numerous 
tools that consume said interface, but which offer the developer more elaborate ways 
to manipulate data exist. The ease of use in distributing data among processing 
nodes is an important feature of the tool. Hadoop has two main layers, MapReduce 
and HDFS. HDFS, as earlier stated, is a general-purpose file system, meaning its 
intended use is to store data, i.e. historical data or data-at-rest. This data are then 
automatically distributed among the data nodes by HDFS. An implication for the 
developer is that it becomes difficult to work with real-time transactions (streams), 
as they would need to be stored and indexed first, in the file system. Many of the 
tools built on top of the Hadoop platform could at the time of writing still not handle 
streamed transactional data. Section 5.2 presents an implementation of a supervised 
machine learning algorithm on top of the Hadoop platform. 
Before the public release of the Hadoop platform, we set out developing our own 
architecture in order to understand how a real-time transactional platform operates 
and to explore any limitations. The challenge of dealing with temporally structured 
data is a common data science problem in industry, e.g. developing Internet of Things 
services, user profiling, network security analysis, or financial services. Dealing with 
streamed transactional data using machine learning algorithms, requires that 
historical data be used for training and real-time data for prediction. Achieving a 
generalised architecture for handling both scenarios became our main aim. The 
secondary aim was to automate the machine learning process, so that once started 
there would not be the need for interference from an operator. This was a challenge 
as machine learning models often tend to be fairly sensitive to issues such as model 
overfitting in training (i.e. a model begins to memorise training data rather than 
generalising) and model specialisation (i.e. a model only works well on part of the 
data) (cf. RQ1). To solve this issue, we decided to implement the use of ensemble 
models (i.e. a combination of many models) as well as continuous model quality 
assurance. For processing that falls under the GDPR, detailed efforts must be made 
that avoid situations where faulty model outputs/decisions are provided to data 
subjects (RQ2.1). 
5.1.1. Developing a Generalised Scalable Software Architecture for 
Analysing Big Data 
The initial training process is always pre-determined as batch processing by the 
system user when defining the model setup. As the requirement on our system is to 
be able to handle both data-at-rest and real-time data, we mapped two separate 
workflow processes: model training workflow and live prediction workflow. Our 
definition of the workflow for training the models is seen in Figure 1. The workflow 
for the real-time prediction is seen in Figure 2. 
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In the model training workflow, data (accessed from the Data Gateway) have 
been pre-processed for validity and other preformatting techniques such as 
adjusting for required granularity, i.e. time resolution. The data feature extraction 
block refers to techniques such as component analysis, standardisation, 
normalisation, or any ad-hoc technique as required by the developer. While data are 
being prepared, an asynchronous flow initialises contact to the worker nodes in the 
public or private cloud (hereafter referred to as cloud when no differentiation is 
needed). These worker instances will be started manually, as to determine resource 
availability, with a pre-prepared operating system image containing required 
software (e.g. correct software versions, security and our base client service that 
starts automatically with the instance), in order for the system user to have full 
control over all simultaneously running instances. Once the initial handshake is 
performed, the necessary binaries defined by the developer and used by worker 
instances to process data are transferred to the worker nodes. We refer to these 
binaries henceforth as software agents. The software agents automatically subscribe 
to the worker instance monitoring service in order to receive jobs, including setting 
up the model. The differentiation between model, agent, and worker instance is that 
the worker instance represents the virtualised cloud instance (including our base 
client service). The model is the serialised machine learning model representation. 
While the agent is a generic binary with the ability to report status, listen to data 
events and execute models as defined in the data event. A data event refers to a new 
or updated input variable; however, the actual data packages sent to the worker 
instances vary depending on the type of job. In the case of a training job, the data 
package includes all the input data a model needs in a fully pre-processed format as 
well as model metadata. The input data for training can be of considerable size and 
is therefore transferred in a compressed format from the data gateway to the worker 
node. Data in the training process are therefore transferred in a binary format, and 
communication is encrypted over HTTPS/TLS. 
An important part of data security in the GDPR is data provenance, i.e. 
authenticity and integrity of data used for analytics. An aim is to investigate ways to 
achieve data integrity for model output as well, which can also be transferred to a 
production-level system (RQ2.1). The training process is thus fully automated and 
we achieve this by making use of both a verification dataset and an evaluation out-
of-sample training dataset for calculating model error rate. The verification dataset 
is usually a pre-training data sample. Training continues until the software can 
confirm that a certain training iteration (epoch) delivered the lowest in- and out-of-
sample training error, in order to minimise the risk of overfitting. We perform a 
comparison of the verification error and training error to determine the 
convergence point, when they combined reached their minimum. Once the model 
training is considered to have reached its minimum training error or timed-out, we 
perform a second out-of-sample test, referred to as evaluation, of the best iterations 
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found using data from post in-sample data to determine the model’s most recent 
performance and ultimately which training iteration to choose as finalised model. 
 
Figure 1 ‐ Training workflow (Westerlund et al. 2014) 
Once the system has trained the models and the system user has initiated that 
real-time forecasting should commence by choosing a certain model set (ensemble) 
to be deployed and starting the software agents, the jobs are distributed randomly 
among the available software agents. To achieve this, we implement a queue of jobs 
(i.e. new data events) that are sent along to software agents that indicate they are 
free. Jobs become outdated once the point in time they are supposed to be 
forecasting to has passed. In case the queue contains jobs that are outdated, which 
implies we have a performance bottleneck, the job is cancelled automatically. A data 
event during real-time prediction includes, in addition to the input data (data 
transaction) needed for prediction, network weights and metadata required for 
processing. For live prediction, data events are normally not compressed as the 
compress/decompress cycle would not be efficient for a minuscule dataset such as 
the envisioned data event. 
Once a job is processed, the result is collected centrally for both calculating a new 
ensemble vote as well as to determine if a certain model has been performing badly 
and needs to be retrained. For automation purposes (i.e. not requiring human 
intervention during training, live prediction and model retraining), we consider 
using an ensemble of models as a requirement. This technique is also known as 
voting by committee. There are several techniques for calculating an ensemble vote; 
we chose to use out-of-sample evaluation data for determining the initial relevance 
of each model. This allows us to later evaluate each model’s continued performance 
in regards to its recent forecast and based on the evaluation error rate to determine 
its current voting rights. 
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Figure 2 - Live prediction workflow (Westerlund et al. 2014) 
The proposed architecture is illustrated through a system component diagram, 
Figure 3. There are three separate components; the agent, the server and the client. 
The client component allows the system user control over model training and 
execution, as well as management of cloud instances. The client takes the form of a 
graphical user interface. The server component acts as a central node responsible 
for interfacing with the client component, extracting features from data sources, 
maintaining efficient distribution of new jobs, and collecting and processing of 
modeling forecast results as defined. The third identified component is the agent, 
responsible for performing the jobs provided by the server component. As our aim 
was to create a unified design for both the training process and live predictions, we 
achieve this through polymorphism and the extensive use of externally available 
Application Programming Interfaces (API) and internal interfaces between the 
components and sub-components respectively. One of the challenges faced was to 
solve how feature extraction is handled, here defined as data generator, in both cases. 
To perform feature extraction on both historical and real-time data with the same 
underlying algorithms requires that data be formatted using predetermined data 
tuples, which include a required amount of data elements and using the same time 
resolution. For certain algorithms, e.g. normalisation algorithms, previous scaling 
values used for historical data must be employed during real-time prediction as well. 
These types of values must therefore be stored as model metadata during training as 
they are used during real-time prediction as well. In our architecture the data 
generator and decision calculator were designed as internal sub-components of the 
server. In case the processing demand should exceed the resources available on the 
server, these two components can be external by executing on separate processing 
nodes. This architecture should mitigate some of the challenges when using non-
linear methods in the design of intelligent systems (cf. RQ1 and RQ2.1). The set-up 
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offer ways to improve data integrity for analytical modeling output that is 
horizontally scalable and may offer high quality results. 
 
Figure 3 - System component diagram for proposed architecture (Westerlund et al. 2014) 
 
5.1.2. Security Risk Assessment 
Defining and implementing a secure system architecture is always important and 
challenging. By performing a risk assessment and prioritising the type of security 
risks one wants to avoid, it is possible to define the security objectives of the system 
(Savola et al. 2012). The risks identified with highest priority to our system were 
unauthorised access to the system, exposure to physical attacks and malicious 
resource consumption. Therefore, our main security objective is to avoid financial 
exposure of an attacker being able to highjack our account resources to run their 
own services. Consequently, we employ the following security controls: 
1.  Each system user is required to use a personalised cloud account. 
2. System passwords required for instance control are only entered during 
runtime (through a secured remote desktop connection). 
3.  Communication between instances is always encrypted over HTTPS/TLS. 
4.  Each instance is required to use a certificate that is unique for each system 
user.  
This type of risk assessment must always be performed on an individual and 
ongoing basis. Noting, that if the system is to be handling sensitive data (e.g. 
personal data), then protecting that data from possible exposure should be a 
prioritised risk. Our risk assessment did not include such a requirement; therefore, 
we omitted end-to-end encryption and pseudonymisation of data. Communication 
is encrypted between nodes and node access is defined through personal certificates, 
but data is stored in a raw format. As in the Hadoop case, implementing end-to-end 
encryption for our proposed architecture would still make it sensitive to a malicious 
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root user. However, provided the cloud operator allows the use of a custom cloud 
instance, which can be sufficiently hardened, this would potentially be an 
improvement compared to the use of X as a Service (XaaS). The inability for XaaS 
customers to provision the underlying environment and root access to nodes in 
XaaS, may make the environment more unsecure. In addition, any vulnerabilities in 
the hypervisor layer, i.e. the layer that cloud instances execute upon, will be a serious 
attack vector. 32 33 This applies particularly to advanced persistent attackers, such as 
state-sponsored hackers. 
5.2. Network Intrusion Detection Using Machine Learning 
Traditional network security focuses on what can be considered passive techniques. 
Such techniques are for instance authentication based on a login/password 
combination, static firewall rules, and static network separation. Although these 
methods provide important means for creating a company backbone, they are 
always based on a binary trust-relationship, to provide ‘good users’ with access and 
keep ‘bad users’ out. The inability for passive systems to continuously re-evaluate 
and adapt the trust-relationship when for example user credentials are leaked or 
zero-day vulnerabilities are utilised, is problematic. Passively secured systems offer 
relatively little protection once the system breach has occurred. 
The introduction of big data analytics tools into the network security workflow 
offers great possibilities for detecting intrusions or unauthorised data access (cf. 
RQ2 and RQ2.1). Although the GDPR mostly consider regulating internal data 
processing for business purposes, keeping personal data safe from unauthorised use, 
be it from an internal or external perpetrator, is just as important. The ability to 
employ machine learning algorithms by using big data tools for detecting intrusions 
in a network environment is important. The amount of network data to be analysed 
has been growing rapidly and to be able to perform network intrusion detection 
using machine learning requires a massively scalable system. Although intrusion 
detection has been a hot research topic since the late 90’s, the utilisation of research 
methods in industry has been rather slow. One of the main reasons for this has 
undoubtedly been the cost of processing network data. A network is often 
customised to a certain company need, and hence an active network security 
intrusion detection system, based on some type of analytical model, may have to be 
trained using on-site data. The use of machine learning in detecting network 
intrusions is important, as other methods such as rule-based detection tend to 
deliver results that can be circumvented through the exploration/estimation of such 
rules by an attacker. In addition, the creation of rules often requires human expertise 
                                                            
32 For a detailed survey of cloud security issues, see Modi et al. (2013). 
33 For hypervisor specific attack vectors, see Perez-Botero et al. (2013). 
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of known threats in the creation process. The use of machine learning in the process 
may improve generalisation and thereby improve detection of unknown threats. 
By making use of a de-facto standardised dataset, KDDcup99, we present a 
machine learning method that scales horizontally without losing detection accuracy 
for classifying intrusion attempts. We employ a machine learning algorithm called 
Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) (Huang et al. 2006) implemented on top of 
Hadoop’s MapReduce programming model. The purpose of our MapReduce 
implementation of ELM is to determine that it scales horizontally and that it can be 
used for network intrusion detection (cf. RQ2). Using the MapReduce programming 
model, we show that machine learning based intrusion detection using ELM can 
extend its applicability to significantly larger datasets than the KDDcup99 dataset. 
Provided enough computer resources can be allocated to the processing tasks, 
growing the dataset is possible without increasing training time drastically, due to 
the near linear scaling ability of the proposed ELM algorithm34. 
We perform two kinds of intrusion detection experiments; binary intrusion 
detection and multiclass intrusion detection. The experiment evaluates MapReduce 
ELM against a local implementation of ELM. For each experiment, we compare two 
characteristics of MapReduce ELM with local ELM. The first characteristic focuses 
on processing performance evaluation of MapReduce ELM against the local ELM. 
The second characteristic compares the performance of the local ELM and 
MapReduce ELM by model accuracy. To determine the accuracy the local ELM is 
tested on one standalone machine and MapReduce ELM on a cluster of 10 nodes. 
Both models were trained with datasets of varying size. In each experiment, we 
recorded the following information:  
 
 False Positives (FP) – the number of normal instances detected as attack 
instances  
 
 False Negatives (FN) – the number of attack instances detected as normal 
instances  
 
 True Positive (TP) – the number of correctly detected attack instances 
 
 True Negative (TN) – the number of correctly detected normal instances. 
For each training dataset we repeated training and testing 4 times in order to 
obtain averages of FP, FN, TP, and TN. Based on these results, the performance of 
MapReduce ELM against local ELM was measured by Overall Accuracy, which 
means the percentage of correctly detected sample instances.  
5.2.1. Performance Analysis of Binary Classification 
For the binary intrusion detection experiment, we pre-processed the training and 
testing datasets by giving label value 1 for each normal sample instance and label value 
-1 for each attack instance. Overall Accuracy for both MapReduce ELM and local ELM 
                                                            
34 For a detailed description of the construction of the algorithm, see Xiang et al. (2014). 
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is about 93% or better depending on the training set size, see Table 3. A slight Overall 
Accuracy improvement is achieved by increasing the size of the network (i.e. number 
of hidden neurons from 50 to 200). MapReduce ELM has a fractionally higher 
detection rate than local ELM in almost all training dataset experiments. For a larger 
training dataset size, Detection rate increases slightly as well. False Alarm rate is low, 
between 0.89% and 1.72%, in all training dataset experiments. 
 
Table 3 - Intrusion detection accuracy for ELM with 50 hidden neurons (adapted from  
Xiang et al. 2014). 
N 
accuracy binary accuracy 23 classes 
local map reduce local map reduce 
100k 94.75 94.65 92.86 92.78 
200k 93.31 94.57 93.26 93.91 
300k 97.08 96.6 95.16 97.28 
490k 97.58 97.7 96.84 97.41 
 
Efficiency analysis of MapReduce ELM compared to local ELM was performed 
with three different dataset sizes 1M, 2M, and 3M samples, using a network with 50 
hidden neurons. For each dataset, the program was executed 4 times on a single 
machine (local) and on 15, 20, 25, and 30 cluster nodes (MapReduce) to calculate 
average execution times. From Table 4 we can see that MapReduce ELM can 
significantly decrease the execution time compared to local ELM. The comparison 
could not exceed 3M samples due to that the local ELM ran out of memory after 2M 
samples. The execution time of MapReduce ELM decreases as the number of nodes 
increases up to 25 nodes. When increasing the number of nodes from 25 to 30, the 
running time increases a bit because of increased communication between nodes. 
We noted a drawback of the MapReduce framework in the overhead required by the 
disk read/write operations of each map/reduce task. This overhead can prolong the 
execution time if the response time of the hard disks cause the workload on the 
processing nodes to be delayed, i.e. workloads are as a result inefficiently processed. 
Table 4 - Execution times (in seconds) of MR ELM for binary class intrusion detection with 50 hidden 
neurons (adapted from Xiang et al. 2014). 
number 
of nodes 
dataset size N 
1M 2M 3M 
single 6659s 11837s Out of mem. 
15 278s 441s 643s 
20 258s 400s 558s 
25 223s 332s 462s 
30 246s 382s 470s 
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5.2.2. Performance Analysis of Multiclass Classification 
The training and testing datasets for multiclass classification was pre-processed by 
assigning an additional feature for five class values (labels), one label for normal 
group and 4 labels for main attack groups. A second added feature includes 23 class 
labels, 1 label for the normal group and 22 labels for specific attack types. We use 
these added features for designing two different experiments. The 5-class and the 
23-class experiment denotes that the model output has an equal amount of output 
dimensions. For both the 5-class and the 23-class experiment, MapReduce ELM and 
local ELM have a very similar and relatively good Overall Accuracy above 90% (see 
Table 3 for 23 class accuracy). For an increased training dataset size, Overall 
Accuracy increases. For the largest training dataset size, Overall Accuracy is slightly 
improved by increasing the number of hidden neurons from 50 to 200. 
Efficiency analysis of MapReduce ELM (see Table 5) shows the execution time of 
MapReduce ELM for three different dataset sizes in multi-class intrusion detection 
with 50 hidden neurons. The experiment was performed using three dataset sizes by 
applying the same test protocol as in binary classification. The results are similar to 
binary classification. MapReduce ELM significantly decreases the execution time in 
comparison with local ELM. Increased communication between nodes slightly 
increases the execution time of MapReduce ELM, when the number of nodes is 
increased from 25 to 30. The speedup is approximately linear except for the tail. 
From 15 to 25 nodes, regardless of input sample size, the increase is near linear as 
more nodes improve parallel computing ability. Increasing the number of nodes 
from 25 to 30 decreases speedup because of the increased overhead in nodes mainly 
caused by communication between nodes. 
Table 5 - Execution times (in seconds) of MR ELM for multi-class intrusion detection with 50 hidden 
neurons (adapted from Xiang et al. 2014). 
number 
of nodes 
dataset size N 
1M 2M 3M 
single 7336s 13498s Out of mem. 
15 294s 485s 659s 
20 256s 431s 571s 
25 230s 367s 488s 
30 252s 382s 494s 
 
5.2.3 Result Outcome 
We consider our Overall Accuracy good, considering that we did not perform 
elaborate data preformatting or use highly optimised modelling techniques (e.g. 
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parameter tuning or ensembles). Our aim was to use a standardised modelling 
technique, with minimal human expert knowledge of the dataset or model, to 
determine whether more data can be used to improve classification, and if 
horizontal scaling works on a complex dataset, compared to a local implementation. 
For both research questions, we consider the aim achieved.  
Implementing an active network intrusion detection system based on machine 
learning techniques offers companies today a relatively rapid way to improve 
security in their networks (cf. RQ2). Using an open-source big data solution offers 
a cost efficient way to improve security. The workflow demand is initially perhaps 
not to detect intrusions in real-time, as a technique described in section 5.1, but 
rather as a resolution defined as near real-time and applying 30-second to 1-minute 
segment intervals may suffice. This requirement would be system dependent; a 
system with multi-layer security may be less sensitive to information loss if the outer 
layer is breached. Hence, multi-layer security may provide system administrators 
with more time to collect and then process network security data, possibly for a 
higher overall accuracy detection. Another processing tool, Apache Spark, built on 
top of Hadoop’s HDFS file system can perform detection with such segment 
intervals. Spark offers an improved programming environment and includes in-
memory computing on data nodes. In-memory computing should improve 
processing efficiency, since data does not have to be stored on the file system after 
each task, which we found to be a bottleneck with Hadoop MapReduce. An 
additional benefit from using the Hadoop platform for intrusion detection is that it 
offers a relatively resilient and cost-efficient mass storage of historical data. Provided 
a company stores its forensic network data this way, it will in the forensic process be 
important to determine what happened or to build an improved training dataset 
that includes new types of intrusion threats.  
An insight gained during our research is that the main challenge companies will 
likely face, is in determining what data should be recorded and how to label the 
training set to create a detailed and specific representation of potential threats the 
individual system can face (cf. RQ2 and RQ2.1). Current rule-based intrusion 
detection tools can be used as a first step in generating a company specific dataset. 
Iterating based on such a dataset can then lead to the identification of new threats 
through the generalisation ability of a machine learning model. In addition, through 
organising a company hackathon, new training data can be amassed and labelled. 
Another approach for collecting valuable data for a content management system 
(web application) is examined in section 5.3.  
5.3. Active Intrusion Management for Open-Source Software 
Today, a common breach of user data often arises from an intrusion attack by a 
hacker on an information system. Software with public communication endpoints, 
such as an application implemented on top of a web server, tend to offer intruders 
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an important attack vector. Open-source software is often hailed for its security 
enhancing ability in comparison to proprietary software. This is based on the 
assumption that many others than the original coder have vetted open-source 
software. However, open-source software also offers an important additional attack 
vector for hackers. So-called zero-day vulnerabilities are undisclosed vulnerabilities 
in a system that someone has found, but still exist as a flaw, i.e. yet to be fixed in the 
system. This allows an attacker, potentially, to use the exploit without a system 
administrator being able to detect the intrusion with traditional passive network 
security means. Open-source software allows the hacker to examine the source code 
and test any multitude of attack vectors in order to gain privileged access to the 
system, before commencing an attack on the intended target. In many cases this may 
make the footprint of the intrusion too small to detect. An additional problem is the 
mixed used of open-source and proprietary software. Modular open-source 
software that allows for customisation through proprietary plugins may be 
problematic if the quality assurance process for the proprietary software is limited 
in scope. 
We present an initial methodology in extension of current recommended 
methods for securing WordPress software35. The challenge is to go beyond the 
installation procedures often used today, and propose ways for hardening an 
installation of the most popular Content Management System (CMS) WordPress. 
WordPress is an easily extendable system, and as a result numerous plug-ins, which 
the original developers of WordPress do not control, exist 36. According to 
independent statistics, WordPress powers 25% of all websites worldwide, while the 
two closest competitors, Joomla and Drupal combined are used by 4.9%37. As later 
will be shown, these plug-ins are sometimes extraordinarily easy attack vectors for 
a potential intruder. This situation has arisen from bad software engineering 
practices (e.g., lack of quality assurance for plug-ins), and the ease of use (in-depth 
technical skills are not required for installing and using the software). A potential 
attacker can automatically scan the Internet (IP addresses and ports) for public 
installations of the software and their corresponding vulnerabilities with minimal 
risk to be detected as a threat. We consider current passive intrusion management 
methods often too limited in ability to secure installations, as current defence 
methods as firewalls, antivirus software and current intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) can often not detect these intrusions. We examine the research question as 
how to define “appropriate security” (cf. RQ2) through the hardening of an 
                                                            
35 For best WordPress administrative practices, see https://codex.wordpress.org/Hardening_ 
WordPress. Accessed 30.07.2016. 
36 It should be noted that not all plug-ins are open-source, and our methodology should also 
encompass these closed-sourced plug-ins. 
37 For more details regarding the CMS study, see https://w3techs.com/blog/entry/wordpress-
powers-25-percent-of-all-websites. Accessed 30.07.2016. 
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installation of WordPress and the creation of an active intrusion detection 
methodology for the WordPress system.  
5.3.1. Active Defence 
We define active intrusion detection as the process when both intrusion responses 
and forensic investigations are proactive and/or automatically triggered by intrusion 
attacks. We present a method for creating what we refer to as booby traps for web 
software. Crane et al. (2013) define booby traps as “code providing active defence that 
is only triggered by an attack”. A booby trap neither implements program 
functionality nor influence its operation. The idea is based on that the program is 
unaware of these booby traps, and therefore unable to trigger them. An attack who 
may be scanning the software will by mistake end up activating one of the traps. 
Once a booby trap is triggered the software, or rather the intrusion detection system, 
will immediately know that an attack is under way. Crane et al. (2013) focused on 
automatically inserting booby traps into the original program code during 
compilation or program loading. In our case, we examined web software and found 
that inserting booby traps automatically during the software installation process 
makes more sense. The use of booby traps in software can allow the system to 
perform advanced forensics to identify an attack in real-time, to facilitate a deceptive 
response, or a denial of access response.  
A tool often used by network security professionals is a honeypot, an unsecure 
system that is used to draw in hackers. A honeypot does not expose any real system 
but functions as a decoy to draw in attacks so that the patterns attackers used can be 
forensically examined. An exploit can be honey-patched, which means that the 
system administrator concerned is aware of said exploit, but instead of only patching 
the exploit, the system also redirects any attempt to use the exploit to a parallel 
system with an unpatched exploit. This offers system administrators the ability to 
continue tracing a potential intruder and forensically analyse data that is left behind. 
The Linux distribution Active Harbinger includes many tools for active defence, e.g. 
against network scanning and restrictive access to certain services. These are 
important tools for network security professionals, but offer limited help for the 
layman or novice that often employs WordPress installations. 
5.3.2. Return-oriented programming attack on executables 
In Paarnio et al. (2015), we present a technique against code-reuse intrusion attacks 
that are based upon similar principles to return-oriented programming (ROP) in 
executables. Return-oriented programming attacks signifies when an attacker takes 
over program flow control in a network connected computer. This type of attack 
takes place without injection of malicious program code, which makes the attack 
very difficult to detect. In an executable, a return-oriented programming attack is 
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achieved by manipulating the control stack address of a RETN (return from 
procedure) instruction. By manipulating the address, the attacker can choose what 
to execute next. The attack is implemented by execution of a gadget chain. A return-
oriented programming attack is achieved by exploiting some buffer overflow 
vulnerability that starts with an injection that overwrites program code including 
the RETN control stack address. Once a new RETN address is inserted, the program 
flow can be diverted to execute an attacker-defined gadget chain. (Prandini, and 
Ramilli 2012; Roemer et al. 2012) 
To booby trap an executable as an active defence method, a similar method to 
return oriented programming for attacking purposes, can be employed. By inserting 
defensive gadget chains, which disrupt program flow if executed, they may catch 
scanning of or unintended execution of calls in binaries. During compilation or 
program loading, the binary is manipulated by inserting randomly return-oriented 
programming gadgets into the assembly code, including implementing a technique 
called Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR). The Address Space Layout 
Randomisation technique changes instruction addresses randomly. As earlier 
stated, the normal program flow is not aware of the existence of the booby trap 
gadgets and can therefore not trigger them. Address Space Layout Randomisation 
can also change the binary structure, in order to create place for the booby traps. If 
an attacker then scans for access points that have been replaced by the insertion of 
a booby trap, the booby trap will be triggered. Once a booby trap is activated, it can 
send an alert to a system administrator or an intrusion detection system. Figure 4 
illustrates how the binary is modified for the insertion of booby traps, by moving 
gadgets around.  
 
Figure 4 - Booby trap modified executable (Paarnio et al. 2015, reprint with permission) 
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5.3.3. Booby trapping web software 
The basic concept of return-oriented programming attacks/booby traps described 
for executables does not extend directly to web applications. However, application 
code running on a web server can be booby trapped by modifying the source code. 
Since the source code is generally not pre-compiled, it can be modified while being 
installed or at a later stage, once a vulnerability has become known. 
The initial step in our study focuses on known vulnerabilities, which are first 
patched manually and then booby trapped. A potential intruder should be unaware 
of the fact that the patch has been applied. A hacker often uses either a passive or an 
active analysis of installed plug-ins38. Passive analysis focuses on detecting specific 
plug-ins and their vulnerabilities through regular valid HTTP requests, while active 
analysis entails automated scanning to perform hundreds or even thousands of 
mostly invalid HTTP requests. A booby traps function can then be to register 
forensic information once the hacker’s analysis identifies the target and the attack 
begins. 
One of the examples provided in Paarnio et al. (2015) is an exploit for the plug-
in WordPress Wp Symposium 14.11. The plug-in version includes a vulnerable file 
UploadHandler.php that accepts as upload any type of file, which means that a 
malicious shell code file can be uploaded. An exploit script is publicly available that 
creates a backdoor to protected files on a WordPress site by simply uploading a shell 
script39. The exploit allows a script that is uploaded to the server to be called by a 
user, by placing a direct request to said file, with the result that the script will execute 
with web server privileges. The attacker can then execute arbitrary executable code 
on the web server. The vulnerability can be patched by only accepting an upload of 
certain file types. While applying this patch and inserting a call to a booby trap, data 
on anyone who tries to make use of the exploit as well as any script they try to 
execute remotely can be gathered in a log. 
Manually booby trapping all plug-ins installed on a typical WordPress 
installation was found to be both labour intensive and error prone. This approach 
captures only publicly known vulnerabilities. As the potential intruder should be 
unaware of patches applied, it also becomes difficult to manage as the client can 
often detect software version updates on the server. Therefore, a sophisticated 
attacker would be able to determine a likelihood of success for an attack before 
commencing.  
                                                            
38 For further information attacking WordPress, see https://hackertarget.com/attacking-
wordpress/. Accessed 30.07.2016. 
39 For further information see C. Viviani, WordPress Wp Symposium 14.11 - 
Unauthenticated Shell Upload Exploit, http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35543/. Accessed 
30.07.2016. 
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To improve the ease of capture and mitigate the effect of attacks we develop two 
novel approaches: redirecting requests for missing resources and path 
randomisation for installed resources.  
5.3.4. Redirecting Requests for Missing Resources 
When an attacker performs active analysis, a website receives requests for a large 
amount of potentially unknown or missing resources, e.g. files that belong to plug-
ins that are not installed on the system. These requests are normally handled by the 
webserver as a request for a missing resource and a standard response, resource not 
found, is sent to the requester. In the experiments the Apache webserver, which 
offers the web administrator a rule-based rewriting engine for changing requests on 
the fly, was used 40. Changing the source code for WordPress or any plug-in was 
found to be difficult if automation of the process was to be achieved. Instead, we 
propose to rewrite conditions for when a “not found” response is sent to the 
requester. Provided a rule condition is fulfilled, we send the request to a purposely-
designed booby trap. Once the booby trap is called, the attacker can be offered any 
desired response without alerting the attacker that something has changed. In our 
experiment, we were satisfied with logging information. We configured the booby 
trap to log the requested URLs together with certain request parameters such as the 
query string and eventual POST data. Stipulate that the objective is to gather 
complete forensic data about potential intrusion attempts; then the script would be 
programmed to emulate sought after plug-ins in order to deceive the attacker to 
believe the attack may have succeeded. Emulation is often necessary since many 
exploits first attempt to detect whether the actual exploit would succeed or not; the 
payload itself may not be delivered if the detection fails. 
We should note that redirecting requests for missing resources (e.g. files 
belonging to plug-ins that are not installed) to a special script which handles the 
requests is not a novel idea itself. Some web frameworks, for example the Yii 
framework41 and Fat-Free Framework42, force requests to go through the main index 
file of the web application itself if the resource is not found. We employ a similar 
methodology here, but for a different purpose.  
By redirecting bad requests, many types of attacks against a WordPress 
installation can be avoided. An attack caught by the redirection would not have 
succeeded in itself (since the requested resource would not have been found), but 
                                                            
40 For further information on Apache Module mod_rewrite, see https://httpd.apache.org/ 
docs/2.4/mod/mod_rewrite.html. Accessed 30.07.2016. 
41 Yii framework The Fast, Secure and Professional PHP Framework. Accessed 30.07.2016 
http://www.yiiframework.com/. 
42 Fat-Free Framework A powerful yet easy-to-use PHP micro-framework designed to help 
you build dynamic and robust web applications - fast! Accessed 30.07.2016 
http://fatfreeframework.com. 
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we have the opportunity to prevent further attacks, since we can now classify the IP 
address that made the request as malicious. As an active defence mechanism, this 
can thus be made a proactive part of the server’s security system if e.g. used to 
automatically reconfigure the server’s firewall to block further connection attempts 
from the implicated IP addresses. This makes the method effective against active 
scanning by hackers. 
5.3.5. Path Randomisation for Resource Installation 
To further strengthen the security of a WordPress installation, we also developed a 
partial method against passive scanning. In passive scanning the attacker cannot be 
easily detected by normal methods that look for anomalous behaviour, such as 
requests to missing resources. The previous method focused on missing resources, 
but offered no added security for installed plug-ins (existing resources). Passive 
types of attacks may be mitigated by using manual booby trapping, but as earlier 
stated we found that this is not well suited for the average system administrator nor 
does it protect against zero-day vulnerabilities. Instead, we explored the possibility 
of automatically renaming plug-in URIs during installation. Requests using the 
plug-in’s standard URL in a potential exploit would then end up being redirected to 
the booby trap, using the previously described method. For this approach to be 
feasible, no manual modification to the plug-ins or WordPress itself can be done. 
Any manual modification would make their respective update process very 
cumbersome; the same modifications would have to be re-applied every time a plug-
in is updated. Our research shows that this task can be accomplished, at least 
partially, without editing any existing source code, using something we call faked 
redirection.  
Initially we identified three ways in which an attacker may end up running code 
belonging to a WordPress plugin: 
 
 Requests directly to a file belonging to the plug-in 
 
 Using hooks defined by the plug-in. The request goes to index.php and 
is internally routed to a function in the plug-in 
 
 Using POST requests to index.php with execution paths similar to those 
of hooks. 
The term hook defines a technique used to alter or augment the behaviour of an 
application by intercepting function calls or messages or events passed between 
software components. To succeed, all URIs that can lead to plug-in code execution 
must be rewritten with non-standard names. Requests for the rewritten URLs would 
then be internally redirected to the original locations, while requests that have not 
been rewritten would be redirected to the booby trap. This implies that normal site 
usage is unaffected since all requests go through the modified URLs, but an attacker 
attempting to leverage an exploit against a plug-in would fail and end up in our 
booby trap. 
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The concept may be better illustrated through a simplification with the popular 
WordPress Download Manager plug-in as an example43. Normally, the  
plug-in resides in “wp-content/plugins/download-manager”, and one of the  
hooks it uses is called “wpdmdl”. We now substitute all occurrences of “wp-
content/plugins/download-manager” with “wp-content/plugins/faked-download-
manager” and all occurrences of “wpdmdl” with “fake-wpdmdl”. Here we add, 
“faked-” to the URIs, but in a real environment this term could be randomised for 
each separate installation and each plug-in in order to make them unique. 
Since we do not want to modify any files belonging to WordPress itself or one of 
the plug-ins, we use a combination of the mod_substitute44 and mod_rewrite45 
Apache modules. mod_substitute is used to modify the URLs when the content is 
served to the browser, while mod_rewrite handles the task of reversing the 
substitution and eventually redirecting requests to the booby trap. 
5.3.6. Result Outcome 
The aim of section 5.3 was to study and develop new methods for defining and 
improving the security of the CMS-system Wordpress (cf. RQ2). In an experiment, 
we set up a booby trapped honeypot server with a publicly available IP and an 
installation of WordPress. The IP address was not issued a domain name, and 
therefore not indexed by a Domain Name Server. Hence, each access to the 
WordPress installation was through the IP address. Because of this, we can assume 
that any connection either was our own or a potential attacker, automatically 
scanning potential installations. Our experiments focus on detecting that our booby 
traps have been activated. Metadata for each attack that is performed against our 
system and consequently caught by the booby trap, are logged on the server. 
Manually booby trapping exploits in plug-ins showed some additional limitations, 
as in cases were the plug-in could be unnecessarily activated through administrative 
activity. Additionally, booby trapping a plug-in that is included on the main page 
(index.php) is not recommended, as all site traffic should then be filtered. 
On the other hand, redirecting requests for missing resources was quite 
successful and many potentially malicious requests were logged. This includes those 
aimed at exploiting software other than WordPress. Our technique also detected 
attempts to discover vulnerable versions of WordPress plug-ins, which were not 
installed on the server.  
                                                            
43 For the source code to WP Download Manager, see 
https://wordpress.org/plugins/download-manager/developers/. Accessed 30.07.2016. 
44 For the specification for mod_substitute, see 
https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_substitute.html. Accessed 30.07.2016. 
45 For the specification for mod_rewrite, see 
https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_rewrite.html. Accessed 30.07.2016. 
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Initial testing shows that the path randomisation method has the potential to 
catch malicious requests. The faked redirection technique for installed plug-ins 
detected connections that were attempts at exploiting vulnerabilities. Without the 
faked redirection technique in place, the above requests would have succeeded since 
they are perfectly valid. Further study should be performed as to determine if the 
technique could also catch zero-day exploit attacks. However, a zero-day exploit 
tends to have a monetary value, and the use of these exploits tend therefore be 
limited to situations where the attacker can gain a monetary return. Each time the 
attacker uses a zero-day exploit to attack a system it poses the risk of becoming 
known and eventually fixed/unusable. 
The focus of our study was on mitigating effects of automated scripting attacks. 
For the most ardent of attackers, the path randomisation method may be less 
successful if the attacker manages to find the randomised paths, e.g. by guessing or 
through references. The proposed method should be studied further to determine 
potential weaknesses. However, in combination the three methods presented offer 
the system administrator a path towards active defence against malicious attacks (cf. 
RQ2 and RQ2.1). Combining these methods should be particularly useful against 
fully automated attacks, where the attacker is not targeting a specific system, but 
rather scans the Internet for any potential target. Furthermore, our methods offer 
machine learning based network intrusion detection a novel way to create labelled 
training data. This offers the opportunity of further exploration in the use of big 
data in network intrusion detection, defence, and forensics. 
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Our goal is not to build a platform; it's to be across all of them. 
― Mark Zuckerberg 
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6. Platform privacy 
The previous chapters have primarily analysed the ambiguity of the GDPR from a 
technical and service design point of view. However, in recent years we have 
witnessed a shift of focus from individual services/products to platforms and 
ecosystems of users. The Regulation has largely addressed the service side, but while 
the debate regarding its existence has been dragged out over the last 5-10 years, 
Internet technology (software) has gone through an evolution of several 
generations. In consequence, business models have shifted form as well. 
The transfer from a digital product to a service is to a large extent technology 
driven. We can determine a fundamental difference between product and service in 
how both user data and application data are stored. In the product, data are often 
stored locally (on the device), while in the service, data are stored on a server or in 
“the cloud”. Going from a service to a platform is however a more strategic decision 
(Gawer and Cusumano 2008). Building a platform means striving to create a two-
sided market. The focus then becomes one of enabling other service providers to 
join the platform and matching them to consumers/customers of said platform, 
while the platform owner levies a transactional fee on said interaction. The exchange 
medium in the loop between service producer and consumer was defined by Parker 
et al. (2016, p36) to be either information, service, or currency. The more positive 
feedback loops that can be built into the platform, the stronger the platform tends 
to get. The platform can then be described as an infrastructure for facilitating the 
exchange loop(s). 
A right to personal data portability and data security both have an implication 
for the platform, but in the Regulation both are mostly limited to an elementary 
impact. However, in today’s information system environment, platforms are 
considered an integral part of a successful launching of a scalable service. We can 
argue that the new Data Protection Regulation was already too extensive to include 
a more thorough deliberation on platform issues. Consequently, in September 2015 
the EU Commission launched a public consultation on the regulatory environment 
for platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the 
collaborative economy (European Commission 2015). The consultation focused on 
gaining a better understanding of online platforms and the need for further 
regulation. In particular, the consultation focuses on illegal content on platforms, 
such as copyright issues, but it also highlights transparency issues. Here we continue 
with a focus on the privacy rights issues that are closely linked to data protection, 
which we find is not sufficiently elaborated on in the GDPR (cf. RQ3). In this 
chapter, we will argue that regulating privacy and personal online security from a 
platform point of view offers the best opportunity to achieve a more trusting 
relationship between those that provide services on a platform and their users. 
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Platform owners have so far had very little incentive to develop platform privacy 
and the relationship to the platform users (both producers and consumers) are 
mostly governed by unilateral contracts, i.e. provider defined. 
6.1. Platform challenges with the GDPR and current 
practices  
This section analyses the GDPR from two different positions to better understand 
issues that arise from the extensive use of digital platforms. The first perspective is 
data protection for the individual and the second aspect is improving conditions for 
competitiveness for new digitalisation business ventures (including both incumbent 
institutions and start-ups) in relation to the already dominant Internet companies. 
The latter position is thus an analysis of how the Regulation could increase 
competition in the market, as a guarantee for better privacy. Section 2.8 reviewed 
the literature for the theory on platform economy, here we continue by connecting 
the theory to the design and practice of such platforms. To achieve this, we will first 
briefly review the current literature on digital platforms and then analyse how the 
Regulation deals with current practices that are linked to the platform. 
Many of today’s successful digital ventures are considered to take the form of a 
digital ecosystem where companies and consumers coexist. The Android mobile 
operating system is often used as an example of such an advanced ecosystem. A 
digital ecosystem is often described in terms of its natural counterpart, where 
adaptivity, competition and sustainability define the success of the ecosystem. 
Lyytinen and Yoo (2002) started the analysis of such environments based on their 
identified trends in technology of mobility, digital convergence, and mass scale. 
Research from an economic perspective has verified that the ecosystem often can be 
described as a platform for multi-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole 2003). When 
Gawer and Cusumano (2008) argued that creating either a platform or service is a 
strategic decision, they considered a service to be an early version of a platform, a 
service that can also exist upon another platform. For a service to become a platform, 
they considered that the service must satisfy two prerequisite conditions: 
performing at least one essential function that can be described as a “system of use” 
and secondly the system should be easy to connect to or to build upon to expand the 
system of use.  
From a technological perspective we see that scalable information system 
architectures are today often designed on the principle of microservices (Dragoni et 
al. 2016). A microservice is a specialised self-contained software system that 
communicates through lightweight mechanisms and with a bare minimum of 
centralised management of these services. The services may be designed in different 
software environments and use different data storage technologies, but 
communicate through a well-defined application programming interface (API) 
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while using a generic protocol. This type of architecture is particularly well suited 
for building digital platforms that are highly efficient and allow for user data to be 
moved rapidly between services for processing. The technical distinction between 
service and platform is disappearing when the service is designed as a microservice. 
A microservice architecture can be seen as a distributed enabler to achieve service 
scaling in the cloud computing environment. The microservice can contain any 
needed business logic for its independent existence and communication with others. 
From a technical perspective the platform is often defined as the communication 
medium. This communication medium can take many business forms, for example 
as a market for distributing games and applications between consumers and third 
parties. An important insight from Henfridsson and Bygstad’s (2013) work on 
generative mechanisms is the role adaption plays in the availability of user data. The 
availability of extensive user data that can be cross-referenced with similar data from 
other users is at the core of the success of a digital platform. 
In a Gartner report, Ekholm and Blau (2014) analyse the next step in the 
evolution of the personal cloud connected to the vision of Internet of Things. They 
use the term Cognizant Computing to describe how analytics can be used “in order 
to increase personal and commercial information about a consumer through four 
stages: "Sync Me," "See Me," "Know Me" and "Be Me"”. A closely related field with a 
consumer perspective is virtual personal assistants, which by observing its user's 
behaviour, builds and maintains data models, with which it draws inferences about 
people, content, and contexts. Austin et al. (2014) define the virtual personal 
assistant’s intention as “to predict its user's behaviour and needs, build trust and, 
eventually, with permission, act autonomously on its user's behalf”. They estimate 
that current dominant companies such as Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft 
will be best positioned to embark into the new era, partly because of their already 
existing access to massive user datasets. The vision set forth states that, in order to 
benefit from them, it will be in the data subject’s best interest to open up as much as 
possible of our life to the companies that offer these services. 
In their work Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) present the view that previous 
research into digital infrastructures fail to articulate “the multiple paths by which 
successful digital infrastructure evolution comes about”. They pose the argument that 
“there is a tendency to offer partial explanations, rather than focusing attention on 
the complete set of key mechanisms and their interaction.” The question we raise 
based on the discussion of past, present and future is whether this is true of the 
rational governing the legal texts as well. Instead of examining data protection 
through modularity (cf. articles in the Regulation) or individual forces that exert 
pressure, we ought to examine this from a more holistic perspective as a function of 
a service objective (cf. RQ3). How can a Data Protection Regulation return and 
retain the individual user´s trust in digital services, while maintaining the generative 
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mechanisms needed to build tomorrow’s platforms that employs intelligent 
services?  
After examining the Regulation we find that the core aim seem to have been just 
that, to create a Regulation that form the basis for a unified view. The secondary 
aim, at least considering the final version, is still not focused on the generative 
mechanisms and will e.g. not force the platforms to open up their data silos. Zittrain 
(2006, p.2027) considered that to achieve generativity, systems must be open and 
adaptive. Arguably, the Regulation consider instead that the use of data is minimised 
and preferably anonymised, and thereby unlikable to the data subject. As 
Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) also found typical in their research, a partial 
explanation is offered by the Regulation by this static view of data, still we can 
consider that most platforms and intelligent offerings strive for an opposite 
explanation.  
One can make the argument that the Regulation should not deal with platform 
issues or intelligent offerings, but rather focus on the data subject and his personal 
data. The Regulation has already grown about 10 times compared to the Directive 
and has become a relatively complex piece of legislation. The EU Commission 
strategy for a digital single market identifies the open questions of platform 
regulation to determine the regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries, data, and cloud computing, and the collaborative economy 
(European Commission 2015). Here we will continue examining the privacy rights 
issues for platforms that are closely linked to data protection, which we find is not 
elaborated in the current Data Protection Regulation. In the following sub-sections, 
we will focus on platform issues that are not taken up or addressed sufficiently in 
the Regulation, but that may improve the trust and generativity in platforms and 
intelligent services.  
6.1.1. Managing Consent for Services on a Platform 
As categorised in sub-section 3.2.4, the Regulation defines lawfulness of processing 
so that each interaction between the data subject and the controller involving 
personal data identifying the subject, starts with the data subject consenting or 
contracting to the processing of this data (GDPR 2016, art. 6(1)). As described later, 
common current practices particularly in regards to contracting, often strive to 
outmanoeuvre or simply void the purpose of earlier described legislation. 
Maintaining a limited number of these often highly complex contracts and/or 
consents ought to some degree be possible for the data subject, for example email, 
search, operating system/platform, and social network. However, exceeding a 
certain number of these consents and contracts will make it implausible for the 
average data subject to remember what he has agreed to and with whom. Currently 
each application installed on a smartphone or service on the Internet is required to 
maintain their separate contracts when handling personal data. With the present 
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system, it will over time likely become unmanageable for the individual to control 
his digital presence when sharing personal data. For the data subject it will be 
virtually impossible to obtain an overall picture of collected and stored data, which 
in turn leads to difficulties in making decisions about deleting specific data. In our 
view the established legal practices sets unreasonable expectations on the data 
subject. A more appropriate solution would be to impose an obligation on the 
platform controller to periodically submit or on request provide information to the 
subject regarding what data have been collected for any platform service, how data 
have been processed, the results of the processing, and to whom the data have been 
shared (cf. RQ3). The GDPR states that a controller cannot defer any legal 
undertakings to a third party, as the ultimate responsibility remains with the original 
collector of consent. As an example, a mobile platform controller is the collector of 
the original data subject consent to use a platform which involves the processing of 
personal data. The platform controller should thus be given an additional obligation 
that includes the management, storing and maintaining of specific consents to any 
additional third party services (i.e. applications or games) distributed in relation to 
the platform. Today most mobile platforms only register the permission details 
granted to applications that give them access to certain platform APIs, for instance 
a location API to access the geo-location of the user. Currently it is often impossible 
for a data subject to retrieve any information from the platform concerning when a 
service accesses personal data and processes or distributes it further. The said service 
would still need to collect a specific consent from the data subject, but would also be 
obliged to submit information back through the platform on processing details. This 
would allow the data subject to more easily gain a transparent overview on how data 
are collected and used in extension of the platform. Accordingly, a platform 
controller should not be allowed to defer responsibility for any processing that 
occurs by the means of a service provider in relation to said platform. The platform 
controller provides the means for the service offering and benefits from any 
monetary transaction on the platform, thus the legal framework ought to define the 
platform controller’s obligations so that a transparent view of processing by a service 
provider can be easily obtained by the data subject. 
The Regulation delegates a similarly unreasonable expectation upon supervisory 
authorities. Their duties include e.g. launching investigations on their own accord 
and certifying controllers and processors as to let data subjects quickly assess the 
level of data protection provided by any service provider. We consider the proposed 
certification mechanism to be a plausible idea for improving trust and transparency, 
but the implementation and collection of compliance records is questionable. The 
supervisory authorities of the Member States will not have resources to perform this 
task adequately, as it is now defined. Certifying a platform, e.g. a mobile operating 
system, will require in-depth technical and considerable monetary resources to 
perform the certification with any credibility. For a company to merely state 
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compliance to some defined notion of privacy, without there being any transparency 
in regards to processing in said platform or service, does not initiate trust on a 
general level (cf. RQ3). As a solution to the issues of certifying services on a platform, 
a similar solution as described in the previous paragraph would offer supervisory 
authorities means to more easily identify data protection issues that may arise from 
unlawful processing. Provided a supervisory authority is granted access to random 
checks of said platform/service data, for the purpose of verifying that said service 
abide by the consent contract and the law, a certification would signal some level of 
trust. 
6.1.2. Discriminative practices against privacy-aware users 
The business world is facing a challenge in adopting new technology to process big 
data (high-volume, high-velocity and/or high-variety data) and establishing new 
revenue models based on big data analysis. The balancing of user privacy is equally 
demanding, particularly when the availability of data is linked to the future success 
of the platform. This creates a difficult balancing act where data protection may be 
on the one side and the company’s future prosperity is on the other. The definition 
of personal data in the Regulation limits its applicability to physically identifiable 
data subjects, thus there is a lack of protection for virtual identities. An example 
given in sub-section 4.2.6 was an online forum that tracks users without asking for 
or storing any information referring to the identification of a natural person. The 
example illustrated how it is possible for a service provider to profile users without 
the possibility to identify the physical identity of the user.  
In comparison, data that have undergone pseudonymisation, which could only 
be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information from a separate 
data source, should be considered as information on an identifiable natural person. 
A similar protection does accordingly not apply to virtual identities. Although, the 
natural person’s physical identity can be irrelevant for profiling with the intention 
of e.g. direct marketing purposes, the protection for virtual identities hence fall 
outside the scope of the Regulation, as the Regulation only applies to data 
concerning an identified or identifiable natural person (cf. RQ1 and RQ3). This may 
have an implication for decentralised blockchain platforms as well, as the user’s 
identity is normally not revealed. A controller of a blockchain service may thus 
process data relatively freely, provided attempts are not made to identify the physical 
user by storing any such data that can link to a natural person. 
We continue this sub-section by examining some current industry practices that 
we find challenging for the Regulation. We find these practices to have a detrimental 
effect on the individual’s ability to choose his or her level of privacy and data 
protection. Declining giving the controller rights to user data for these services will 
effectively mean a refusal of service by the controller. 
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6.1.2.1. The right to use pseudonyms 
Common practice in the design of current platforms, e.g. smartphone operating 
systems, is to require the user to identify themselves through a physical 
identification mechanism in order for the consumer to be able to make full use of 
the platform and its services. This can e.g. take the form of linking a phone 
subscription (number) to the profile of the smartphone platform operator, by 
requiring the consumer to enter a code sent by SMS to the phone. Employing a 
mechanism that requires physical identification suggests that all platform 
operations and services distributed on said platform are legally bound by the 
Regulation. Hence, e.g. each application consequently installed on a smartphone 
should ask for the data subject’s permission to store and process data. A similar 
authentication process is also often used for signing up to a web service. The 
question we want to raise is whether the platform owner should be allowed to 
require a physical identification mechanism such as linking an email account to a 
phone number or a credit card, unless there exists an explicit legal need for 
identification. As defined earlier, the controller has a monetary interest in collecting 
data by means of user profiles. Being able to combine data from the physical world 
with the digital makes the data collected easily transferable as a service to other 
companies and thus a tradable instrument. However, there can also be certain 
service quality reasons for employing methods based on verified physical identities. 
For example, it can be argued that using a real identity makes users more aware of 
privacy. Due to the user having to make a conscious decision in the linking process, 
the user is also likely to be more vigilant in what information is shared in the future. 
Another argument is that the use of “real names” helps in keeping the community 
safer, by reducing malicious activity and in improving methods for detecting such 
activity. 
Nevertheless, the data subject’s inability to make a conscious decision whether 
or not to link the physical identity to said user profile should not be considered best 
practise. For example, in the case of smartphones, linking a pseudonym (or virtual 
identity) to a hardware-based device ID should be considered adequate, without the 
consumer having to identify himself by physical means. This refers to the process of 
logging in with credentials governed by the smartphone OS operator to make use of 
said device. In the case of public safety reasons, authorities have other means to 
cross-reference a device ID with a natural person through the telecom operators. 
The issue of pseudonym identities has also been raised by German regulators in 
suggested amendments to the current proposal as well as in its interpretation of 
current German data protection law (Unabhängiges 2015). 
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6.1.2.2. Privacy policy as a lock-in mechanism 
Privacy policies (or data policy or terms of service) governing the digital relationship 
between the controller and the data subject are often complicated matters. Research 
has shown that more than half (52%) of Americans do not understand the purpose 
of a privacy policy (Smith 2014). Through a longitudinal study they observed that 
there has been little progress in awareness during the last decade. The majority of 
respondents still believe that the intention of a privacy policy is that the controller 
agrees to keep user data confidential. Facebook (the social network service) has 
perhaps one of the most publicly discussed terms. Facebook’s policy states that the 
user grants Facebook “a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, 
worldwide license to use any IP content” 46 that is uploaded. The company also 
reserves the right to transfer the users’ information between their other services such 
as Facebook Payments, Instagram, and WhatsApp in accordance with their 
respective terms. Thus, a situation is created where users become so intertwined and 
dependent on said company that they arguably can be considered locked in. 
Harrison et al. (2015) found four broad categories of service relationship lock-in 
factors: “Moral/Obligatory Factors”, “Personality Factors”, “Switching Costs and Lack 
of Alternatives”, and “Positive Benefits of Staying”. These factors all contribute to 
creating the privacy paradox. At present there are very few other options for a digital 
social network than Facebook. However, Facebook has become more than a social 
network. Today we can consider them ‘The global communication platform 
company’, often superseding traditional telecom carriers in voice, text, video, 
images, and directory services. This is in addition to their original and still core 
service of users receiving notifications when friends update their profiles. 
The issue we aspire to highlight with this discussion (cf. RQ3) is that from studies 
regarding network externalities we know that digital service companies that can 
manage to lock-in their user base, tend to be able to create and sustain a “processing 
silo” within certain segments (Haucap and Heimeshoff 2014; Argenton and Prüfer 
2012). There are arguably other social network companies than Facebook, such as 
Twitter, but they are currently competing within different segments of the market. 
47 Even Google, who tried creating a competitor to both Facebook and LinkedIn, 
Google+, has not succeeded in getting users to switch and start using the service. In 
the Google+ case it is worth mentioning that Google started with a massive 
persistently signed-in user base from both its email service as well as Android 
operating system. These users were then often reminded that they could merely turn 
on the features for Google+ by clicking an acceptance link. Haucap and Heimeshoff 
                                                            
46 Facebook Terms of Service as of 30.1.2015, Accessed 22.09.2017, 
https://www.facebook.com/terms. 
47 Facebook is estimated, by Statistica 2017, to have 2.05bn global users, whereas the total 
number of social network users worldwide is estimated to be 2.46bn. Accessed 22.09.2017, 
http://www.statista.com/topics/1164/social-networks. 
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(2014) reasoned that if a company can create a proprietary single platform, then 
strong network effects can lead to a highly concentrated market structure. In 
contrast to traditional wisdom regarding monopolies, strong network effects in 
digital services also tend to make highly concentrated market structures efficient. 
Haucap and Heimeshoff (2014), find that this efficiency leads to an unambiguity in 
how market concentration affects consumer welfare. 
Spulberg and Yoo (2014) argued that the network effects are not a source of 
market failure in their denouncement of heightened antitrust scrutiny of network 
industries. They observed that vertical integration and vertical restraints tend to 
promote, rather than harm, competition in network industries. The above example 
of Facebook tends to suggest the same; vertical integration in the company has led 
to what we consider a disruption in the whole communication sector globally. What 
Spulberg and Yoo (2014) seem to fail to recognise in their analysis of natural 
monopolies within the Internet sector is that initial competition within an emerging 
segment does not equal continued competition, given that “processing silos” are 
created and maintained. The lock-in factor at play in today’s platforms mostly relate 
to access to user data 48 and not infrastructure (cost inefficiencies), service 
innovation, or price regulation as they suggest. In the Google+ case this was quite 
evident; the service itself was considered good by many, including media journalists 
(Duffy 2012). However, when it came to user contributed content, very little existed. 
Those that tried out Google+ often did not want to keep cross-posting status 
updates. As a consequence, the uptake was lacklustre and critical mass was not 
achieved. 
Many of the EU Member States have good earlier experiences from the regulation 
of platforms. The telecommunication sector has been transformed through 
regulation from local regional carriers to a functioning pan-European service 
market, with some of the lowest prices and highest quality services in the world. The 
original GSM mobile communication network that was allotted to two or more 
operators, were divided by Member State and not region. The Member States bound 
the interested telecommunication operators to adopt the 2nd Generation GSM 
standard through a competitive tender (Eliassen et al. 2013). The change introduced 
the consumer to a choice of network operator, which could for the first time be based 
on personal preferences. Eventually, in some countries, e.g. Finland, even allowing 
the consumer the option to transfer the phone number between operators. This 
option was important, because it removed the last lock-in mechanism available to 
operators, to “force” consumers to stay with them (cf. RQ3). This indicates the 
regulator’s power to change market dynamics on its own accord for the benefit of 
the consumer. The regulatory environment improved conditions for European 
companies by increasing the market size, but also created an enriched roaming 
                                                            
48 We define user data to include describing, behavioural, created and generated data. 
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experience for European citizens. Comparing to the social networks of today, the 
alternative to a non-regulated mobile telecommunication infrastructure in Europe 
would have been that each operator had developed their own technology that would 
have been incompatible with that of all other operators, including communicating 
from one network to the other. This would likely have created an ecosystem with a 
few pan-European or worldwide operators that most likely would also have 
manufactured their own equipment. From a business point of view this had not 
perhaps been a failure of markets, but from a consumer point of view a drastically 
inferior experience. 
6.2 Exemplification of the importance of platform privacy when 
integrating future Internet of Things enabled services 
This chapter has examined present practices and relevant legislation in connection 
to platforms and privacy. In the following example, we want to illustrate what can 
be expected from the digital services of tomorrow. The intention is to imagine a 
technological vision, serving as a guidance and motivation for the discussion in 
chapter 7 on a proposal for both an architectural change (cf. RQ2 & RQ2.1) and a 
different legislative environment for platforms (cf. RQ3). 
During recent years we have seen the introduction of the first Internet of Things-
enabled devices for the consumer market. Among the first such products launched 
were personal health-monitoring devices. These were first exclusive for various 
fitness enthusiasts, but have later on been introduced as mass-market products. 
These types of products can continually monitor a user’s activity, location and 
certain bodily functions, such as heart rate, brain activity, or glucose. An example of 
an advanced intended use case is to be able to remotely monitor individuals, such as 
elderly people in their own homes. The intention is to enable the individual to 
continue living at home as long as possible, while alerting relatives or health 
supervisors if an anomalous event occurs, such as the person falls down or becomes 
ill. In addition to personal health measuring devices, sensors measuring impact are 
being built into floors, motion detection is used for measuring activity, energy use 
is measured to prevent appliances from running amok, audio recognition can be 
used for detecting shouts for help, to mention a few. Essentially, the more complete 
and real-time data we have about an individual, the better the service quality can be 
made. In addition to previously mentioned data types, we are here referring also to 
behaviour, usage, the individual’s social network and their corresponding data. The 
example illustrates how sensitive the information gathered can be and to what the 
technological progress is heading. Data flow for this type of service often includes 
limited storage on the sensor device and with long term storage in the cloud. Often 
there is an intermediary device required as well, e.g. a computer or a smartphone, 
were data is cached within a certain application. User data is hopefully always secure 
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and encrypted but this is not possible to explore for an average user. The processing 
of data would likely be in the cloud, provided the data communication is real-time.  
The example highlights the positive application and progressive use of data 
collection and processing for the purpose of creating intelligent prescriptive services 
(cf. RQ3). However, from a legal standpoint the intention of the Regulation is that 
data should be collected, processed and stored in a data minimising way. At the same 
time, the Regulation does not provide the data subject with the right to review the 
security in the data flow for the platform/service. As data subjects we are currently 
forced to trust that the controller collects data in a minimalistic way, processes data 
only with the data subject’s best in mind, stores data securely, always promptly 
notifies us when data are shared or breached and, given that the subject wants to 
close the account, taking for granted that the provider actually deletes all data in a 
non-retrievable fashion. This is the primary reason we consider the rationale behind 
the Regulation to be antiquated and why we call for an increased focus on platform 
privacy. Closed systems tend to instil distrust as a lack of transparency into said 
systems means any processing or security can and should be questioned in terms of 
validity. 
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The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge faster than society 
gathers wisdom. 
― Isaac Asimov  
   
 124 
 
 125 
7. Discussion and Future Research 
Trust as a key design goal for information systems encompasses a wider definition 
than data protection in the Regulation. Trust includes, inter alia, security 
implications such as an ability to easily switch between different platforms and 
choose between different service levels. This thesis presents an understanding of 
trust that also includes processing on data which is generated by man or machine 
alike, without any direct separation of data linking to a natural or virtual person. 
The example provided in section 2.4 of Microsoft’s experiment with a chatbot that 
learns from previous communication showed that increasingly, through a symbiotic 
process, algorithms and humans will develop a collective intelligence (Malone and 
Bernstein 2015). Recent claims against Google’s search engine suggest that a similar 
symbiotic learning process has revealed sensitive information regarding for example 
the identity of juvenile delinquents, where the search algorithms have learned and 
extrapolated from other users’ interaction (Duffy 2017). Although such symbiotic 
relationships are the aim of many intelligent personal agents, they are likely to cause 
clashes with the legal view of data protection and privacy in general. Trust as a key 
design goal is further discussed from an intelligent system design point of view in 
section 7.1, from a technical viewpoint in section 7.2, and from a platform viewpoint 
in section 7.3. 
Data protection as a term in the EU legislation is reserved for defining the 
lawfulness of processing personal data, whereas, the term privacy is not used in the 
Regulation. Privacy on the other hand can be considered to be used in the US as an 
extended synonym for data protection. Examples of such US laws that define 
sectorial privacy are the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act49 and 
the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act50. Both terms used in their respective 
setting tend to be limited in regards to security aspects of how to keep data subjects 
safe. Security can be defined through a number of viewpoints in digital services, e.g. 
information security, network security, access control, or availability. Section 7.1 
highlights some important interpretations that can be derived from the GDPR, 
particularly in regards to such processing of personal data that leads to profiling and 
automated processing. The ambiguities in the GDPR discussed in section 7.1 present 
an architectural design such as client-side processing as a way of avoiding many of 
the issues that personal data processing services encounter with a traditional 
centralised architecture. 
                                                            
49 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA; Pub.L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 
1936, enacted August 21, 1996). 
50 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA; Pub.L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681-728, 
enacted October 21, 1998) 
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An EU Directive on Network and Information Security (2016/1148) was adopted 
to, inter alia, establish security and notification requirements for operators of 
essential services and certain digital service providers (NIS, art. 14(3) and art. 16(3)). 
The operators are to be identified by Member States continuously, on criteria related 
to defining an essential/critical service in the Member State, including digital 
infrastructure of non-traditional Internet industries. However, such Member State 
lists are not considered complete or limiting, rather companies should be vigilant in 
determining their own stature within the various Member States. NIS can be 
considered providing an operator with a minimum level of obligations related to 
their information systems security. It should be noted that the NIS is not legally 
applicable for a great deal of digital platform and service companies. Rather the NIS 
can be considered a minimum best practice for these companies. All companies 
processing personal data are guided by the GDPR, and are thus required to use 
appropriate security to reduce the risk and scope of security incidents. The term 
appropriate security is discussed and a proposal for what should constitute 
appropriate security in a modern information system is provided in section 7.2. 
One of the GDPR challenges identified in the thesis is how to handle personal 
data in connection to platforms. We have presented the concept of the platform as 
a processing silo that from a legal point resembles the discussion in the 1990’s 
surrounding telecom operators and their ability to lock-in customers. We have 
highlighted that a marked difference between then and now is how the cost for using 
the service is determined, highlighting the issues that arise from the consideration 
that the interchange of personal data means that no monetary payment has been 
provided. Thus, today many platform operators consider the data subject a ‘user’ 
and not a ‘consumer’, with the corresponding rights that have been established over 
many decades. Changing this dynamic will be difficult, as currently the vertical 
integration among the more successful platform companies, have led to that few 
other alternatives may exist. The efficiency in using the network effect has enabled 
the platform companies to develop a business model that in many other consumer-
facing industries would be considered either monopolistic or oligopolistic. In 
section 7.3, we highlight three problem areas that need to be addressed by a future 
EU Regulator, provided that these platforms as maintainers of processing silos are 
considered problematic. Here we limit the focus to the GDPR, but this has a much 
broader implication for the Regulator, for example by involving policies on anti-
trust, consumer protection, national security, and taxation. 
7.1. Design of Intelligent Systems Handling Personal Data 
Processing that aims at creating data subject profiles or automated decision making 
which creates a legal effect or significantly affects said person, is limited to situations 
where consent is given or for the performance (or in anticipation) of a contract. 
Additional provisions apply for such processing as the data subject can demand that 
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the controller provides human intervention and that any decision is contestable (see 
chapter 4 for further analysis). The full implication for intelligent systems will only 
become known over the coming decades when these services are rolled out and the 
courts further define the implication. There has been discussion in the EU 
Parliament of regulating AI and robotics further that, at the time of writing, has led 
to a report with general considerations for what aspects can and should be 
considered if constructing regulation (European Parliament 2017). The subject of 
how to govern AI and AI-enabled robots including the accountability aspects of AI 
algorithms, although interesting for future research, is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Here we focus on the privacy aspect of intelligent services and pose the 
following research question:  
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RQ 1. What are relevant interpretations and ambiguities for information systems 
that can be derived from the GDPR, particularly in regard to such 
processing of personal data that leads to profiling and automated 
processing? 
The symbiotic learning relationship between man and machine is likely to 
continue to interest researchers for decades ahead. Let us here consider the issue 
from the perspective of designing trusted personal assistant agents that conform to 
the privacy rights in the EU. We can find a connection to information systems 
research in how these agents are trained and how training data are sampled. In both 
Microsoft’s and Google’s case the algorithms are trained using normative (group) 
sampling, and this can also be considered the most common approach in current 
use. This means that the training sample is based on the interaction of all users. 
Thus, something learned from one user is generalised and transferred to any other 
user. We can define normative learning as that the subject acts rationally and that 
analysis of the group provides insight into the individual (cf. section 2.1) (Lorscheid 
and Troitzsch 2009; Tuyls and Parsons 2007). A different approach to the problem 
is to focus on learning using individual sampling, thus descriptive learning assumes 
that the subject is irrational and requires analysis of the individual subject in order 
to gain insights into his behaviour (Tuyls and Parsons 2007). Normative learning in 
contrast aims to introduce prescriptive elements (e.g. opinions of other users) that 
may offend and/or propose moral values that are not generalisable. This separation 
of sampling may offer researchers/developers an approach toward creating agents 
that are compliant with the European fundamental rights. To use an analogy, each 
citizen can claim a right to freedom of expression provided no harm or offense is 
incurred on any other natural or legal person. Individual sampling can be likened to 
the right to freedom of expression while normative sampling can at times introduce 
harming or offensive behaviour into the agent. When the symbiotic relationship is 
exclusive between the agent and the human, we can consider any potential offensive 
behaviour self-induced. Thus adopting trust as a key design goal for agents suggests 
that individual sampling for descriptive learning offers a path forward that is 
guaranteed to be compliant with the GDPR. For normative learning to be compliant, 
a generalisation criterion must be defined for the transfer learning between 
individuals to occur. The criterion should take into consideration the possibility of 
the training sample containing a learning bias that may be offensive. 
To design prescriptive services, one needs to go beyond data minimisation as 
required by the GDPR (cf. section 2.8). To ensure a high decision quality of digital 
personal agents using prescriptive techniques, it will require that the data subject 
provides the algorithm with every single data point that refers to the data subject. 
The more comprehensive data that exist as input for the model, the better the output 
result can become. However, we can consider it likely that data from the 
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surroundings will improve the model further. Techniques for obfuscating data are a 
current and important research topic, for example differential privacy considers 
how to add (mathematical) noise to data in order to improve the privacy of data 
collection practices. A different type of method that is being researched is the use of 
distributed ledgers (e.g. the blockchain) for storing personal data (Mainelli 2017). 
The distributed ledgers would add cryptographic security, access control, access logs 
for forensic investigations, and perhaps most importantly would remove the central 
point of failure. A company without complete access to the data subject’s data will 
be unlikely to launch a successful intelligent personal assistant service that utilises 
prescriptive analytics to deliver decision support or acts on the behalf of the data 
subject. Gartner’s prediction that current platform companies will be the ones 
leading this new area is thus very likely (Austin et al. 2014). Platform companies 
with a high degree of vertical services on the platform will be best positioned to 
legally collect data in a broad sense that can then be utilised in the creation of 
tomorrow’s intelligent services. 
An ambiguity identified in the GDPR is how client-side processing that occurs 
outside the direct control of a controller should be handled. Recent launches of 
smartphones have specific hardware included for enabling efficient operation of 
machine learning algorithms. Client-side processing has been possible in the 
browser on desktops, but the introduction of new hardware in smartphones creates 
new possibilities for building intelligent services for mobile devices that do not need 
to communicate with a centralised server to reach a decision. This probes the 
question that, provided no communication using personal data with the outside 
world is implemented in said service or application, how does the GDPR then apply 
to the design of intelligent services. As in the example presented (section 4.2.6) with 
virtual identities that do not receive protection, we can only assume that the 
application of the GDPR would be limited, for example, in the case of client-side 
profiling. As the applicability of the GDPR is connected to the ability of the 
controller, or third party, to directly or indirectly identify a data subject using 
personal data, then in such cases where client-side processing offers no ability for 
the controller to access such data, we need to consider whether the GDPR is 
applicable or not. These are the types of boundary cases that will likely require 
further elaboration by the courts. As an observation, from a data protection point of 
view one can make the argument that client-side processing would in many cases be 
preferable to server-side processing, because of data minimisation and privacy by 
design requirements in the Regulation. However, in the longer perspective we may 
need to verify that the algorithms are dependable and accountable, and this may 
require additional legislation that has an implication on how autonomous agents 
operate and report. 
An interesting aspect for information systems researchers is how management 
support systems will be affected by the GDPR when processing personal data. 
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Considering in particular the lawfulness of the analytical component of MSS and 
similar consumer facing systems provides information systems researchers with a 
new and highly relevant field to research. The GDPR does not make any distinction 
between personal data when it is handled for employment or for health reasons, 
compared to for instance direct marketing. The thesis has connected MSS to the 
GDPR by considering the level of automatisation in expert systems (fully) and 
decision support systems (partially) respectively. Automated agents acting on the 
behalf of the data subject has also been introduced as a concept for describing digital 
personal agents, albeit these are still in their infancy. The use of fully automated 
expert systems will thus likely be limited to processing that does not use personal 
data. Decision support systems that handle personal data must support manual 
intervention at every decision making step in the process. 
7.2. Active Network Security in Scalable System 
Architectures 
The GDPR does not define measures for system security, but states that appropriate 
security must be used. This section provides a discussion of findings in the thesis 
concerning what should constitute appropriate security. We highlight through three 
exploratory case studies (cf. chapter 5) the need for adaptive security and the 
integration of data generators built into the software, in what we define as active 
network security. The network term is inserted to capture that in virtual 
environments nearly all the threats materialise over a network connection, hence 
active network security is not only concerned with the transportation layer, but also 
includes suspicious use of or direct attacks on end-points, such as API’s and web 
user interfaces.  
In Grahn et al. (2017) we define a taxonomy for active network security that 
considers near real-time techniques for improving network security. Figure 5 
illustrates the taxonomy categories from the perspective of an analytics workflow. It 
should be noted that active network security extends beyond adaptive network 
security using analytics into, for example, booby trapping and the identification and 
application of advanced security measures to be taken after an intrusion 
attempt/event. In addition, active network security should be seen as 
complementary to passive methods, and not as a replacement. 
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Figure 5 - Active network security taxonomy (adapted from Grahn et al. 2017) 
 
The discussion in this section attempts to answer the following two research 
questions: 
RQ 2. What future technical implications can “appropriate security”, defined as 
a legal requirement for lawful processing under GDPR, entail for scalable 
information system architectures? 
RQ 2.1. With focus on security in publicly accessible software, what is a 
viable technology basis for a scalable processing architecture? 
The combination of scalable systems that can potentially handle billions of users 
and traditional passive security is problematic because of the impact on society when 
a breach occurs (Newman 2017a, 2017b). Once an attacker gains access to such a 
system, it may mean that the complete data store can be accessed and transferred 
outside the company network without the controller’s knowledge, as in the Yahoo 
case (O'Brien 2017). Any software installation accessible over the Internet is 
potentially vulnerable, and thus such systems should always be designed and built 
so that even if an attacker gains access, the potential for damage is limited to a small 
number of users. This requires that the attack can be detected in near real-time and 
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that detection and decision-making is automated. The attack vector may differ 
depending on whether the software is proprietary or open source, but both source 
types are similarly vulnerable if the software is not kept updated. 51 52 So-called one-
day attacks occur when a bug is publicly known but not patched, whereas a zero-day 
attack occurs when a bug is known by the attacker but not by the public. By 
definition the system owner can defend against one-day attacks by either updating 
the software or by taking the software offline when a bug is identified, while zero-
day attacks typically are very difficult to defend against. In section 5.3 we present 
the preliminary work on a novel method for defending against both one-day and 
zero-day attacks on web software. The aim of our work was to develop a method (a 
set of techniques) that improve the ability to defend against both one-day and zero-
day attacks, which can be applied to an installation without any significant changes 
to the existing codebase, and to enable active security management by implementing 
data generators that can be connected to various analytics-based security systems. 
In section 5.2, we provide a study of such an analytics-based security system for 
network intrusion detection. The method for defending against both one-day and 
zero-day attacks on web software is based on three techniques: booby trapping, 
redirecting requests, and path randomisation. Although the difficulty in showing 
conclusive proof of its effectiveness against any possible attacks today or in the 
future, preliminary findings are positive. Future research could be conducted as a 
longitudinal study of how well the system withstands attacks by setting up a 
honeypot server and connecting an analytical security management solution for 
detecting anomalies and controlling traffic. By continuously monitoring new bugs 
and their consequent patches for a longer time, we would be able to monitor the 
different attack vectors used and how well our method withstands the test of time. 
Section 5.1 provides an insight into the low-level architecture of scalable systems 
underlying so-called Analytics as a Service (AaaS). Based on these three explorative 
studies in chapter 5, the thesis highlights the converging trend towards distributed 
architectures, adaptive security based on analytical methods, and the use of data 
generators inserted into public end-point installations. 
7.2.1. Distributed Architectures and Decentralised Systems 
The traditional information system architecture usually aims at separating the 
application logic (i.e. the implementation of the business logic) and the data store. 
Connecting the application logic and the data store with an enterprise service bus 
                                                            
51 An example of an attack on proprietary software, 
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/05/12/wannacrypt-ransomware-worm-
targets-out-of-date-systems/  
52 An example of an attack on open source web software,  
https://qz.com/1073221/the-hackers-who-broke-into-equifax-exploited-a-nine-year-old-
security-flaw/  
 133 
became the foundation for the centralised monolith architecture. However, in 
practice the enterprise service bus often also connects different application logic 
modules together, thereby contributing to the difficulty of detecting intrusions and 
massive data leaks by monitoring the traffic on the enterprise service bus. Once the 
application logic, for example a public endpoint, is breached the attacker may gain 
sufficient access behind the outer firewalls to continue to breach the whole network. 
The introduction of horizontally scalable systems into enterprise architectures 
requires a radically different approach than the traditional one. The introduction of 
IoT-enabled devices, smartphones, and digital platforms that all handle personal 
data governed under the GDPR, suggests that the traditional passive security 
methods cannot be considered appropriate security. As determined in chapter 5, to 
assess the appropriate level of security, account shall be taken of risks presented by 
data processing. For example, provided the communication over the enterprise 
service bus cannot be analysed in real-time, while the company is still able to send 
and receive user data in real-time, then the appropriate level of security should not 
be considered achieved. If an attacker gains access through such a public end-point, 
it may mean the attacker also gains direct or indirect access to the data store. Thus, 
the monolithic architecture for scalable systems with public end-points may be 
considered problematic from a security point of view.  
IoT security is also an issue that currently faces a challenge in scaling with the 
explosive growth of IoT-enabled devices (e.g. home monitoring cameras) (Pulkkis 
et al. 2018). This is considered due to their reliance on a centralised update service 
and a device-required configuration (Kshetri 2017). This centralised governance 
architecture may act as a bottleneck or point of failure that then disrupts the entire 
network. Other attack vectors such as vulnerability to distributed denial-of-service 
attacks, hacking, data theft, and remote hijacking also exists. In this thesis, we are 
primarily considering IoT-devices when they handle personal data, for example 
wearable devices, webcams, home automation/security systems, or digital personal 
assistants, but their security concerns a broader perspective. Malicious IoT-
networks (called botnets) have become a threat to the information society and 
although botnets are not necessarily handling personal data, their vulnerabilities 
influence security in other systems handling personal data. The IoT-architectures 
tend to be distributed, while the system governance can be centralised or 
decentralised. A similar distributed architecture can be found in scalable systems 
that for example employ microservices. In our view, decentralised system 
governance tend to work better for distributed architectures than centralised. 
Based on the discussion above, we can identify three main categories in 
monolithic designs that can be differently addressed through decentralised systems. 
 
 Application logic 
 
 Data management 
 
 System governance 
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The use of microservice architectures (cf. chapter 2) to create scalable systems 
potentially enables the system operator to both localise problems and to improve 
the creation of autonomous security supervision. Using the three categories above 
and combining with analytics objectives for IT-security, a framework for handling 
and improving security in scalable distributed architectures is presented in Table 6. 
The framework offers an overview of how active network security can be a solution 
for achieving the status of “appropriate security” as the general data protection 
regulation loosely defines. 
A current challenge for organisations in using distributed architectures e.g. a 
platform based on microservices, lies in how authentication and authorisation for 
each microservice is handled. The de-facto industry standard for handling 
authorisation is OAuth2 (Hardt 2012). The authorisation challenge for different 
architectures can be described as data traversing in the non-scalable monolith often 
between point-to-point, in the scalable monolith often as point-to-multipoint, while 
in the decentralised system (e.g. microservice, mobile, or IoT architectures) data 
may need to flow multipoint-to-multipoint. The challenge with OAuth2 is that it 
delegates security concerns to the SSL protocol. This means that the client 
authenticates the server by using the provided SSL certificate. As the server does not 
authenticate the client, this means the server has no way of knowing who is actually 
sending the request. In data flow architectures this may be problematic as it may 
lead to for example man-in-the-middle attacks. However, because of the challenge 
new solutions that improve upon existing solutions have been proposed that instead 
use decentralised authorisation technology (e.g. Crary and Sullivan 2015; Moffatt 
2016). For example, by utilising the blockchain as an authorisation backbone 
infrastructure, devices can potentially communicate securely, exchange data with 
each other, and perform transactions automatically by using smart contracts. 
Currently a major factor impeding this development is related to the processing 
throughput of blockchains. A current emerging research area is how to other types 
of distributed ledgers or how to modify the blockchain workflow through the use of 
state channels for the verification of state changes outside the blockchain, and then 
registering only a minimal record on the blockchain for forensic purposes. 
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Table 6 - Analytics-based Framework for Active Network Security 
Analytics Framework for Active Security in Scalable Architectures Analysis 
  Application layer Data management System Governance Input Output 
Descriptive 
analytics 
-Quantify historic 
application usage 
patterns. 
-Identify anomalous 
patterns. 
-Quantify historic data 
store access patterns. 
-Quantify historic 
scaling patterns, 
internal network 
patterns, and instance 
access monitoring. 
-Historic 
data. 
-Pattern 
recognition 
models. 
Diagnostic 
analysis 
-Provide a near real-
time anomaly threat 
analysis of deviating 
usage behaviour, 
using adaptive models 
based on descriptive 
analytics. 
-Provide active 
intrusion 
management, by 
monitoring the 
techniques described 
in section 5.3. 
-Provide a near real-
time threat analysis of 
deviating access 
behaviour, using 
adaptive models based 
on descriptive 
analytics. 
-Provide a near real-
time resource analysis 
of deviating instance 
behaviour and 
instance access, using 
adaptive models 
based on descriptive 
analytics. 
-Real-
time 
data. 
-Alerts. 
Predictive 
analytics 
-Forecast trends in 
usage behaviour and 
determine potential 
oncoming peaks that 
can disrupt the 
service, e.g. a Denial 
of Service attack. 
-Predict access 
behaviour, both on 
user level and on data 
store level. 
-Classify deviating 
behaviour that 
indicate oncoming 
malicious data 
transfers. 
-Predict instance and 
system failure. 
-Forecast deviating 
behaviour that 
indicates oncoming 
malicious system 
behaviour. 
-Real-
time 
data. 
-Signals 
based on 
probability. 
Prescriptive 
decision 
making 
-Application alerts or 
signals are activated, 
then initiate 
autonomously specific 
decisions from the 
governance rule set, 
e.g. refuse access to 
the service for a 
specific user or 
redirect request to a 
honeypot installation. 
- Data mgmt. alerts or 
signals autonomously 
initiate specific 
decisions from the 
governance rule set, 
e.g. aborting a data 
transfer or revoking 
user access to data 
store. 
-Defines a rule set of 
generalised decisions 
to mitigate the effect 
of attacks, e.g. 
revoking system 
access or starting 
more instances to 
cope with increased 
processing load. 
-Maintains an 
operative overview 
for the system of 
decisions taken. 
-Alerts 
and 
signals. 
-Decisions. 
Forensic 
analysis 
-Record all user 
interactions with a 
service in a user-
transparent way in an 
immutable data store 
that is only accessible 
for forensic purposes 
and where data is 
either encrypted, 
pseudonymised, or 
anonymised. 
-Record data store 
access, actions, and 
data transfers in an 
immutable data store. 
-Record system 
access in an 
immutable data store. 
-Provide forensic 
analysts with access 
to user interactions, 
data store forensic 
data, and system data.  
-Provide methods to 
analyse said data. 
-Real-
time 
data. 
-Historic 
data. 
Visual 
interactivity 
-Provide a human operator decision support through visual overviews of 
analysis methods above, incl. specific behavioural views of different 
type of actors in the system.  
-Interactive ability to act on non-automated alerts or decisions and to 
launch new analysis efforts. 
-Real-
time and 
historic 
data. 
-Visual 
interaction. 
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7.3. Platform Privacy Regulation 
Thus far in this chapter we have examined which security measures companies can 
take to appropriately secure their information systems and how the GDPR holds up 
in a technical environment driven on by the development of intelligent services. The 
final section will look towards the data driven economy that supports digital 
platforms, to explore some future policy options. It should be noted that the 
discussion is targeted at incumbent large-scale platforms offering intelligent services 
and is not applicable to every website. This follows a similar classification as that 
which been defined in the GDPR regarding the requirement of appointed data 
protection officers in certain organisations and in the NIS regarding whom it applies 
to. The section focuses on the following research question: 
RQ 3. What is a potential future direction for EU privacy regulation in guiding 
the continued development of digital platforms? 
The challenges that face the individual’s right to privacy are substantial. Some 
ten years ago, data was first termed as the oil of the digital economy (Palmer 2006). 
Today, user generated data has arguable become the currency of the virtual world. 
The more complete and timely data we have about an individual, the more it is also 
worth to a service provider and particularly a platform provider. Complete data is 
here defined as accurate, but also as encompassing and in-depth as imaginable. 
Determining the exact worth of user data is difficult, as the intrinsic value is 
dependent on many factors, such as type of data, accuracy, timeliness, and 
uniqueness. In addition, the market value depends on factors such as the ability of 
the company to create insight based on the data, connect the data subject to a service 
market, and then monetise upon these earlier findings.  
The difficulty in determining user data valuation and setting a standardised price 
for customers led for example Google to create an auction market, AdWords,53 for 
selling targeted advertising based on consumer activity to third parties. The auction 
market allows Google to create a dynamic pricing logic that self-regulates based on 
demand and availability. Many other platform companies today (e.g. Facebook and 
LinkedIn) have a similar model or a variation of the model in use. 
 Although we today may consider our ability to a private digital life impractical 
and unmanageable, it is likely we have only taken the first step on the digitalisation 
journey. Estimates by IDC on behalf of the EU Commission considers the data 
driven market in the EU for 2016 to roughly amount to 2% of GDP. 54 Under an 
                                                            
53 See the official Adwords documentation, accessed 29.10.2017 
https://adwords.google.com/home/ 
54 See European Data Market (SMART 2013/0063) Final Report, by IDC and Open Evidence 
for the European Commission, published 1.2.2017 
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increased investment scenario, the data driven economy is expected by IDC to more 
than double until 2020 (in absolute numbers from € 300 B (2016) to € 739 B (2020)). 
Sectors that become data driven can offer double-digit growth for the near future, 
something the EU economy acutely needs. The EU Commission’s strategy for a 
digital single market is an important effort in propelling companies to invest toward 
becoming data driven. As the platform companies have shown, the platform can be 
a very efficient business model for accumulating personal data and to profit from 
the interaction of market participants. However, the current business model for data 
subject facing platforms also raise many questions and fears, both from a data 
protection point of view and societal impact. To mention two common mischiefs; 
does the platform misuse personal data, including insights based on such data, and 
how do platform companies contribute to the local society where the consumer 
resides, in for example local tax returns. 
Economic research into platforms may yet have to conclude how to value user 
data in relation to a platform. For antitrust cases Grunes and Stucke (2015) 
highlighted the problematic relationship of free services that are paid in user data, 
but where user data have no determined value. The value of collected user data can 
be estimated in individual cases by any current or future service that may entice the 
user to continue using said service. Therefore, it can be argued that existing user 
data should always be considered of value, even if left unprocessed. Grunes and 
Stucke (2015, p.7) probe the question why companies would otherwise continue to 
“spend a considerable amount of money offering free services to acquire and analyze 
data to maintain a data-related competitive advantage”. User data in a digital format 
bears at least the cost of the research and development that has gone into 
implementing said platform. Perhaps more importantly, in practice, the value of 
user-contributed data is best determined by the value it provides the company which 
accumulates the data, to create a barrier of entry towards future entrants. A 
comparison to Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and the later allegations and 
consequent fines imposed from the EU Commission of non-transparent activity on 
behalf of the acquirer during the acquisition process can be made (Lunden 2014; 
White 2016; European Commission 2017). Acknowledging that all personal data has 
a monetary value, although indeterminable in a generalised way, may also improve 
the ability of regulatory authorities to consider platform privacy in anti-competitive 
terms. 
Privacy in general is of immense importance in improving our trust towards the 
digital society, but particularly so in a world where we are striving to create 
intelligent services that can advise us humans what to do or even act on our behalf. 
Still consumers are saying that privacy issues are a great challenge and that 44% of 
consumers do not trust the companies or platforms behind today’s digital platforms 
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and services with their personal data. 55 When personal data are used for creating 
insights about users and then traded forward for profit (supported by privacy 
policies), it can cause users harm. Pew Research (Smith 2014) found that in a large 
majority of cases exploitation of user data causes uncertainty and that confidence in 
service providers is weakened. Therefore, it should be highlighted that the 
Regulation is not only one dimensional, in the sense that its existence is to only 
guarantee the protection of the data subject. Rather the Regulation also offers a 
notion of long-term business opportunity, if realised correctly, by improving the 
consumers trust in companies and their platforms/services. Future Internet of 
Things-enabled platforms are likely to record anything (behaviour, voice, video, and 
other special categories of sensitive data) that occurs in the consumer’s personal 
space (e.g. private residence). It should then become evident that these services will 
need the trust of the consumer. The more encompassing the data that is being 
processed regarding the data subject is, the greater the importance of how privacy 
and consumer choice regarding the platform is regulated becomes. 
Early influencers on the design of privacy preserving information systems, 
defined the task to accomplish as “The Path to Anonymity” (van Rossum, 
Gardeniers, and Borking 1995). We also find that the current EU rational for data 
protection is based on the premise that anonymity is plausible and desired. The 
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, has been interpreted as 
equivalent to a right for anonymity for a natural person. The design rational 
presented by van Rossum, Gardeniers, and Borking (1995) explores a number of 
potential techniques and how privacy enhancing technology can be employed in 
information systems. Although the technological jargon presented in their work is 
still mostly accurate, from a modern digital platform development point of view we 
consider the anonymity target as a utopian objective. At the time, information 
systems were mostly closed off and user data was very costly to store. Whereas today 
a state-of-the-art digital infrastructure is often described as an evolutionary entity 
that employs generative mechanisms in its inner workings that determine its success 
over time. 
Based on our reasoning, we formulate three theses that we consider should be the 
leading indicators for data protection platform legislation when it comes to the 
consumer-business platform relationship. 
1. Every networked device is inherently vulnerable, i.e. leaking information, 
but some more than others. 
2. All personal data can be assigned a monetary value and data describing the 
data subject will be stored for an indefinite time, and data will eventually be 
processed. 
                                                            
55 For further details see http://www.trustarc.com/blog/2016/01/28/state-online-privacy-
2016/. Accessed 29.10.2017. 
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3. Privacy does not equal anonymity, as there cannot be true anonymity in a 
near-fully connected world. 
In chapter 6 we posed a question regarding how trust can be created for digital 
platforms, we think that the following definition of privacy could regain and keep 
the individual user’s trust in digital platforms: 
 
 Privacy should be a right for each data subject to continuously monitor and 
actively participate in the control of where and how data pertaining to the 
individual is stored, handled, consumed, transferred, and erased. 
Additionally, any personal data collected through the use of the platform, 
should be monitorable and controllable through the same platform. The same 
applies for any insights gained by using personal data collected through the 
platform by the platform operator or by a third-party service. 
When considering the traditional digital services offered on the Internet the 
GDPR offers a relatively good balance between data subject privacy and company 
profiting, but when considering the platform model we find the GDPR relatively 
limited. The remainder of the section focuses on elaborating on this inadequacy and 
providing detailed suggestions for improving platform privacy.  
Today, data subjects are often completely exposed to platform providers, and 
there is often little or no privacy in regards to a handful of global companies. As 
contended in chapter 6, this is enforced through complex privacy policies were users 
are forced to give up their rights and data protection laws are circumvented. These 
companies have gone to lengths to create as complete registers as possible on their 
users. For example, this has been achieved by creating data collection syndicates for 
registering information from not only their own service, but also when a data subject 
uses the services of other companies that implement the same technology. 56 So far, 
the gathered information mostly contains behaviour related data for direct 
marketing purposes, but future development is not limited to this. Automotive 
companies (e.g. Tesla) have launched semi-autonomously driving cars that work by 
accurately scanning the surrounding environment, which the companies then want 
to monitor continuously. For example, fleets of these cars would very effectively be 
able to police fellow road-users, by reporting to authorities which registration 
numbers has passed by, the speed of other cars, and distances between cars (cf. 
public interest analysis). The introduction of new Internet of Things data sources 
                                                            
56 One such example is Google’s Display Network that employ a technique referred to as 
Remarketing, which uses cookies placed in a user’s web browser by other websites to track 
the users earlier web history. According to Google’s own marketing material: ”With millions 
of websites, news pages, blogs, and Google websites like Gmail and YouTube, the Google 
Display Network reaches 90% of Internet users”. Accessed 31.10.2017 
https://adwords.google.com/home/how-it-works/display-ads/ 
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(or data generators) makes it even more important that data subjects are given 
comprehensive control of data related to them in near real-time. Our definition of 
platform privacy focuses on the data subject as an active actor, who can and should 
make a conscious decision regarding how privacy should be invoked also after that 
the consent contract has been signed. The definition is motivated by the data 
subject’s capacity and capability to choose an alternative platform service approach, 
which we find is lacking in the current Regulation. Forcing companies, which have 
already achieved a de-facto monopolistic or oligopolistic position through their 
“processing silo” platform, to truly open up user-generated data would, in addition 
to improving privacy, also lead to an improved competitive digital landscape in 
Europe. 
7.3.1. Competition and consumer choice in the data intensive business 
Although the digital platforms have improved their practice regarding personal data 
portability since we authored the original paper (Westerlund and Enkvist 2016), the 
underlying issues with competition and consequent limited consumer choice in data 
intensive business, still exist. In the previous sections, we argued that the network 
externality effect contributes to create de-facto monopolies in the digital world 
through the creation of “processing silos”. We consider the fundamental reason for 
this to be the immobility of data among platforms. Data immobility provides 
incumbents with an entry barrier against new competition. Data immobility 
includes user identification, user data, and user profiles. Cerf and Quaynor (2014) 
made the argument that “a fragmented Internet that is divided by walls will inhibit 
the free exchange of ideas, increase business costs, stagnate job creation, and 
fundamentally disrupt our most powerful global resource”. The near non-existence of 
consumer initiated data sharing between platforms highlight this problem. Today, 
user contributed data are often locked in behind a service gateway that is connected 
to a platform user ID. An open flow of data implies that service discovery and service 
linking can be initiated by the data subject. The GDPR requires that the platform 
allows for transportation of personal data away from the platform (or service), but 
the GDPR does not force platforms to allow for the open flow of data to and from 
their platform. At the time of writing this thesis, many companies have implemented 
functionality for data subject initiated transfers of personal data and some even 
provide public API’s in anticipation of being compliant with the GDPR requirement 
on data portability. The requirement for platform companies to be compliant with 
the GDPR on data portability has perhaps become one of the most significant 
disappointments for entrepreneurs and privacy advocates alike.57 The opinion 
                                                            
57 See for instance Madge, R. (2017). GDPR: data portability is a false promise. Accessed 
5.11.2017 https://medium.com/mydata/gdpr-data-portability-is-a-false-promise-
af460d35a629 
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presented by the Article 29 WP (2013, p.47) promised what can be described as an 
open flow of personal data, the “direct access to their data in a portable, user-friendly 
and machine-readable format may help empower them, and redress the economic 
imbalance between large corporations on one hand and data subjects/consumers on 
the other”. In the analysis of the finalised Regulation the Article 29 WP (2016) 
concludes that only data that have been directly and actively provided by the data 
subject (including observations such as previous history) are to be portable and that 
the Regulation aims to produce interoperable systems, not compatible systems. 
This change in opinion certainly reflects some of the challenges that the legislator 
went through in the enactment of the GDPR. Although certain global platforms may 
need additional regulatory incentives, the GDPR was perhaps not the best place to 
include such platform specific legislation. With the exception of some global 
platforms, most organisations handling personal data today would likely struggle in 
implementing an open data flow. Thus, portability as an open data flow should be 
seen as a directional effort for the future, not as a lost cause. To consider the needs 
of start-ups and other new innovating ventures, the EU should continue to work 
towards the vision of open data flow. This will become an ever more important issue 
for the future with the introduction of intelligent services, such as personal digital 
agents. 
As stated earlier, many platform providers have or are beginning to open up 
portability APIs, but to achieve true data mobility we believe a clear legal 
requirement is a necessity. An initial step in regulating platforms is a mandatory 
separation of personal data storage activities and the platform service provider 
(processor) duties into separate legal entities, as this would create a possibility for 
actual personal data control. As considered in section 7.2, the transformation of IT-
architectures from centralised to decentralised, should be transferred to the 
platform business model as well. An abundance of providers will improve data 
subject privacy and markedly improve the start-up landscape in areas that are now 
dominated by incumbent platforms. That services of similar nature could conform 
to the same data-sharing standard is plausible from a technological perspective, but 
other interests (e.g. incumbent business and sovereign) have so far prevailed. As an 
example, current social network platforms share a common data structure, largely 
based on messages, user IDs, and relationships. Standardising such a social 
networking platform should be comparatively straightforward, compared to for 
example the standardisation efforts surrounding mobile communication networks 
such as 4G mobile networks. 58 However, standardisation will most likely not drive 
the centralised platforms towards an open data flow without a regulatory 
requirement, as this may also mean creating a competing decentralised business 
model whose popularity will be based on consumer trust and loyalty. It should be 
                                                            
58 Standardization efforts for social networks is currently ongoing in the W3C Social Web 
Working Group.  Accessed 5.11.2017 https://www.w3.org/wiki/Socialwg 
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noted that the problem described here is not connected with the existence of current 
platform companies, but rather in how their business model is defended. By 
transforming the current centralised platform business model, any of the current 
incumbent platforms can continue being successful, but this transformation to open 
up the processing silos will likely require Regulator intervention to transpire. In 
addition, consideration must also be given to the fact that the decentralised business 
model in itself may also develop to resemble the current centralised model without 
guidance. Thus a platform regulation that demands the open flow of data may have 
a positive influence for both the centralised and decentralised model in introducing 
trust as a key-design goal. The EU Commission has a long and often successful 
history in providing regulation aimed at opening a closed market; this can perhaps 
best be evidenced from the opening of the telecom sector. Continued focus by the 
EU Commission on open data flow in connection to platforms is needed. 
In an earlier section, we stated that the legislation sets unreasonable expectations 
on the data subject when it comes to managing given consent contracts. By 
separating the data storage activities into a separate legal entity, new service 
innovation can be established in personal data storage solutions (data store). In 
extension, this should lead to a generalised solution where service providers would 
allow any data store provider to provide the personal data store backend to a service. 
Then by using personal data store providers, consumers would have a natural way 
of storing and controlling all their consent contracts from a service. This solution 
allows the user to determine the service and security level in a much more fine-
grained fashion than today. If the data subject wants to continue with a similar setup 
that exists today it would be possible, a platform service provider would likely pay 
the potential transaction cost on the user’s behalf in return for non-restrictive access 
to processing the user’s data. Conversely, privacy-aware customers would have an 
option as well if they want to pay themselves. New business ventures could get access 
to personal data and thus compete on equal terms.  
To enable the vision of consumer initiated open data flows, identity management 
needs to be handled in a different way than today. Centralised identity management 
needs to give way to decentralised solutions. A federation-based decentralised 
authentication service is already in use for a worldwide roaming access service called 
Eduroam, where access is handled in a similar fashion to email identities “user (at) 
domain”.59 Eduroam was developed for the international research and education 
community. The EU project FutureID developed a decentralised system for 
exchanging user ID credentials between different Internet services (Bruegger and 
Roßnagel 2016). Javed et al. (2017) propose a framework for cross-domain identity 
and discovery to perform web calling services based on WebRTC. These three 
solutions are built on the premise of trust, however, but also trustless consensus 
                                                            
59 See https://www.eduroam.org/ for further details. Accessed 5.11.2017. 
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solutions based on distributed ledgers, such as the blockchain, have recently been 
proposed (Xia et al. 2017). These initiatives show that technology is becoming 
mature to support a more user controlled privacy scheme that would support data 
mobility between platforms and services. What is missing are incentives for 
incumbent platform providers to open up their platforms to decentralised services. 
Essentially, once a platform becomes a de-facto standard, a separation of the 
platform and the data store is needed to allow for continued competition in the field. 
User data can be moved in accordance with the original platform, while processing 
takes place in differentiated services. 
7.3.2. Resolutions to the Centralised Platform Concerns 
To define a future direction for Europe in how to deal with digital platforms, the 
thesis has followed Brynjolfsson and McAfee’s (2014) recommendation that we need 
to define “what we really value, what we want more of, and what we want less of”. 
We have made an argument for modifying the Data Protection rationale from a 
focus on the right for anonymity – towards a Data Protection rationale based on 
individual and active control. An insight gained has been that if we want to achieve 
a safe digital societal inclusion, we also need a bridge between privacy policies, 
business models, technology standards, and legislation. As highlighted throughout 
the thesis, these are currently often on opposite sides of each other, whereas a 
balance is the key to creating a digital society that people can trust. Below follow 
three resolutions for consideration in a future EU platform privacy regulation that 
we find would clarify the data subject’s position in regards to platform privacy 
issues, particularly so when intelligent services based on artificial intelligence 
become as commonplace as for example email is today. The ability for the data 
subject to choose between different providers of intelligent services, e.g. intelligent 
personal agents, and have them connect to the user-initiated open flow of personal 
data, will be key to a digital society that is trusted by the EU residents. The 
resolutions should also strengthen the competitive landscape, particularly with a 
focus on improving conditions and ability for new diversified digital ventures and 
start-ups to challenge incumbents. When the EU residents trust the digital 
environment, that business environment is also likely to grow at an even more 
advanced rate compared to an environment that is neither transparent enough nor 
allows for consumer choice. 
7.3.2.1. Resolution 1 – User lock-in 
One of the central resolutions of how platforms are regulated ought to be aimed at 
lessening the ability of incumbent global actors to lock-in the user base to their 
platform. Our motivation is to enable true competition and a selection of 
differentiated services. The de-facto platform monopolies create a dangerous future 
where a few companies can dictate or influence how the digital communities should 
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behave as well as follow up how they actually behave. Once again, considering 
intelligent services that may soon become so smart that they even act on our behalf, 
if we allow for an environment where there is only one platform offering a specific 
service, then everyone is required to conform to the behaviour of this service. One 
possible way to avoid this lock-in effect is to regulate the company-internal 
information sharing between all services with a public audience. Unless comparable 
public data sharing protocols (APIs) exist that conform to a sector-based standard 
(incl. service discovery, service linking, and data structure), any internal 
information sharing would not be allowed between said services. This, however, 
with the exception of some internal identity authentication and billing services that 
the company may not want to expose. These public data API´s must have the same 
service level in regards to reliability, extensiveness, and promptness as any internal 
information sharing protocol. 
Essentially this entails that for example a platform such as Facebook would not 
be allowed to share data subject generated data between e.g. WhatsApp and its other 
services without a public API (incl. service discovery, service linking, and data 
structure) for accessing the flow of user contributed data through the API. Argenton 
and Prüfer (2012) suggested a similar solution also for regulating search engines. 
Their argument was that the best way of dealing with Google’s dominant position 
in search engines, would be to force it to share its search data, such as previous user 
searches and clicks, as well as other important metrics. 
7.3.2.2. Resolution 2 – Authentication and data stores  
The second resolution we put forward is regarding identity authentication and data 
stores, essentially re-defining how, when, and why data are transmitted outside the 
data store. To limit the current unwanted tracking ability of data collection 
syndicates, we propose that any authentication and data storage of personal data is 
separated from other processing activities. By separating authentication and data 
store into a separate legal entity, it opens up for innovation in new types of 
decentralised authentication and data storage solutions. By requiring a monetary 
based (not data based) transaction cost for the identification service, paid either by 
data subject or intended service provider (controller), it will be possible to open up 
innovation for new types of services that offer alternatives to incumbent solutions 
that are built on the premise that cost is paid directly or indirectly in user data. 
By implementing a requirement for an external data store as the backend for 
personal data, the identification of users from other services must be addressed in 
order to define relations between individuals. The ability to contribute and act under 
a pseudonym can also be issued by the data store. Ullmann et al. (2015) 60 suggest a 
                                                            
60 Cryptographic algorithms exist for this purpose and have been suggested e.g. for broadcast 
purposes in the automotive industry to ensure privacy. For more information see: Ullmann et 
al. (2015). 
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cryptographically sound approach for handing out time-limited pseudonyms.  This 
approach could be extended to the data store that would offer data subjects 
pseudonyms, which could unlink provider control and sensitive data misuse by 
other parties, while the data store would still be able to store any historical records 
on the behalf of the data subject. Unlinkability of messages in a system means that 
the ability of the service controller (or attacker) to relate these messages to an 
individual do not increase by observing the system over time (Pfitzmann and 
Hansen 2010). We find it essential to assure an ability of sender anonymity and 
message unlinkability in regards to the controller; in case of misuse, authorities can 
still gain access to the true identity through the data store. The data store provider 
would thus be able to designate a pseudonym ID to a data subject upon request, 
which when used can have a certain level of similarity to the true User ID, but offers 
a way to obfuscate certain easily identifying details about the data subject. A data 
store would also likely be offering network services, e.g. virtual private network 
(VPN), in order anonymise access to a public network. The resolution above should 
also ensure that the ability of a controller profiling of children, intentionally or 
unintentionally, can be reduced. Device or browser fingerprinting may still be an 
issue, but in the case of the browsers ability to offer privacy settings or privacy modes 
that implements some obfuscation mechanism or reduces the information in the 
browser fingerprint so that the fingerprint can no longer be considered unique, 
should hinder unwanted tracking.  
7.3.2.3. Resolution 3 – Security and data protection policies 
The third resolution we are proposing is in respect to how security and data 
protection policies are reviewed. Achieving complete security is as improbable as 
achieving full anonymity; too many attack vectors exist to be able to mitigate them 
all separately. Nevertheless, the importance of dealing with security breaches in a 
proactive and reiterated fashion can never be overstated. The Regulation introduces 
a new role of a company-located data protection officer in addition to the 
supervisory authority. The role requires 1) expert knowledge of data protection law 
and practices, 2) being in a position to perform their duties and tasks independently, 
and 3) liaising with regulators over personal data breaches and 4) monitoring the 
performance of the data protection impact assessments of organisations. The data 
protection officer is a mandatory position in organisations that fulfil certain criteria, 
the role can initiate internal security and policy auditing and is a first and important 
step. The role, although not formally, may require a law degree for fulfilling the 
description of a data protection officer. The role is similar of a financial officer that 
also needs a formal financial reporting background. As stated earlier, we find there 
is a gap between the law and its practical implementation. Security and data 
protection technology are highly complex technological subjects. We find it 
improbable that a supervisory authority can markedly improve the consumers’ trust 
in IT-services on its own. To certify a company for how it handles security and data 
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protection requires in-depth engineering skills. We therefore propose a third party 
auditor role that periodically monitors security and data protection in companies. 
In practice, this would take the form of a compulsory and periodically returning 
review by auditing, in a similar fashion to a financial audit, where the auditor is 
responsible for expressing an opinion. The auditing opinion indicates that 
reasonable assurance has been obtained, that the statements as a whole are free from 
material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and that they are fairly 
presented in accordance with the relevant technological and legal standards (PWC 
2013). If it is found later on that an auditor neglects their legally stated duties they 
would be held liable as well. 
7.4. Discussion Summary 
The aim of the discussion has been to extract answers to the research questions 
posed. The underlying drive for the thesis has been to improve the understanding 
of the transformation that platforms have on the digital society, particularly so 
through the lens of the agreed upon human right to privacy of one’s private 
communications. Towards the end of the writing process, the focus has been on how 
trust can be achieved in the digital society. As earlier reported, nearly half of the 
population does not trust current solutions. Without the data subject’s trust, the 
deployment and uptake of coming intelligent services will become more difficult to 
achieve.  
7.4.1. Summary of Research Questions 
A summary of the answers to the research questions is presented below in the format 
of main key points, for the elaborated answers see the previous discussion. 
RQ1: What are relevant interpretations and ambiguities for information systems 
that can be derived from the GDPR, particularly in regards to such processing of 
personal data that leads to profiling and automated processing? 
 
 Two core information system design implications stemming from the GDPR 
is to ensure the implementation of the concepts of data minimisation and data 
protection by design and default.  
 
 These concepts have been shown to go against both the nature of today’s 
vertically integrated platforms and most importantly against the innovation 
intelligent services may bring.  
o The concepts offer a relevance for traditional standalone services that do 
not have the strategic aim of becoming a platform, but as for protection 
against growth-focused services and platforms the concepts offer rather 
miniscule protection.  
o These concepts should be updated to focus on a clear legal requirement 
for controllers to provide and maintain means for data subjects to actively 
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control the processing of personal data, including third-party transfers 
and processing that occur in relation to the platform.  
 
 The need for transparent processing, including transparent data transfers, 
manipulations, and removals, may be best met by an immutable forensic data 
storage solution, for example a distributed ledger.  
o Treating each corresponding data operation as a transaction and 
recording that transaction, offers an auditable record for forensic 
purposes and an approach for showing compliance to potential data 
subjects and the regulator. 
 
 Client-side processing and processing data on virtual identities have been 
identified as ambiguous areas in the GDPR.  
o The view presented here is that both methods should be bound by the 
GDPR, but in practice this is unlikely to occur.  
 
 From a data protection perspective client-side processing should be 
considered the preferred method for intelligent service provisioning. 
 
 The GDPR limits the use of information systems processing personal data that 
are using the following methods: 
o Fully autonomous agents or decision making. 
o Some machine learning algorithms, e.g. those trained with unsupervised 
learning or reinforcement learning methods, provide a difficulty in 
determining the behaviour of the algorithms and this may create a 
transparency problem. For example, unsupervised learning may contain 
clusters that represent information in an unsolicited manner, as clusters 
may be a synthesised product of special categories of personal data such 
as religion, race, sexuality, or health. Now the processor and/or controller 
may or may not know this as a fact, but this has a clear implication on the 
creation of profiles on data subjects. 
o Due to deep learnings sensitivity to training data tampering, assurances 
must be made of training data integrity, particularly when group learning 
is performed. 
o All machine learning techniques are also susceptible to stereotyping and 
bias due to the training dataset, and under/overfitting of the model, thus 
the use of these techniques requires assurances from the controller that 
output is not offending and that some transparency exist in regard to a 
resulting decision, e.g. which data have been used as input. 
RQ2: What future technical implications can “appropriate security”, defined as a 
legal requirement for lawful processing under GDPR, entail for scalable information 
system architectures? 
 
 As data protection is sometimes misunderstood as only dealing with misuse 
that occurs through malicious intent by the controller or processor, an aim of 
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the thesis is to broaden the discussion towards how security is handled in 
companies and to examine what should be considered appropriate security 
from a generalised technical perspective. 
 
 An important aspect of the GDPR is to address breaches of companies’ 
security and consequent leakage of their users’ personal data. A technology 
agnostic law that can stand the test of time, offers little guidance towards what 
measures should be taken to achieve compliance with the regulators 
intentions towards appropriate security.   
 
 Determining technological actions based on achieving an environment that 
ensures appropriate security, may be challenging for controllers, processors, 
and owners of information systems. The regulators focus on data security 
methods (e.g. data minimisation and privacy-by-design) is understandable, 
but from a technical perspective appropriate network security is just as 
important. The omission of what can be considered guiding network security 
principles in the GDPR should not lead to a lesser focus from companies on 
improving this aspect of their information systems. 
 
 GDPR recommends as a minimum precaution that personal data be 
pseudonymised before being stored, particularly if data are stored long-term. 
Where possible, the controller should try to anonymise data belonging to a 
special category. This implies for example that such traffic meta-data that is 
not needed for service personalisation, but where data can be used at a later 
stage for some other purpose, should be anonymised. 
o Meta-data describing, e.g. data source, access rights, and justification for 
lawful processing should be recorded along with the data when it 
becomes associated with a natural person. 
o Client-side processing, particularly profiling activities, may be more 
secure as data would only be stored in a readable format locally when 
needed, and that it otherwise remain encrypted (incl. an encrypted 
backup in the cloud). Thus, vulnerabilities to such systems would affect 
devices on an individual basis. However, in client-side processing the role 
of who, if anyone becomes processor, is ambiguous and leading to a 
difficulty in determining the requirement of lawful processing. Our view 
is that due to the added security, this type of processing is preferable in 
many cases, particularly for data from real-time based interactions that is 
used for the execution of machine learning models. 
o Machine learning algorithms usually needs data in an unencrypted form. 
Consequently, if a controller or processor is located in a third-party 
country without a data protection agreement with the EU and maintains 
root access to nodes, then any software stack can be considered unsecure 
for processing personal data. This applies to any type of node e.g. cloud, 
mobile, IoT or desktop. 
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 Integrating tools for big data analytics into the security workflow offers novel 
opportunities for detecting intrusions or unauthorised data access. 
Implementing an active network intrusion detection system based on 
machine learning techniques offers companies today a relatively effective way 
to improve security in their networks. Open-source big data analytics 
solutions offer a cost efficient way to improve security.   
o In our experimental MapReduce implementation of ELM we could 
determine that it scales horizontally and that it can be used for network 
intrusion detection with a relatively high success rate. Using the Hadoop 
tool, we also show that machine learning based intrusion detection using 
ELM can scale to large datasets using the MapReduce programing model.  
o An insight gained during our research is that the main challenge 
companies will likely face, is in determining what data should be recorded 
and how to label the training set to create a detailed and specific 
representation of potential threats the individual system can face. Rule-
based intrusion detection tools can be used as a first step in generating a 
company specific dataset. We also present an alternative method by 
designing and inserting data generators into web software installations. 
 
 We examine the research question as how to define “appropriate security” 
through the hardening of an installation of WordPress and the creation of an 
active intrusion detection methodology for the WordPress system. The focus 
of our study was on mitigating effects of automated scripting attacks. The 
active network security method presented offers the system administrator a 
path towards active defence against malicious attacks. Combining the use of 
data generators and analytics to create an active methodology should be 
particularly useful against fully automated attacks where the attacker is not 
targeting a specific system, but rather scans the Internet for any potential 
target. Furthermore, our data generator method offer machine learning based 
network intrusion detection a novel way to create labelled training data. This 
offers the opportunity of further exploration in the use of big data in network 
intrusion detection, defence, and forensics.   
RQ2.1: With focus on security in publicly accessible software, what is a viable 
technology basis for a scalable processing architecture? 
 
 The thesis has highlighted the currently ongoing shift in information systems, 
whereby centralised platforms are starting to shift toward their decentralised 
counterparts and technology is shifting from the monolith toward distributed 
architectures. 
o An objective with the research question is to understand the technology 
stack and methods behind big data analytics, as well as to elaborate design 
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concerns and security by implementing an architecture for a big data 
analytics processing tool. 
 
 The ability to create intelligent services using models based on machine 
learning techniques opens new business opportunities. If the intended use 
requires massive processing power, e.g. for individual model training or 
transfer learning per user, then this will require a massively scalable 
processing architecture.  
 
 The practical use of analytical systems typically require them to be scalable. 
One important factor to become scalable is the ability to grow the processing 
environment when required, and shrink the environment when resources are 
no longer needed. To achieve this elasticity, a public cloud is often used. This 
architecture opens the system to new network and data security threats that 
need to be mitigated, as reported for RQ2.  
 
 In our results we present an architecture suitable for processing spatio-
temporal data, including processing on both historical data-at-rest and 
streaming data. Our findings are that scalable processing architectures can be 
implemented efficiently through a generalised worker/master node 
architecture, where the master-node performs a type of scheduling duty. The 
architecture designed was modularised and this offers the ability to run these 
modules as self-contained microservices. 
o An important part of data security in the GDPR is data provenance, i.e. 
authenticity and integrity of data used for analytics, and this also applies 
to model output. An aim has been to investigate ways to achieve service 
integrity for model output as well, which can also be transferred to an 
autonomous production-level system. Thus the training process 
developed was fully automated by making use of both a verification 
dataset and an evaluation out-of-sample training dataset for calculating 
model error rate, whereas model output techniques such as ensembles, 
model selection, and model management (replacing bad models with new 
improved ones) were used to keep results stable and to improve results.  
 
 Scalable architectures for platforms can be implemented in various ways, e.g. 
as a centralised or as a decentralised system. Based on referenced examples, 
the monolith architecture may make it more difficult to monitor, to detect 
intrusions or other attacks, and to remediate attacks. The microservice may 
offer a better ability to compartmentalise security issues due to the modular 
nature and that each module has a well-defined role. Provided governance is 
decentralised then security governance should become more manageable. In 
Table 6 “Analytics-based Framework for Active Network Security” we present 
a solution for ensuring appropriate security in connection to RQ2.  
 
 The use of microservices can support the personalisation of intelligent 
services, this includes the ability to handle individualised back-end services 
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for client-side processing. Our explorative case study detailed a generalised 
modular design that can be autonomous and scalable to a large extent. The 
handling of scalability and security governance should remain in the 
microservice module. The initialisation and shutdown of microservices could 
for this purpose be connected to a decentralised external governance 
mechanism that also maintain billing, authentication, authorisation, and 
other core functions. For this reason we refer to the system as decentralised 
and not distributed. 
For RQ3: What is a potential future direction for EU privacy regulation in 
guiding the continued development of digital platforms? 
 
 The author considers the GDPR as a much-needed improvement to the 
current Directive and a great leap in comparison with many other countries’ 
legislations. However, the Regulation also includes a rationale based on 
anonymity that is impractical at best and unfeasible at worst. The Regulation 
may consequently be rather toothless in compelling and incentivising 
platforms to become transparent. 
o Introducing IoT into the home will in time digitise any personal 
experience occurring inside the walls of private property. The GDPR 
highlights the importance of data minimisation and privacy-by-design, 
hence the clash between the technological and legal views are obvious. 
Regulating digital platforms that offer intelligent services is important if 
we want to remain private in our own homes. However, anticipating the 
challenges is a very difficult task.  
 
 The centralised governance model is the common manifestation of the 
platform today and we discuss its challenges for society at large by being so 
effective and impeding nearly any competitive alternatives. We highlight the 
benefits of user initiated open data flow and the ability for data subjects to 
choose between multitudes of service alternatives. 
 
 Open data flow entails the innovative use of personal data stores that offer 
various additional methods for data subjects to improve their privacy, e.g. 
transparent data access records or a pseudonym identity service.  
o To create an environment for open data flows we propose three 
resolutions: break the lock-in ability of incumbents, unlinking 
authentication and data store from other processing activities, 
introducing mandatory and continuous security audits. 
 
 The existence of service alternatives will become an even more important 
issue when intelligent services, such as personal intelligent assistants, arrive 
en masse. Current processing silos maintained by many incumbent platforms 
are an impediment to a diversified development that guarantees start-ups 
equal opportunity and democratic rights for data subjects. 
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 To regulate the centralised platform's ability to sustain a processing silo we 
need to consider both the organisation and the logical communication. 
Requiring compatibility among systems in connection to the platform is the 
key to dismantling the processing silos and allow for decentralisation and true 
competition to occur. Similarly, when the EU Regulator considers how to 
introduce laws governing artificial intelligence, the first step is to solve how 
companies other than current incumbent platforms can get access to data. A 
proliferation of intelligent service providers is important if we value our 
democratic rights in the future. 
 
 The ability to construct decentralised platforms is not tied to the development 
of distributed ledger technology. The rapid development of distributed ledger 
infrastructure for constructing decentralised platforms has shown that the 
"code is law" principle is a complex proposition that needs more time to 
develop secure design patterns. Although it solves the trustless consensus 
dilemma elegantly, trust-based solutions will likely continue to be the drivers 
over the foreseeable future. Our resolutions do not make a distinction, but 
rather applies to both types of solutions. 
 
 At the time of writing we can but speculate that to achieve compliance with 
the GDPR, platforms will seek to establish lawfulness of processing through 
contracts. The stringent conditions that consent requires, will likely be 
reserved for processing special category data or profiling that leads to a legal 
effect. As stated, the ability for platform companies to create intelligent 
services will require complete past and present data in regards to the data 
subject, and for this equivocal purpose consent will be difficult to obtain. 
Thus, via a terms of service agreement seeking to establish lawfulness through 
contract, a platform company can obtain wide-ranging concessions to process 
personal data collected through the platform as it sees fit. 
 
 In the thesis we assume that the invasion of the data subject’s privacy is a 
measurable property and not a binary value. The measurable property can be 
an objective opinion of the courts, but the recommended approach is that it 
is a property determined through a subjective opinion of both the data subject 
and the controller. Determining a level of privacy violation or even the risk of 
a violation may be challenging, but to achieve trust between platforms and 
data subjects it is key to the future adoption of intelligent services. Trust as a 
key design goal has been presented as the means that the data subject can 
conveniently and actively participate in making processing of personal data 
transparent. For platforms this means that also processing made by third-
parties (e.g. app developers for smartphones) must be reported through the 
same platform in a convenient and user friendly manner. 
 
 The thesis has argued that data protection in relation to platforms should not 
focus purely on anonymity, but ought to examine data protection from a more 
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holistic perspective, as a function of a service objective. To return and retain 
the individual user´s trust in digital services, while maintaining the generative 
mechanisms needed to build tomorrow’s platforms that employs intelligent 
services, will require a platform privacy regulation that opens the processing 
silos of today. This can be achieved through the resolutions proposed to 
compel companies to introduce both an organisational and logical change. 
 
 The GDPR may even be strengthening the platforms with a large degree of vertical 
integration, as these platforms will be allowed to process personal data from each 
of the vertical layers, whereas others may not handle such personal data that is not 
directly connected with the contractual service offered. This should however not 
only be seen as criticism, but it may also offer the EU regulator an opportunity, a 
way to legally distinguish between platforms that deliver intelligent services and all 
other websites that may at some time handle personal data.  
7.4.1. Concluding Discussion 
Some may argue that the legislative process should be reactive and not anticipating in 
nature. The question of regulating platforms then becomes how much evidence is 
needed before the regulator may react. An independent source (Parse.ly 2017) 
summarises that Facebook and Google platforms combined currently have a direct 
influence over nearly 70% of where the internet traffic is directed.61 This in addition 
to the personal data they store on each user. As earlier stated Google considers its data 
collection efforts to reach over 90% of all Internet users. A former manager of 
Facebook tasked with ensuring user privacy, stated that the platform maintains no 
responsibility in regards to third-party developers when they overuse personal data 
on the platform and even arguing that it is not in Facebooks interests to care about 
such violations (Parakilas 2017). Thus, provided privacy and perhaps most 
importantly consumer choice is valued in our digital society, then opening the 
processing silos that constitute the platform business model is required. The proposed 
resolutions offer a starting point for this work, and as considered earlier there are 
many technical details that need to be agreed upon to achieve an open data flow.  
Distributed architectures and the decentralised platforms built upon these, will 
introduce their own set of problems that need to be analysed and solved in future 
research. Decentralised platforms and technology offers researchers completely new 
problems to investigate for the foreseeable future. Still, we take the position that 
centralised platforms are so effective and efficient that a new platform privacy 
regulation is needed to allow for new competing solutions to develop outside these 
platforms. The proposed shift in rationale should be on enabling data subject-
                                                            
61 Parse.ly's Network Referrer Dashboard provides insight into referral traffic to the 2500+ 
sites in Parse.ly's network of online media sites. 
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initiated open data flow. This will only be possible if companies, standards, 
technology, and legislation is developed in unison.  
The ability for the data subject to select providers for intelligent systems is of great 
importance if we value our democratic rights to form our own opinions. For example, the 
immersive environments of virtual reality and the prescriptive power of artificial 
intelligence will form future generations to come. Perhaps even to the degree of replacing 
certain educational institutions. To achieve prescriptive artificial intelligence, for example 
in the form of intelligent personal assistants, the models need complete access to the user’s 
past and present existence. If we value individualism, democracy, and a free market, then 
the personal data processing silos that platforms today exhibit, need to be removed. Here, 
it is important to understand that platforms by definition are markets that allow 
counterparties to trade. As earlier stated, this trade is not the problem; future markets 
should however be open for every market participant on equal terms. To achieve such 
markets, payment for any transaction needs to have a monetary value defined and not as 
today that insights from personal data are provided as a collateral trade. A transformation 
to monetary denoted payments also has an importance for society at large, for example 
the ability to tax these platform markets and for determining anti-competitive behaviour. 
At the moment taxable income from digital platforms offering “free to use” services are 
outside the scope of most European countries. Enabling an environment with monetary 
valued transaction costs offers many benefits, including opportunities for countries to 
collect tax based on consumption, just as in the physical society, and most importantly a 
cost for unnecessarily processing personal data. 
User-friendly Legal Science realises the qualitative approach of design science. The 
aim is to develop an interpretive understanding through a holistic approach to the 
subject, which should describe societal reality from different perspectives. Research 
questions should be sufficiently narrow and answers are to be developed through the 
hermeneutical circle to achieve a holistic view. User-friendly Legal Science suggests 
an observational method in order to explore an artefact in its environment, and here 
the primary artefact is the GDPR. The thesis as a whole is therefore based on a 
descriptive part and then combined with an interpretivist part that includes qualitative 
problem solving and technical case studies. User-friendly Legal Science thus involves 
both questions that are descriptive and normative. For theories that are descriptive, 
the test is in their coherence with the words of the statute and with factual judicial 
practice, while for theories that are normative, the ultimate test lies in the justice and 
reasonableness of their consequences (Peczenik 2005). The objective in the thesis is to 
establish the notion of trust as a key design goal for future information systems 
handling personal data. This has been achieved by not limiting the analysis to positive 
law or technology, but rather by providing a holistic view of the interconnectedness 
of law, economics, society, and technology. The hermeneutical circle is closed by 
delivering a de lege ferenda resolution connected to platforms and a technological 
framework to industry and information system researchers.  
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To know that we know what we know, and to know that we do not know what we do 
not know, that is true knowledge. 
 ― Nicolaus Copernicus  
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This doctoral thesis deals with and interprets the 
European Data Protection Regulation. The purpose 
of the dissertation is to establish the concept of 
trust as an important design goal for information 
systems that handle personal data. The interpreta-
tion is linked to the areas of analytics, security and 
privacy issues in the development of intelligent ser-
vices. The centralized platform model is identified 
as a challenge for the data protection regulation in 
realising an open Internet.
I föreliggande doktorsavhandling behandlas och 
tolkas den Europeiska dataskyddsregleringen. Syftet 
med avhandlingen är att etablera begreppet för-
troende som ett viktigt designmål för informations-
system som hanterar personuppgifter. Tolkningen 
kopplas till områdena analytik, säkerhet och integri-
tetsfrågor för utveckling av intelligenta tjänster. Den 
centraliserade plattformsmodellen identifieras som 
en utmaning för dataskyddsregleringen i förverkli-
gandet av visionen om ett öppet Internet.
